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Through mutual trade in goods and assets, economies become closer linked - integrated -
and this changes the way these economies react to their own and each other's economic
policy and disturbances. Recognising this, the countries may chose to enter into integration
arrangements which facilitate goods and asset trade and may permit co-ordinated action
in the policy sphere. A monetary integration arrangement unites more closely the monetary
systems of a number of countries, and this may be in the absence or presence of a broader
economic integration arrangement (for example a common market). This thesis examines
aspects of the integration arrangement known as the Common Monetary Area (CMA) ,
between South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland.
Chapter 2 outlines theoretical considerations of the desirability of monetary integration,
while Chapter 3 uses a model to analyse the effects of goods and asset market integration
on the economic policy and disturbance transmission of two countries. Chapter 4 describes
the institutional and historical setting of the CMA, as well as the reasons behind the
changes made to the legal arrangement in 1986. Chapter 5 presents a critique of an attempt
-to analyse the CMA as an optimal currency area, while Chapter 6 analyses the state of
broader economic integration over the CMA, and assesses its implications for monetary
integration. Chapter 7 addresses empirically the question of the degree of asset and goods
market integration and explains the implications for monetary integration, while chapter
8 analyses the situation of Botswana, a non-CMA member, to assess its importance for the
CMA and its relation to the debate surrounding the continued existence of the CMA.
The conclusion that is reached is that, given extant levels of goods and asset market
integration, the members of the CMA (especially the smaller members) would benefit from
greater joint policy making and policy co-ordination, Le. greater monetary unification.
iii
Except where specifically indicated in the text, this thesis is wholly my own work and has
not been submitted for a degree in any other university.
John Stuart
Durban, 2nd January 1992
iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would firstly like to thank my supervisor, Professor Merle Holden, whose idea the thesis
was in the first place, and who has advised, encouraged and assisted me throughout its
duration.
Secondly I would like to thank the following for their advice, help and constructive
criticism: Professor Gavin Maasdorp of the Economic Research Unit, Nick Wilkins La.
for the typestyling, presentation and printing of the final draft, and Nikki Cattaneo Jor
many helpful references. Thanks are also due to Gladson Kayira for exchange rate data.
The comments of an anonymous referee are hereby acknowledged.
Thirdly I would like to acknowledge the help of, and extend my thanks to, the staff of the
following libraries: Main Library and Economic Research Unit Library, University of
Natal; Rhodes University Library; the Reserve Bank Library, Pretoria, and Mrs J. McGee
of the William Cullen library, University of the Witwatersrand.








LIST OF TABLES xiv
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. xv
LIST OF ACRONYMS xvi
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1
1.1 GOAL OF THE THESIS
1.2 DEFINITIONS
1.3 THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS





CHAPTER 2 THE THEORY OF MONETARY INTEGRATION 5
2.1 INTRODUCTION
2.2 THE OPTIMAL CURRENCY AREA APPROACH
2.2.1 Real Characteristics
2.2.1.1 Labour Mobility








2.2.2.2 Inter-Regional Price and Wage Flexibility
2.2.2.3 Similar Inflation Rates
2.2.3 Policy Integration and Interdependence
2.2.4 A Critique of the OCA Approach









2.3.1 The Benefits of Monetary Integration 14
2.3.2 The Costs of Monetary Integration . 16
2.3.2.1 Loss of Control of Internal Balance 16
2.3.2.2 Loss of Monetary and Fiscal Policy Autonomy 17
2.3.2.3 Exacerbation of Regional Problems 18
2.3.2.4 Qualifications 18
2.4 MONETARY INTEGRATION AMONG DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 19
2.4.1 Goals and Formulae of Monetary Integration among LDCs 20
2.4.2 Recognising the Capacity for Monetary Integration 21
2.4.3 Appropriate Measures for Developing Countries 22
2.4.4 Costs and Benefits 23
2.5 THE SUB-OPTIMALITY OF AN EXCHANGE RATE UNION
VERSUS A FULL MONETARY UNION 26
2.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 31
CHAPTER 3 ASSET AND GOODS MARKET INTEGRATION IN AN
EXCHANGE RATE UNION: THE ALLEN-KENEN MODEL . 32
3.1 INTRODUCTION




3.3 THE ALLEN-KENEN TWO COUNTRY MODEL 35
3.3.1 A Summary 35
3.3.2 Production/Labour Market 36
3.3.3 Commodity Demand, Savings and Wealth 37
3.3.4 Government Consumption and Foreign Demand 38
3.3.5 Goods Markets 39
3.3.6 Household Asset Demand 39
3.3.7 The Central Bank 40
3.3.8 Reserve Settlements 40
3.3.9 Exchange Rates 41
3.3.10 Government Expenditure and Fiscal Policy 42
3.3.11 Asset Markets 42
3.3.12 Summarised Equations 43
3.4 ON SIMPLIFICATIONS AND SYMMETRIES 44
3.4.1 The Balance of Payments (BOP) 44
3.4.2 Propositions 45
3.4.3 Goods Market Symmetries 45
3.4.4 Asset Market Symmetries 45
3.4.5 Savings Functions 47
3.4.6 Bilateral Balancing 47
3.4.7 Crowding Out 47
3.5 COMPARATIVE STATIC RESULTS 47
3.6 THE EFFECT OF INTEGRATION ON MACROECONOMIC

















3.7 THE EFFECT OF INTEGRATION ON ASSET AND GOODS









A Shift in Demand for Bonds










CHAPTER 4 MONETARY CO-OPERATION BETWEEN
SOUTH AFRICA, LESOTHO AND SWAZILAND--- 74
4.1 INTRODUCTION




4.2.1 Aspects of the Monetary Systems of Developing Countries 75
4.2.2 The Monetary Systems and Recent Monetary Events
in South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland 77
4.2.2.1 Lesotho and Swaziland Prior to the RMA:
Common Arrangements 77




4.3 THE RAND MONETARY AREA AGREEMENT 87
4.3.1 A History of Money and Monetary Co-operation
in South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland 88
4.3.2 Reasons for the RMA Agreement 89
4.3.2.1 ;Lesotho and Swaziland 90
4.3.2.2 South Africa 90
4.3.3 Details and Provisions of the RMA Agreement 91
4.3.3.1 The Preamble 92
4.3.3.2 Article 1: Definitions 92
4.3.3.3 Article 2: Legal Tender 92
4.3.3.4 Article 3: Transfer of Funds
Within the Rand Monetary Area 92
4.3.3.5 Article 4: Access to the South African Capital and
Money Markets and Related Matters 92
4.3.3.6 Article 5: Gold and Foreign Exchange Transactions 93
4.3.3.7 Article 6: Compensatory Payments 93
4.4 THE NEW AGREEMENTS
4.4.1 Reasons for the Amendment of the RMA Agreement
4.4.2 Details and Provisions of the Amended Agreements
4.4.2.1 The Trilateral Amending Agreement
4.4.2.2 The Bilateral Agreement with Swaziland










CHAPTER 5 THE CMA AND OPTIMAL CURRENCY AREA THEORY 101
5.1 INTRODUCTION 101
5.2 The CMA in terms of OCA Theory 101
5.2.1 Labour Mobility 102
x




5.2.6 Similar Inflation Rates 106
5.2.7 Policy Integration 106
5.2.8 Political Agreement 107
5.3 CONCLUSION 107
CHAPTER 6 ECONOMIC INTEGRATION VERSUS
DISINTEGRATION IN THE CMA 108
6.1 INTRODUCTION 108
6.2 APPROACHES TO ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
AMONG DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 109
6.2.1 Factors Affecting the Success of Economic
Integration Among Developing Countries 109
6.2.2 The Goals of Economic Integration among
Developing Countries 111
6.2.3 Bloc Characteristics and the Success of Integration among
Developing Countries 113
6.2.4 Co-operation versus Integration Among Developing Countries 115
6.2.5 Conclusion: Integration among Developing Countries 116
6.3 ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND INTEGRATION
ARRANGEMENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 117
6.3.1 The Southern African Customs Union 117
6.3.2 The Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference 118
6.3.3 The Preferential Trade Area (PTA)




6.4.1 The Reduction of Dependence
6.4.1.1 Forms of SADCC Dependence on South Africa
6.4.1.2 Success of Dependence Reduction to Date









Prospects for Closer Co-operation and Integration
Enhancing Trade Links





6.5 THE ROLE OF THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN CUSTOMS UNION 134
6.5.1 The Position of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland
6.5.2 The Practicability and Desirability of











CHAPTER 7 THE EXTENT AND IMPLICATIONS OF GOODS
AND ASSET MARKET INTEGRATION IN THE CMA ... 143
7.1 INTRODUCTION
7.2 JUSTIFICATION FOR THE FOCUS ON SWAZILAND







7.3.2 Limitations Arising from the Adaption of the Model 145
7.4 THE MODEL 147
7.4.1 The Objectives of the Model 147
7.4.2 The Data 147
7.4.3 Asset Market Integration - Estimating The rr2 Curve 148
7.4.3.1 The Theoretical Relationship 148
7.4.3.2 The Estimated Relationship 152
7.4.3.3 Making Use of the Results 159
7.4.4 Goods Market Integration - Estimating the y'ly'l Curve 160
7.4.4.1 The Theoretical Relationship 160
7.4.4.2 The Estimated Relationship 161
7.4.4.3 Making Use of the Results 167
7.4.5 Conclusion to the Model 168
7.5 CONCLUSION 172
_CHAPTER 8 THE DEBATE FOR MORE OR LESS MONETARY
UNIFICATION: THE CMA OR FLEXIBILITY? 174
8.1 INTRODUCTION 174
8.2 SOUTH AFRICA'S FINANCIAL CRISIS 175
8.3 THE THEORETICAL CASE FOR FIXITY 176
8.4 THE CASE OF BOTSWANA 178
8.4.1 The Nature and Implications of Botswana's Economy
8.4.2 The Realities of Botswana's Flexible Exchange Rate
8.4.3 Botswana's Monetary Independence: Qualifications





8.5.1 The Case For Withdrawal






CHAPTER 9 CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 192
9.1 SUMMARY OF THE STUDY









Table 3.1 Impact Effects Under a Flexible External Exchange Rate 49
Table 3.2 Steady-State Effects Under a Flexible External Rate 49
Table 6.1 Black Foreign Workers in South Africa, 1978-1986 125
Table 6.2 Direction of SADCC Trade, 1985 ($ million) 130
Table 7.1 Asset Market Regression Results 156
Table 7.2 Goods Market Regression Results 164
Table 7.3 Swaziland Monetary Trends: 1984 - 1990 170
Table 7.4 Swaziland Monetary Trends: December 1989 - March 1990 171
Table 8.1 Key Economic Variables for 10 African Countries 179
Table A.1 Goods Market Data for the Regression Sample (Original) 196
Table A.2 Goods Market Data for the Regression Sample (Transformed) 197
Table A.3 Asset Market Data for the Regression Sample 198
Table A.4 Miscellaneous Data: Price Indices and Inflation Rates 199
LIST OF FIGURES
xv
Figure 3.1 Asset market effects of an open-market purchase of either bond 51
Figure 3.2 Goods market effects of an open market purchase of either bond 51
Figure 3.3 Individual asset market effects of an open market purchase
of the Northern bond 54
Figure 3.4 Effects on individual goods markets of Northern deficit spending
and a tax cut 59
Figure 3.5 Effects on individual goods markets of a balanced budget
increase in Northern spending on both goods 59
Figure 3.6 Individual policy reaction curves for levels of deficit
spending required to achieve short run income targets 61
Figure 3.7 Goods market effects of a balanced-budget increase in
Northern spending on the Northern good 63
Figure 3.8 Asset market effects of a balanced-budget increase in
Northern spending on the Northern good 63
Figure 3.9 Asset market effects of an increase in the supply of the
Northern bond resulting from Northern budget deficit 66
Figure 3.10 Goods market effects of an increase in the supply of the
Northern bond resulting from a Northern budget deficit 66
Figure 3.11 Effects on asset markets of an increase in the foreign
interest rate 68
Figure 3.12 Effects on nominal income of an increase in the foreign
interest rate 68
Figure 3.13 Goods market effects of a shift in demand from the foreign
good to the Northern good 71
Figure 3.14 Goods market effects of a shift in demand from the Southern
good to the Northern good 71
Figure 8.1 Botswana nominal and real exchange rates against South
African rand 182
Figure A.1 Actual versus Fitted Swaziland Interest Rate 200
Figure A.2 Residual Plot of SWINTR Regression 200
Figure A.3 The r2r2 Scatter 201
Figure A.4 Actual versus Fitted Swaziland Real GDP 201
Figure A.5 Residual Plot of SWGDPR Regression 202





































Republic of South Africa
South Africa
Southern African Customs Union
Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference




1.1 GOAL OF THE THESIS
The goal of this thesis is to elucidate the viability of the Common Monetary Area (CMA)
between South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland in order to be able to make recommend-
ations about its future. Specifically, the thesis attempts to reach a conclusion about the
viability and desirability of the current set of arrangements in the light of theoretical and
empirical considerations, in order to enable judgements to be made about the desirability
of either increased or decreased monetary unification in future.
1.2 DEFINITIONS
There appear to be at least two interpretations of the term 'monetary integration', and it
is necessary to define it in the sense it is used in this thesis. The first interpretation is that
used by Corden (1972), who understands it as a term describing an institutional or legal
monetary link between states. Whilst Corden defines this institutional~ structure as an
exchange rate union, others are more flexible, defining monetary integration in terms of
a variety of institutional arrangements. Kafka (1969) defines monetary integration as "any
arrangements under which the effects of the existence of separate currencies merely
approach, more or less, the existence of a single one" (p.135). Thus Kafka allows for a
degree of monetary integration, implying that the term does not apply fixedly to any single
type of arrangement. Gros (1989) suggests that since there are different interpretations of
the term 'monetary union', "there are different degrees of monetary integration that
approximate to different degrees of this definition of monetary union" (p.219). These
different interpretations of 'monetary union' will be examined and explained in the
following chapter, so that their importance for the task at hand might be better understood.
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Suffice to say that, for now, the term 'monetary integration' will be understood to imply
some form of legal arrangement that two or more sovereign countries enter into to unite
more closely their monetary systems.
The second interpretation of the term refers to the state of two or more countries which
are closely financially linked. This 'financial linking' involves a high degree of
substitutability between the assets of the countries, such that their interest rates and asset
prices move closely together. This interpretation will not be used here, since the Allen-
Kenen model, which the thesis makes extensive use of, defines this state rather as "asset
market integration" (AlIen and Kenen, 1980, p.14). Use will also be made of the term
'goods market integration' which is understood to imply a high degree of substitutability
between the goods of two or more countries.
It is important to note that the first interpretation refers to an actual legal arrangement,
while the second encompasses extant linking between countries' financial systems
regardless of the legal arrangement or exchange rate regime. The idea that the latter may
exist regardless of the degree of the former is an important one for this thesis, since it will
be shown later that existing asset and goods market integration often necessitate a formal
integration arrangement due to their limiting effects on the independent functioning of
economic policy. To avoid confusion, the practice here shall be to refer to the first
interpretation as 'monetary unification' and the second as asset market integration. Where
the term 'monetary integration' is used, however, the first interpretation- will be applied
to it.
1.3 THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS
A brief outline of the nature, purpose and methods of research of each chapter follows:
Chapter 2: The Theory of Monetary Integration
This chapter will review the literature on monetary integration in general, with specific
attention to developing country monetary integration. It will also include a section on the
relative merits of the degree of monetary integration in the light of more recent
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contributions to the debate. The advent of monetary integration in Europe has spawned
substantial contributions to the debate, and many of these are used in the chapter. The
purpose of this chapter is thus to introduce the debate around monetary integration, point
out the direction of its development and emphasis and establish its relevance to the task
at hand.
Chapter 3: Asset and Goods Market Integration in an Exchange Rate Union
This chapter will focus the analysis of monetary integration by describing a theoretical
model and observing its functioning under a variety of conditions. The purpose of the
chapter is to provide a theoretical basis for an ultimate empirical investigation into the
CMA situation.
Chapter 4: Monetary Co-operation between South Africa, Lesotho and
Swaziland
This chapter examines the historical, institutional and legal background of the CMA, and
provides a functional summary of the agreement itself. The reasons behind the advent of
the agreement are discussed in detail, as well as the changes that were made to it and their
reasons. The purpose of this chapter is to put the agreement in historical and institutional
perspective and to uncover the problems it entails for the smaller countries - Lesotho and
Swaziland.
Chapter 5: The CMA and Optimal Currency Area Theory
An attempt was made recently to analyse the CMA in terms of the optimal currency
approach, one of the theoretical paradigms examined in Chapter 2. This chapter discusses
the weaknesses of this study and indicates why an alternative approach must be used. Its
purpose is thus both to describe and criticise the study and also to hint that another
solution is required.
Chapter 6: Economic Integration versus Disintegration in the CMA
Antecedent to monetary integration is broader economic integration - the relations that
govern trade and infrastructural links, among others, between countries. The CMA
overlaps with two arrangements relevant to economic integration (although only one is a
true integration arrangement) - the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the
4
Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC). The purpose of this
chapter is to describe the nature, functioning and success of these arrangements as well as
their relation to one another. Their implications for monetary integration can then be
ascertained.
Chapter 7: The extent and Implications of Goods and Asset Market
Integration in the CMA
Without a quantitative assessment of the actual degree of integration between the members
of the CMA, pronouncements and recommendations about the viability and desirability of
the monetary union would lack credibility. Therefore the purpose of this penultimate
chapter is to attempt to add empirical weight to, and confirm, the fmdings of earlier
sections of the thesis on the practicability of the union. This is achieved by applying the
model of Chapter 3 to the CMA in order to assess the degree of asset and goods market
integration. The implications for the CMA can then be established.
Chapter 8: The Debate for more or less Monetary Unification: The CMA
or Flexibility?
The absence of Botswana from the CMA and its apparent monetary autonomy poses an
interesting question: would Swaziland and Lesotho be better off outside the CMA and with
a greater degree of flexibility between their currencies and the rand? This chapter attempts
-to answer ,this question by analysing the nature and implications of Botswana's monetary
autonomy and then assessing the relative merits and demerits of continued CMA
membership, by Swaziland and Lesotho, or otherwise.
1.4 THE USE OF THE THESIS
The overall purpose of the thesis is to enhance the understanding and appreciation of an
important integration arrangement in Southern Africa. It will thus be of use both to other
academics interested in the field and as a tool for policy makers involved in the area of
monetary integration and policy. Few integration arrangements in Africa have endured,
and for this reason the CMA is especially important - it can provide valuable lessons for






This chapter is divided into three major parts. Firstly, Secti<?ns 2.2 and 2.3 deal with the
two 'traditional' approaches to the study of monetary integration. The first of these
approaches, which has been termed the 'optimal currency area' (OCA) approach, attempts
to single out one or more characteristics of a region that would indicate the desirability or
preferability of a 'currency area' over that region - i.e. a common currency unit. l The
second which I will call the 'net benefit' approach, is a more pragmatic approach in that
it bases the decision for a currency area on foreseen costs and benefits of currency areas,
rather than attempting to deal with the more abstract and less identifiable 'characteristics'
of the OCA approach. There is a need to look at both approaches since the theoretical
argument that is developed in this thesis incorporates elements of both: the OCA approach
is essentially concerned with estimating the extent to which two or more independent
currency areas resemble a single country (in economic terms) and thus warrant a single
currency; the net benefit approach primarily emphasises the loss of policy autonomy
associated with monetary unification. The analysis in Chapter 3 draws on elements of the
logic of both since it develops an analysis of the loss of economic autonomy against the
background of the existence of high levels of economic integration. In other words, the
fact that the degree of economic autonomy (or lack of it) is dependent on the degree of
economic closeness (integration) between two or more regions, is recognised.
The second major part of this chapter, Section 2.4, examines considerations specific to
monetary integration among developing countries, and thus provides insights into the issues
1. The first to coin the term 'optimum currency area' was Robert A. Mundell in "A Theory of Optimum
Currency Areas", American Economic Review, Vol 51, September 1961.
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affecting especially the two less developed members of the CMA - Lesotho and Swaziland.
This section could thus point to potential conflicts of interest in the CMA between the less
and more developed nations.
Finally, Section 2.5 sketches an argument for full monetary union where monetary
integration has been embarked upon by nations. It is shown here that any 'lower' form
of monetary integration is always inferior to full monetary union, i.e. a common currency
and a union central bank. These lessons are carried into later chapters.
2.2 THE OPTIMAL CURRENCY AREA APPROACH
The discussion of 'characteristics' is divided between 'real' or non-monetary characteristics
and monetary characteristics. This is consistent with the Chapter 3 analysis where a
distinction is made between goods market and asset market factors. In addition a third
'characteristic' is examined - that of the level of existing policy integration.
2.2. 1 Real Characteristics
2.2. 1. 1 Labour Mobility
Mundell (1961) cites labour mobilliy as~ost important determinant of an OCA. It
facilitates adjustment between regions and prevents economic slowdown because it implies-- -- --
~mployment equalisation over areas which, in its absence, would be characterised by
extremes of high and low employment. In support, Scitovsky (1969) explains the wage
equalising function of labour mobility: unions will not push for unrealistically high wages
if there is the threat of an influx of labour from surrounding regions in response. Thus
labour mobility keeps employment and wages consistent over areas in which it is
significant and makes regions in a currency area better able to adjust to payments
imbalances between themselves.
However, the usefulness of labour mobility as an adjustment mechanism is doubted by
Lanyi (1969) and Corden (1973) among others. Their main objection is an important and
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somewhat obvious one: that labour is simply not mobile over any considerable distance,
even within countries, and cannot be expected to become so in the near future.
2
Continents, even regions are too culturally, racially and climatically diverse to permit this.
They argue instead that economic adjustment by exchange rate change or macroeconomic
policy is still far more viable.
2.2.1.2 Degree of Openness
A country is defined to be more 'open' the greater the proportion of tradeable to non-
tradeable output.3 A high degree of openness between regions has been suggested as an
important criterion for currency area formation and it is especially important for this thesis
because of its relation to goods market integration. While they do not imply the same
thing, it can be argued that they are positively related in that increasing openness would
conceivably foster increasing integration while a high level of integration would imply a
high degree of trade between countries and thus high mutual openness.
McKinnon's (1963a) argument for currency area formation between open countries is
based on the ineffectiveness of exchange rate adjustment between such countries. In the
first place, he argues, exchange rate adjustment would cause sympathetic price adjustment
among tradeables in order to maintain competitiveness in the face of high foreign demand
elasticities.4 The price instability resulting from exchange rate fluctuation would impact
negatively on the economy and reduce the worth of such exchange rate adjustment as
openness increased. Alternatively, price stabilisation would require non-tradeable sector
deflation, also with a high economic cost. Secondly, with the high marginal propensity
to import associated with a high degree of openness, any exchange rate variation will
become tantamount to price variation and thus spark off pressure for wage adjustment to
maintain real wages. When wages are adjusted, any advantage bestowed on a trade deficit
country by a depreciation will be mostly removed, since expenditure on imports can
2. The example Corden uses encompasses the E.C. countries, but his argument seems universal and
compelling. Labour mobility of any significance cannot be expected over areas of cultural and racial
diversity.
3. This definition is accepted by Tower and Willett (1976) and McKinnon (1963a).
4. These high foreign elasticities imply a further characteristic of the area in question: that it is small in
the context of the world.
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continue unabated. Thus there is a low level of 'exchange rate illusion' associated with
open countries. The ineffectiveness of the depreciation is reinforced by another effect -
that of the low import elasticities associated with more open economics. The lower these
elasticities the greater the exchange rate adjustment required to alter real expenditure by
a given amount. Orcutt (1955) makes the same point in respect of the usefulness of
exchange rate adjustment under openness.
Further, Machlup (1966, p.40) points out that openness reduces the employment impact
of tight financial policy and thus justifies policy adjustment rather than exchange rate
adjustment to disturbances. Tight policy affects import demand more as openness
increases and thus less of the negative affects of the deflation are felt locally. Instead, the
tight policy is translated into effective balance of payments (BOP) adjustment.
Tower and Willett (1976, p.41) note that openness serves, through its effects on spending
and the BOP to increase competition and 'spread' disturbance adjustment within a currency
area. It will be found in Chapter 3 that the same conclusion applies for an increase in
goods market integration.
A further argument for the ineffectiveness of exchange rate adjustment in open areas is put
forward by Tower and Willett (1976, p.44). They give three reasons why a devaluation
would increase expenditure and thus, through the multiplier, nullify its BOP effect.
Firstly, they argue that local wealth will increase more for devaluation the greater is the
level of openness. This follows from the fact that wealth holders in open countries are
likely to hold a larger proportion of foreign assets than otherwise to minimise the risks
involved in the purchasing power fluctuations common to open economies (this follows
from McKinnon's first point). Secondly, wealth will also increase for a devaluation
through the devaluation's effect on the stock of physical capital, the value of which will
rise if it is mostly imported. These wealth effects can be expected to stimulate
expenditure, regarding any BOP improvement. Finally, Tower and Willett point out that
investment expenditure can also be expected to rise for a devaluation if imported
investment goods make up a large proportion of investment and if investment plans are
relatively fixed.
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McKinnon's (1963a) argument has been criticised on two points. Firstly, Corden (1972)
'1't ~gues that McKinnon' s idea of the price instability of exchange rate variation is
~onditional on the assumption of external, or world price stability. If external price
instability is the case then flexible rates are more desirable. Secondly, McKinnon has not
demonstrated that there is a positive gain in adopting fixed exchange rates, only that the
. " ..... ,
. cost of their adoption is less.
',-
~ .
In conclusion, however, it must be accepted that in general, openness (and hence







'Financial integration' is defined in terms of financial capital mobility. The more mobile
capital is between regions, the higher the degree of financial integration. Further, 'mobile'
in this context refers to the inter-regional interest elasticity of investment: the higher it is
the more 'mobile' is the capital. Thus as financial integration increases, inter-regional
interest rate movements must of necessity become closer, and closer 'financial integration'
in this sense is entirely compatible with the concept of asset market integration used in
Chapter 3.
Certain writers have argued that high financial integration between areas will facilitate
adjustment to payments imbalances and thus reduce the need for flexible exchange rates.
Scitovsky (1969) suggests that adjustment is achieved by wealth transferral less painfully
the higher is the degree of capital mobility. This is because the transfer of assets required
to correct imbalances is achieved with less price and interest rate adjustment in either
country. Further, Ingram (1962) specifies that integration should apply to long-term
securities if this means of adjustment is to have any meaningful effect. If capital flows are
mostly short-term, the regions will lack the fundamental asset market structure required
to produce meaningful capital flow adjustment, since short-term securities are transferred
too readily and their holding depends on short run interest rate fluctuations. Thus there
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may exist no true link between the asset markets of countries, albeit that short-term
integration is apparent.
The criterion of financial integration is not accepted by all as a compelling reason for
currency area formation. Fleming (1971) argues that, under fixed rates and in the absence
of exchange control, high capital mobility may lead to harmful speculative short-term
capital flows which aggravate inflation or depression conditions. This will be the case
where changes in desired investment exceed or fall short of changes in desired saving,
exacerbating inflationary or demand deficient conditions.
Ishiyama (1975) points out a further problem with capital flow adjustment: that o( the
possibility of a lack of sufficient acceptable assets to enable capital flows of the required
magnitude. This argument is, however, subject to empirical qualification.
Finally, Tower and Willett (1976) make the point that the existence of endogenous capital
mobility may not be in itself so important as the ability of monetary and fiscal authorities
to create and influence capital flows. Thus they imply that what is essential is the
existence of asset markets structured to permit high capital mobility rather than the pre-
existence of self-propelled capital flows themselves. In this they raise the question that
Ishiyama raised earlier; again, it has an empirical answer.
2.2.2.2 Inter-regional Price and Wage Flexibility
In the absence of exchange rate flexibility, some other method of relative real income
adjustment is required to promote payments adjustment. Capital mobility has already been
examined as one method, and labour migration is an indirect way of achieving the same
thing. Tower and Willett (1976) suggest another: the presence of wage and price
flexibility across regions. Through wage and price adjustments, it is possible to effect a
change (increase or decrease) in the real income of a region relative to another without
changing the apparent real income within the area and thus minimising the consumption
and employment costs. The relative change in real income will force a change in import
expenditure, correcting the payments imbalance in the desired direction. For example, a
worsening trade balance due to declining export demand will be favourably reduced if
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prices rather than outputs in the export sector drop and translate through to the rest of the
economy as a decline in aggregate demand (through the affects of export sector wage
reductions). 5 The decline in aggregate demand will then hopefully effect a reduction in
imports, although imports need not decline by as much as the initial imbalance if foreign
export demand is reasonably elastic (since part of the deficit will be removed by the
increase in export demand).
Although the existence of price and wage flexibility appeals intuitively as a substitute for
exchange rate flexibility, it is unfortunately not of much use here. Since the intention here
is to examine goods market integration, it is necessary to look at cases in which inter-
regional prices become even more inflexible due to the increasing degree of substitutability
between goods as goods market integration increases. In Chapter 3 this will be examined
in more detail.
2.2.2.3 Similar Inflation Rates
The argument that candidates for a currency area should have similar rates of inflation is
-based on the assumption that the primary cause of payments imbalances is due to
differences in such rates. Fleming (1971) and Haberler (1970) ascribe to this view,
suggesting that the imposition of fixed exchange rates in the absence of close inflation rates
would lead to imbalances. Behind divergent inflation rates lie differences in monetary
expansion, trade union pressure and structural factors, implying that these factors should
show compatibility between regions if a viable currency area is to be established.
While the logic behind the argument is compelling, it may not be an important one if
inflation rate equalisation is relatively easily achieved, as is suggested by Parkin (1972). 6
Parkin argues that the primary cause of inflation rate divergence is differential monetary
expansion and, since he believes in a high level of price and wage flexibility, he therefore
suggests that inflation rate equalisation is easily accomplished. This argument, if valid,
5. Interestingly, the more open the economy the larger will be the export sector and thus the more
effective price and wage flexibility. This is another argument for openness.
6. The question of inflation rate equalisation and its costs are more thoTOugWy examined in Section
2.3.2.1.
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would tend to de-emphasise the problem of divergent inflation rates. The related question
of whether departure from a chosen point on the Phillips curve imposes high costs on
currency area candidates is addressed in the following section.
2.2.3 Policy Integration and Interdependence
Most writers have recognised that macroeconomic integration as well as policy integration
which "promotes competition, makes financial markets more efficient and removes barriers
to factor mobility" (Tower and Willett, 1976, p.46) is not only desirable but ultimately
necessary for a successful currency area. Ingram (1969) and Haberler (1970) argue that
similar attitudes to problem solution and policy formation are as important as any of the
economic characteristics studied. Further, Tower and Willett (1976) emphasise the
importance of regional development policy co-ordination: redistribution to depressed areas
should be combined, where possible, with programs encouraging factor migration, so that
economic homogeneity in welfare and income is promoted within the currency area.
What seems antecedent to policy co-ordination within a currency area is the issue of
agreement of problem and policy attitudes among currency area candidates. However, a
high degree of policy interdependence (due possibly to high goods and asset market
integration) may preclude the option of first determining whether candidates agree on
policy co-ordination. They may have no choice but to co-ordinate their policies, given a
high level of integration, and the question then becomes one of 'the how' not 'the why'
of policy integration. Policy interdependence between integrated areas is examined closely
in Chapter 3, where it is examined as an argument for total policy co-ordination -
monetary and fiscal unification.
Fleming (1971) discusses some of the conceivable problems of policy integration, one of
these being the requirement of symmetry of problems between regions. If problems do
not complement each other - for example a depressed/deficit region and an inflated/surplus
region - then policy clashes may result, eventually exacerbating conditions. Again, it will
be possible to look more closely at policy integration and its effects using the model of
Chapter 3.
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Finally, Ishiyama (1975) raises the issue of the political aspects of policy co-ordination.
The surrender of political power required to make monetary and fiscal unification work
is often considered too severe by national authorities. This is why a full monetary union
is often foregone in favour of an exchange rate union - which often proves to be a sub-
optimal option. This issue of the degree of unification is one of the more important
questions addressed in the analysis in Chapter 3.
2.2.4 A Critique of the OCA Approach
Before proceeding to examine the alternative approach to monetary integration some of the
shortcomings of the OCA approach which seem to justify an alternative will be looked at.
Ishiyama (1975) has pointed to four major problems which are examined in turn.
The first is one of the emphasis of the OCA approach - being on the ineffectiveness and/or
uselessness of flexible exchange rates rather than on the positive gains supposedly arising
from the creation of a currency area. The alternative approach does, however, fill this
deficiency. Secondly, it is not specific about the nature of disturbances (in terms of cause,
magnitude, duration and frequency) and lacks explicit models. For present purposes, these
aspects will be taken care of by the model of Chapter 3, which is capable of supporting
analysis of cause, duration and frequency as well as magnitude (to a limited extent) of
disturbances. The model is also not limited to analysing microeconomic disturbances (for
example, shifts in demand) which is Ishiyama's third objection to the traditional approach,
but is capable of handling macroeconomic disturbances and fluctuations as well (for
example, differential rates of monetary expansion).
Finally, and importantly, the OCA approach fails to make explicit the benefits attainable
from currency area membership. Thus a proper comparison and evaluation of membership
versus non membership is not possible. Again, the alternative approach suggested by
Ishiyama is able to fill this deficiency in the OCA approach.
Something more might be said about the nature of the OCA approach - it might be too
abstract both in terms of the 'optimality' notion and in terms of the characteristics it
attempts to identify. If one is faced with the problem of a dissolving exchange rate union
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one may achieve better results by looking at macroeconomIc fluctuation and its
consequences within the union than by attempting to estimate labour mobility or financial
integration for example.? Thus the OCA approach is of limited use by itself, it apparently
requires use in conjunction with an alternative approach which is able to emphasise
important issues that it cannot. This alternative approach is examined next.
2.3 THE NET BENEFIT APPROACH
2.3. 1 The Benefits of Monetary Integration
The most popular argument for a common currency has been put forward by Mundell
(1961), Aliber (1972), Tower and Willett (1970 and 1976) and Grubel (1970) among
others. It is simply this: that a common currency reduces transaction costs of currency
conversion and uncertainty about exchange rate fluctuations and thus enhances allocative
efficiency. It is also optimum store of value due to the large domain over which it
commands goods and service. Grubel (1970) argues that larger and more efficient markets
could grow under a common currency due to the removal of the uncertainty and cost of
currency conversion and the improvement in allocational efficiency that it bestows.
Further, Mundell (1961) and Kenen (1969) argue that the usefulness of money declines
under flexible rates for smaller and more open economies and thus recommend a common
currency between such areas. Kenen explains that due to their lack of economic
diversification, low import and export demand elasticities, and higher propensities to
import, small open countries are more liable to suffer from exchange rate instability under
flexible rates. Further, there is the problem of speculative capital flows; the small asset
markets of these countries would make them easily influenced by a small number of
speculators who would be able to reap gains by speculating in forward markets when
exchange rate fluctuations are expected. These fluctuations will then be exacerbated,
forcing a larger change and destabilising the economy. 8
7. This suggests the approach taken in this thesis.
8. Again, one encounters an argument for currency area formation among small, open economies.
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A third argument for monetary unification centres on the expected increase in goods and
asset market integration that it would foster and the resultant improvement in resource
allocation, economies of scale and growth (see Kindleberger, 1972). There are some
doubts, however, that increased integration would remove the need for exchange rate
change although it has made such change more difficult (Oppenheimer, 1974).
Mundell (1973) and Kafka (1969) point out an obvious gain that can be expected to arise
from a common currency - that of reserve minimisation due to reserve pooling. A smaller
quantity of reserves is needed in a common currency area than the sum of the individual
amounts since disturbances that previously affected each country individually are now more
likely to offset each other. If reserve requirements are minimised, allocative efficiency
must improve as those funds can be invested where most productive. Kafka points out,
in addition, that reserve savings can also be made on intra-area trade by the granting of
credit between currency area members.
There are also non-economic arguments for currency area formation, specifically those
referring to political and institutional benefits from formation. Williamson (1976) argues
that currency area formation encourages and enables fiscal and policy integration;
Lamfalussy (1976) holds that it will give regions more diplomatic leverage. It is generally
believed, however, that fiscal integration is a far more difficult step than monetary
integration and requires a great deal of effort and sacrifice by the countries involved.
Fiscal integration will be discussed at the end of Chapter 3, where the implications of
goods and asset market integration for monetary and fiscal unificatio?1 are debated.
The issue of speculation and its minimisation under fixed rates has been critically
addressed by Ishiyama (1975), who points out the possibility of continued speculation
within the currency area if an adjustment in parity between one of the countries and the
others becomes necessary. This possibility cannot be ruled out, particularly as
"irrevocably fixed exchange rates are hard to imagine among nations" (p.363). Tower and
Willett (1976), in emphasising the reserve gain to be made from currency area formation,
qualify their argument by pointing out that the same arguments for currency area reserve
saving may be made in arguing for flexible rates. Thus at least two of the 'benefits' from
currency area formation are not undisputed or free of problems.
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2.3.2 The Costs of Monetary Integration
2.3.2. 1 Loss of Control of Internal Balance
The fact that the creation of a currency area might lead to a loss of control over internal
balance was pointed out by early critics of monetary integration - among them Fleming
(1971) and Corden (1972). Corden's argument recognises the fact that inflation rate
equalisation is required between members of a monetary union but that its achievement
will, in the presence of Phillips curve relationships, require departure from the optimal
inflation/unemployment position for at least some of the members of a monetary union.
Departure from optimal inflation/unemployment positions will always occur when nations
have different Phillips curve relationships - reflecting structural differences between them.
They may also have different preferences as regards the acceptable amount of
unemployment and concomitant inflation, but if their Phillips curves are different it will
not matter if they do agree on the acceptable level of either unemployment or inflation,
the other variable (inflation or unemployment) will still have to change.
..
Two situations exist in which a country will not have to sacrifice employment for inflation
rate equalisation. The first is trivial: if one of the countries dominates politically or
economically it may be able to maintain its own inflation rate and force less influential
-countries to equalise theirs with it. This situation does not offer much hope for the
monetary union as a whole, however, since overall unemployment will still change and
other countries will have to suffer the welfare losses of departing from their preferred
Phillips curve positions.
Secondly, it may be possible to alter growth rates of nominal after-tax wages or growth
rates of productivity, which would then change the Phillips relationships so that inflation
rates could be equalised with no change in unemployment (De Grauwe, 1975). This could
be achieved by fiscal transfers with wage taxes in low inflation countries and subsidies in
high inflation countries. Alternatively, if productivity growth rates are to be equalised,
regional policies promoting education, population upliftment and investment need to be
followed. These may impose a high cost on the union, however, and some members may
not be prepared to shoulder it. The unavoidable conclusion is that monetary integration
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among regions with dissimilar Phillips relationships and optimal inflation/unemployment
trade-offs will always require losses and adjustments which may be serious enough to
negate what advantages the union may have to offer.
2.3.2.2 Loss of Monetary and Fiscal Policy Autonomy v
Implied in the requirement of inflation rate equalisation is the subjugation of national
monetary policy to that end. In a full monetary union, monetary autonomy is entirely
forfeited to the union central bank, but even in a simple exchange rate union, monetary
autonomy is limited. Monetary expansion can not take place without regard to its effect
on the inflation differential (or equality) with other union members, and monetary policy
must therefore be co-ordinated across the union. Mundell (1962) and Fleming (1962)
point out that capital outflows will rob expansionary monetary policy of its output effect
anyway, and serve to distribute the expansion evenly across the union. This occurrence,
and its relation to the level of asset market integration, are examined in Chapter 3, in the
context of a specific model.
What of fiscal policy? Arndt (1973) shows that in a model of a two-country monetary
union and outside world, fiscal policy may require co-ordination in order to solve each
member's external balance, since there is only one monetary policy tool - the unified
monetary policy - but two external balance targets (after internal balance targets have been
reached with fiscal policy). Johnson (1971) explains that fiscal policy will also be limited
by government debt constraints - if monetary policy is limited then so is the borrowing
ability of government, which will have to look outside the union for finance.
The question of loss of policy autonomy is taken up again in Chapter 3 where, as was
mentioned, it is possible to pose it in the context of a specified model. It is found that
policy autonomy at moderate to high levels of goods and asset market integration is limited
anyway, thus the emphasis is placed not so much on the disadvantages of the loss of
autonomy so much as the prescriptions for making policy work in its presence.
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2.3.2.3 Exacerbation of Regional Problems
If monetary integration leads to an increase in the power and domain of trade unions, it
is feared that the resulting decline in the flexibility of real wages will exacerbate regional
problems (AlIen and Kenen, 1980, p.388). Depressed regions will suffer increases in
unemployment and the labour migration resulting will deprive these areas of the best
workers. Alternatively, higher productivity areas will experience an influx of labour
which may exacerbate transport and housing congestion and drain the supply of other
social services.
Labour migration may not be the only problem. If regions of current account deficits and
surpluses exist alongside one another and if capital is mobile, it may exacerbate those
imbalances by moving from the deficit regions to the surplus regions, which are likely to
offer the more attractive investment opportunities. While these capital movements may
tend to equalise private rates of return, they may not equalise social rates, as Cairncross
(1974) points out, further entrenching regional social problems. 9 Thus the costs of
monetary integration are, from the point of view of regional economies, potentially quite
high as well. 10
2.3.2.4 Qualifications
In qualifying the argument concerning the loss of control over internal balance, Tower and
Willett (1976) point out that, as the degree of openness of a country increases, its ability
to trade-off domestic inflation with local unemployment decreases due to a decline in the
level of 'exchange rate illusion'.ll Instead, due to the large component of foreign goods
in the expenditure bundle, local economic agents revise their income and wage demands
more and more in accordance with foreign inflation as openness increases. Countries
operating under these conditions are limited in their inflation/unemployment choice
anyway, and do not stand to lose much by foregoing the option of exchange rate variation
9. These capital movements may require the provision of social services (due to externalities) and thus
increase the pressure on high growth areas.
10. See also Johnson (1971), Hirsch (1972a and b) and Kaldor (1970, 1971).
11. The degree to which individuals are prepared to accept a decline in their real incomes relative to the
outside world.
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and linking their exchange rates. Once again, the argument that openness increases the
case of monetary integration has been supported, albeit from a different angle.
Further, AlIen and Kenen (1980, p.386) point out that many of the problems relating to
BOP adjustment in an exchange rate union would not occur in a full monetary union. For
one, the monetary union would not suffer from inconsistent monetary policy as there
would be only one monetary authority anyway. This would help to solve the problems of
divergent inflation rates, which could more easily be harmonised. In addition, they
suggest that payment flows in a monetary union would be smaller than those in an
exchange rate union, both because exchange rate speculation would be totally ruled out in
a monetary union and because the highly integrated financial markets would facilitate
automatic capital flows. Also, capital flows generated by countries defending their reserve
positions in an exchange rate union would not occur in a monetary union since external
reserve settlements take place at the union level. Some of these arguments are considered
again in the final section of this chapter.
What can be concluded from this is not that currency areas are without adjustment and
macroeconomic problems, but that the extent to which they suffer from these problems
depends in part on the degree to which monetary unification has taken place. This
argument will be encountered again in Chapter 3, where it is shown that the problems of
a single exchange rate union are often resolved not by less unification but by more. In
addition, this topic of the relative superiority of various degrees of monetary integration
is considered in Section 2.5 of this chapter.
2.4 MONETARY INTEGRATION AMONG DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
By looking at the desirability, in general, of monetary integration among developing
countries, it will be possible to enhance an understanding of the desirability of the CMA.
This section thus complements Sections 2.2 and 2.3, especially the latter section, since it
20
examines theoretical considerations of monetary integration but with application to
developing countries. 12
2.4.1 Goals and Formulae of Monetary Integration among LDCs
There are problems in applying the theory of monetary integration to developing countries.
Firstly, as Nana-Sinkam (1978, p.89) points out, the theory is based on an idea of
monetary integration as forming one of the last stages of economic integration between
advanced market economies. There is little to be found concerning rudimentary monetary
co-operation between less developed economies. Further, Nana-Sinkam (1978, p.90)
explains that both customs union theory and monetary integration theory espouse "a
continuum of formalised stages of integration ... " therefore hindering the analysis of
integration between countries relatively more or less developed. Nana-Sinkam argues
instead that an approach must be taken which places monetary integration in the context
of development and analyses its role as a facet of this development. In particular, he sees
the question of whether economic integration and/or fiscal harmonisation should precede
or follow monetary integration, or whether they need to be initially considered at all, as
important (p.91).
In light of the developmental role of monetary integration, then, it is possible to identify
various proposed reasons for enhancing monetary integration. Firstly, Robson (1968,
p.49) believes that at least some form of monetary integration is necessary to fully realise
the gains of market integration. For investment reasons, Robson argues that "effective
integration demands an assurance of freedom of payments ... at stable rates of exchange"
(p.49). Alexander Kafka (1969, p.136) supports Robson on this first point and also
specifies that stable exchange rates are required. In addition, he offers two more reasons
for monetary integration, the first being "economising on international reserves"
(encountered earlier), and the second, the strengthening of what he calls "multi-lateral
surveillance" (p.136). This latter issue presumably refers to the strategic aspects of
political co-operation, the former is a well-known justification for monetary co-operation
12. It is appreciated that South Africa is more advanced than a typical 'developing country'; however, it
is held to possess a dualistic economy which is characterised by an advanced and a developing sector
alongside one another.
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and one that has been mentioned before (Chapter 1). Finally, Nana-Sinkam points to five
reasons for monetary co-operation in modem Africa, reasons which go beyond the simple
facilitating of trade:
(1) the impracticability of the independent monetary areas of small, open
economies (a familiar argument: see Section 2.2.1.2 above);
(2) dissolution of trade links with Europe;
(3) dissolution of links between monetary authorities;
(4) increases in the cost of "decentralised policy-making" due to external
pressures; and
(5) problems of adjustment and illiquidity since the "demise of the old
order" i.e. the Bretton Woods system (1978, p.93).
He therefore argues for the expansion of co-operation and integration and the formation
of new institutions and policies to counter these problems and enable development. There
are many degrees of co-operation, however, and all may have some benefit.
The simplest form of monetary co-operation is monetary policy harmonisation, which
Robson (1968, pp.50-51) sees as necessary to prevent the external payments and capital
flight problems consequent upon differential monetary expansion in an economic grouping.
Alternatively, a minimum requirement in an economic grouping is the agreement to limit
credit to central government to that required to reach external balance, which Robson
states amounts to "de facto harmonisation" (p.51).13
2.4.2 Recognising the Capacity for Monetary Integration
Determination of the stage of integration that a country has either arrived at or is prepared
for is explained by Nana-Sinkam (1978, p.94). Firstly, "political and economic interest
structures" will reflect the requisite changes; secondly, the levels of "economic and
political sovereignty" that governments are prepared to give up reflect importantly on the
13. Otherwise, unbridled credit expansion would enlarge incomes and import volumes and result in a
deteriorating external payments situation.
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type of integration arrangement possible and, thirdly, the exi ting trade and payments
structures indicate which further arrangements are "technically sustainable". However,
as Nana-Sinkam points out, there is no "standard path" to financial development - the
possibilities and combinations of structures and arrangements are many and varied (1978,
pp.94-95). He does, however, specify certain characteristics of the economies initially
prepared for agreements to "underwrite the integration of trade relations and product and
factor markets ... "(p.91). The prospective members should have low external (to the
group) trade/GNP ratios, developed "monetary and fiscal infrastructures" and a
predisposition on the part of governments to co-operate (pp.91-92). It is these countries
which can benefit from increased integration and co-operation to make resource utilisation
more efficient and promote development.
2.4.3 Appropriate Measures for Developing Countries
What then are the measures that should be followed by these countries? Kafka suggests
that as a first step, intra-area exchange controls should be removed so that capital
movements may be freed up and asset market integration facilitated (1969, p.137). Kafka
dismisses the possibility of intra-area flexible exchange rates for at least two reasons:
firstly, it is unlikely in developing countries that there will be sufficient speculation, let
alone stabilising speculation, required to make the systems workable. Secondly, exchange
rate fluctuation will result in changes in relative prices between countries which ~'will not
be conducive to the growth of intra-trade in less than perfect markets, where goodwill has
to be built up over the years" (1969, p.138). Kafka thus advises that a system of pegged
rates, which are adjustable only in the face of fundamental disequilibrium, should be
adopted. This sort of arrangement will necessitate increased levels of reserves since, as
Kafka shows, under normal conditions countries usually deal with deficits by allowing
exchange rates to change while surpluses are allowed to add to reserves. However, with
exchange rate fixity deficits will have to be financed.
Further, Kafka suggests that at least part of the Area's reserves should be pooled but that
drawing on them should not be automatic (1969, p.141). Instead, the past performance
of each country should be taken into account in determining the eligibility of that country
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for reserve credits. 14 Kafka goes on to allude to the well known advantages and
economies of reserve pooling vis-a-vis third countries and the extension of intra-area
mutual credits. However, he explains that certain characteristics of developing countries
- limited mutual trade and the unlikelihood of offsetting terms of trade - seem to indicate
that these gains may only be small among them (1969, p.142).
A further measure, mentioned by Robson (1968, p.51), relates to the internal policy
making of integrating countries. His arguments concerning monetary policy harmonisation
of less sophisticated countries he believes apply as much even to full monetary unions
among more advanced developing countries. Where credit is expanded in one country of
a Inonetary union, care must be taken to ensure that it does not increase its imports out of
hand, thereby making the other members of the union pay for its development efforts.
The final measure would be that overall union credit expansion, hopefully equitably
distributed, should "preserve external balance in the national monetary BOP, over a period
of years" (1968, pp.51-52).
These sentiments pre-empt some of those expressed in the Chapter 3 findings of the
Allen-Kenen model concerning monetary policy in the presence of economic integration,
although in the developing country case, the need for policy harmonisation springs from
the desire to advance equitable development rather than from the need to avoid sterilisation
of mutual monetary policy. The latter considerations are less important to developing
countries - precisely because they are possessed of less developed asset markets and
engage in integration efforts in order to develop and advance their economies, rather than
merely to increase policy efficacy and efficiency.
2.4.4 Costs and Benefits
Finally, this section deals with the projected costs and benefits associated with developing
country monetary union. Whilst these considerations, discussed by Saleh Nsouli (1981,
pp.41-44) apply tofuU monetary union - i.e. a common currency and union central bank -
14. Kafka does not say who is supposed to police the drawing of monetary area reserves. I~ a full monetary
union it would be the job of the union central bank.
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there is nevertheless an extent to which the mentioned benefits and costs apply to lower
levels of integration. The rationale for discussing benefits and costs at this stage is simply
this: having discussed limitations of conventional theory, degrees, purposes and measures
of integration, the 'functional' considerations of monetary integration are, in a sense, only
lacking a discussion of projected results, since the actual establishment and composition
of the monetary union have already been dealt with.
Monetary integration, according to Nsouli, will serve to increase overall investment in the
area (1981, p.42). He gives four reasons for this: firstly, exchange risk is reduced due
to exchange rate fixity and funds flows facilitated by the absence of exchange control.
Secondly, domestically-generated resources are more likely to be invested domestically as
the range of opportunities expands with the investment area. Thirdly, the stability of a
common currency, owing to the fact that its value is determined at the union level, would
serve to attract additional foreign capital, and fourthly, resource allocation is improved
since funds are able to flow to the optimal use opportunity in the area.
An increase in the level of savings may also be made possible by monetary union, to the
extent that it can encourage investment and stimulate growth and thereby raise per capita
income. Financial intermediation can also be increased as the range of opportunities is
expanded over the whole union and intra-regional financial markets develop (Nsouli, 1981,
p.42). Nsouli addresses the question of whether monetary union will expand intra-regional
trade. He finds that this is more likely in the long run than in the short Qr medium term,
since 'infrastructurallimitations' are ingrained and not amenable to adjustment through the
advent of monetary co-operation alone. In the long run, however, 'changing production
patterns' that result from the changes in investment may facilitate increased trade (1981,
p.43). In Section 2.3.1 above, the promotion of goods market integration - which comes
about by trade - is mentioned as a benefit of monetary union.
A further advantage mentioned by Nsouli relates to enhanced external exchange rate
stability. The logic is that the larger monetary area of a monetary union will permit
smoother adjustment due to the increased likelihood of offsetting disturbances over the
area. The argument is not new - diversified monetary areas were held to be a better idea
by Kenen (1969) due to this shock-accommodating possibility and the likelihood therefore
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of greater external payments stability. Nsouli also mentions the possibility of exchange
reserve economies in a monetary union; these have also been discussed by Kafka (1969)
and Mundell (1973).
On the costs side, Nsouli sees monetary policy limitations and interest rate equalisation as
important possible problems. Uniform monetary policy implies uniform credit growth and
this may not suit the development needs of particular countries in the union. Interest rate
equalisation may also harm less advanced, 'low-return' countries since their costs of funds
may not be met by their returns on capital (1981, p.43). This could result in adverse
intra-regional capital flows, with the more advanced areas ending up with all the
investment. This problem is particularly important among capital-starved developing
countries.
Finally, Nsouli emphasises the possible fiscal policy constraints in a monetary union. The
existence of a union central bank limits the use of deficit financing through sale of debt,
but tax revenue sources are also limited in developing countries, as well as private sector
borrowing (due to' crowding-out). Thus government spending is sure to be more limited
in a monetary union than otherwise, the only advantage being that of the imposition of
spending discipline due to the constraints (1981, p.44).
Thus, as Nsouli points out, the benefits have to be weighed against the costs, the final
outcome and decision for or against monetary integration depending on considerations
specific to each area. In this he has applied the 'net benefit' approach to currency area
formation among developing countries. In the case of the CMA, the issue (at least for
Swaziland) has not been concerned with more monetary unification but rather with less,
due to an increase in costs experienced by the smaller countries. Since, as has been
mentioned, a full de facto monetary union existed from the start, the question offormation
of a monetary union has never been important. Instead, the choice between the status quo
and less monetary integration seems to have been the most important.
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2.5 THE SUB-OPTIMALITY OF AN EXCHANGE RATE
UNION VERSUS A FULL MONETARY UNION
What is discussed in this final section of the chapter is a set of purely economic arguments
for monetary union versus some less intense form of monetary integration. Therefore the
debate has shifted somewhat from that in the first section - the degree of monetary
integration is debated rather than its desirability per se. This approach is clearly more
relevant (than that in the first section) to countries that are already integrated financially
and in other ways, and thus have no choice about the absence or presence of some
formalised monetary integration arrangement, only about its nature. These arguments are
thus more relevant to members of the CMA, who experience close asset and goods market
integration, than those in the first section.
There is much evidence to suggest that a simple exchange rate union will be functionally
inferior to a full monetary union. Indeed, this idea is one of the most important
conclusions of the following chapter, where the Allen-Kenen arguments concerning policy
autonomy of monetary unions are discussed. These and other arguments supporting the
idea of the inferiority of an exchange rate union will be put forward here, after initially
defining in detail the meanings of 'monetary union' and 'exchange rate union' .15
-Daniel Gros (1989, pp.219-230) has exhaustively analysed the factors surrounding the
extent and degree of monetary integration. By identifying six considerations of the degree
of co-operation, he permits distinctions to be made between the levels of integration
corresponding to 'exchange rate union' and 'full monetary union'. The first consideration
of Gros' is the "credibility of the exchange rate commitment" (p.222). He argues that a
first requirement for monetary union is the certainty in the minds of economic agents that
exchange rate fixity is permanent. Permanent fixity need not be the case for a simple
exchange rate union, however. Secondly, he suggests that any remaining bands of
permissible fluctuation (within the definition of 'fixity') detract from full monetary union,
while thirdly the existence of bid-ask spreads among commercial banks has the same
15. The central theme of the following chapter is the effect on countries of goods and asset market
integration, and thus the present analysis does not pre-empt any of its analysis or fmdings.
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effect. 16 In essence, both imply a lack of perfect substitutability between currencies,
something which Gros sees as defining full monetary union (p.221). Fourthly, the legal
tender status of the currency is an obvious indication of the degree of monetary union.
Universal legal tender status is seen as a preliminary stage to the introduction of a common
currency, since it is not possible without the elimination of bid-ask spreads and margins
of fluctuation. Universal legal tender status thus implies a stage further in exchange rate
union. Fifthly, Gros suggests that if prices are to be quoted in two different currencies,
an inefficient situation typical of simple exchange rate unification is implied (p.223). The
levels of goods market integration that occasion competition between substitutes of
different national origin in the same market would therefore seem to require at least
preliminary monetary co-operation, and a common currency would obviously be the most
effective and desirable situation. Finally, the practice of using different currencies in
different sectors of the economy would not happen in a full monetary union, it therefore
typifies the exchange rate union case. The example Gros gives is the use in the 'wholesale
financial sector' of an international currency and the use in the retail sector of a domestic
currency.
To summanse, an exchange rate unIon is typified by the following characteristics (a
monetary union possesses none of them): non-certainty of exchange rate fixity; margins
of fluctuation; commercial banks' bid-ask spreads; different national currencies are all
legal tender (Le. no common currency); prices of goods and services are quoted in more
than one currency and different currencies are used in different sectors of the economy.
Gros then defines three levels of monetary unification:
(1) "Ex post macro monetary union" - an exchange rate unIon with
non-permanent fixity - "escape clauses".
(2) "Ex ante macro monetary union" - an exchange rate union with
permanent fixity. The mentioned characteristics, besides the first one,
still apply however, and thus the currencies are not perfect substitutes.
16. A 'bid-ask spread' is the difference between the exchange and face values of a unit of currency at
conversion. Gros sees the existence of bid-ask spreads and bank commission as resulting from the need
by banks "to cover the costs they incur by holding bank notes in different currencies and by having to
set up several accounting systems" (1989, p.222).
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(3) "Micro monetary union" - this is a full monetary union in the sense
that the currencies are perfect substitutes - they are in fact "one
money" (1989, pp.223-224).
The distinctions between the various degrees of monetary union have been discussed in
detail due to the complexity of the CMA case. The CMA has been, since 1986, three
separate currency areas - a full micro monetary union between South Africa and the TBVC
states and Namibia, a near-complete monetary union with Lesotho, and something
approximating an ex post micro monetary union with Swaziland. Whilst the present
situation with Swaziland resembles a near-complete monetary union, the contingency of
de-linking and the advent of non-legal tender provisions in the 1986 agreement lead to
conditions more typical of an ex post macro monetary union, or exchange rate union. The
situation in Namibia, although unchanged at time of writing, will in all likelihood end up
like that of Botswana - an eventual flexible exchange rate relationship with South Africa
after an initial period of exchange rate fixity during the tie-cutting stage. 17 However,
such considerations are beyond the scope of this section: what is important here are the
implications concerning the optimality, efficiency and functionality of the particular
situations. Ignoring for the present the various ways the CMA (or most of it) resembles
a full monetary union, the most important consideration pertaining to the, status of the
CMA is the lack of a common currency. Further, whatever can be said about the degree
of substitutability of the currencies of the CMA, it falls short of full monetary union by
an additional factor - the fact that the South African Reserve Bank, whilst appearing in
--- -- ----- - - - -
terms of power and capacity to be the union central bank is not jointly controlled by the
members of the CMA. On the importance of this, consider the words of Casella and
Feinstein: "the organisation of a jointly controlled central bank is crucial for a common
currency ... " (1988, p.3) (my emphasis). The reasoning behind this is discussed later.
Suffice to say that it can be concluded that, whatever it is, the CMA is not a full monetary
union, and this fact lies behind the reasoning for the focus of the Chapter 3 model, as well
as the arguments put forward next.
17. Namibia joined the CMA on independence but has also announced plans to establish its own central
bank and currency by 1992.
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The Allen-Kenen model of Chapter 3 permits conclusions to be drawn about policy
effectiveness between highly integrated nations. It is stated there that, since harmonisation
of policy targets and instruments is necessary to permit realisation of those targets, some
form of policy co-operation is necessary between interdependent countries. Inter-
dependence increases as goods and asset market integration increase, and the existence of
a degree of monetary co-operation - exchange rate union - is found to have the effect of
enhancing integration. Thus if the institutional arrangements enhance integration, and if
this integration decreases policy autonomy, there is a strong argument for establishing a
monetary union with a union central bank. The undertaking of separate policy by a
national central bank is found almost always to necessitate offsetting policy by the other,
at cost to both and often without ultimate success. Hence it is postulated that a union
central bank is required, which will guarantee policy autonomy and require only agreement
on targets. More on this in the next chapter.
A second argument for full monetary unIon flows from the analysis by Casella and
Feinstein (1988) of the welfare effects of macroeconomic policy under various monetary
unification arrangements. Briefly, they find that exchange rate union with common legal
tender is problematic since each country finds it possible to exploit the other (pp.9-12).18
This happens since each is able to finance government expenditure through the issue of fiat
money, increasing nominal local wealth as well as real local wealth, since claims on the
foreign country's tradeable goods are not eroded by depreciation. The optimum issue of
fiat money becomes larger as the government's time horizon (its propensity to favour the
future generation over the present) increases. However, the spiralling monetary expansion
boosts world inflation eventually, thereby lowering utility. There is thus no equilibrium
since "for any amount of currency issued by the foreign government, the home
government desires to supply more" (1988, p.11). Unless issue of the common currency_______ or
can be controlled by a union central bank, the flexible exchange rate case is the only--- -- -- --~ -- - -
~ternative. However, even here successful operation of the monetary union requires that
18. The situation they describe (pp.9-12) is entirely hypothetical and meant only to demonstrate the
impracticality of common currencies without a common monetary authority. In this there is the tacit
assumption that the goal of a common currency has already been established, the only further
considerations relating to the issue and administration of the currency. It is unfortunate, however, that
they did not analyse a more realistic case - that of an exchange rate union with non-perfectly
substitutable currencies.
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the members are either very similar in size and influence or very dissimilar - implying that
a monetary union between countries of various sizes is not viable.19 This conclusion
would not seem to preclude the CMA though, it being composed of countries of very
dissimilar size and influence.
The realisation of the full range of benefits for the three degrees of monetary co-operation
is analysed by Gros (1989, pp.227-229). Whilst all three - ex-ante, ex-post and micro
monetary union - entail the loss of the freedom of exchange rate adjustment, the micro
monetary union allows the most benefits. Specifically, it permits:
(1) Eradication of the use of surprise inflation by governments.
(2) An increase in trade as exchange rate stability is fully felt.
(3) An increase in the transparency of prices of tradeables and the removal
of transaction costs of trade.
(4) Enhancement of the power and status of the area.
(5) Reduction of the exposure of members to external shocks. (Gros, 1989,
pp.227-228)
An ex-post monetary union can only partially permit benefits (3) and (5), while an ex-ante
monetary union additionally prevents the complete realisation of benefits (1) and (2) (see
Gros, 1989, table p.229). Gros thus concludes that, when considering monetary
integration, only the most complete form is desirable in any but transitional stages.
On this point, Nana-Sinkam (1978, p.151) criticises the 'either/or' approach to flexible
rates/monetary union adopted by earlier authorities, citing Ingram, Johnson and Sohmen.
As part of the transition to full monetary union, he sees the advent and existence of earlier
stages of monetary integration as quite acceptable: " ... it seems to me an unnecessarily
extremist position to claim that a single common currency must exist from the begin-
ning ... " (p.151). The importance of transition seems especially relevant to developing
countries, whose nascent financial systems and political aspirations may not permit the
entry into a full monetary union and common currency.
19. See Casella and Feinstein (1988, pp. 16-17), especially the diagram opposite p.17.
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2.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The original currency area approach bases its decision for or against establishment of a
currency area on its assessment of the degree to which a number of regions are
economically homogenous, i.e. the degree to which they resemble a single country,
economically speaking. The characteristics it examines are factor mobility, openness,
inflation rates, policy integration and inter-regional price and wage flexibility. The net
benefit approach bases its judgement for a currency area on a comparison of the foreseen
costs and benefits of unification, rather than dealing with conceptually difficult and abstract
'characteristics'. The 'development' approach views the decision for monetary union in
the light of the goals and peculiarities of developing countries. It is like the net benefit
approach except that its hierarchy of costs and benefits is different (although there is
significant overlap). If monetary integration can increase investment and improve resource
allocation it is likely to be desirable among developing countries, although the importance
of transitional stages is stressed. Some authorities feel that the loss of policy autonomy
and sovereignty would jeopardise developing country monetary unification, but this
assumes that there is sovereignty to lose. If the countries are so closely tied that their
goods and asset markets are interdependent anyway, as will be seen is the case in the
CMA, then a new set of considerations become relevant - that of the degree of monetary
unification. This comes about if extant goods and asset market integration has progressed
beyond a point such that the bloc members do not have the choice of the 'insulation'
offered by flexible exchange rates since their interdependence means their policy and
disturbances are mutually felt regardless of the formal monetary arrangement. In this
case, cognisance should be taken of the fact that full monetary union can be shown to be
superior to all less intense forms of co-operation, and this lesson is carried into the
remainder of the thesis.
In the next chapter the focus is on integration of goods and asset markets as a factor
affecting the choice of a currency area in terms of the effect of integration on the
independent policy functioning of member countries and the transmission of disturbances.
Conditions and outcomes are limited by using a model, and the effects of economic
integration can thus be explicitly examined.
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CHAPTER 3
ASSET AND GOODS MARKET INTEGRA TION
IN AN EXCHANGE RA TE UNION:
THE ALLEN-KENEN MODEL
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Having examined the theoretical contributions to the issue of what makes a good currency
area, it is possible to focus the analysis and examine explicitly the functioning of an
exchange rate union under various conditions. To do this, use is made of AlIen and
Kenen's Chapter 11 model of "Asset markets, Exchange Rates and Economic Integration" ,
as well as their graphic analysis, developed in later chapters. The authors state that the
purpose of their model is:
" ... to show as precisely as possible how market integration limits
autonomy in monetary and fiscal policies, to show how one government
may be required to react to decisions by another and to assess the gains that
may accrue from the co-ordination or harmonisation of national policies and
from outright policy unification" (p.377).
The analysis will draw selectively on insights provided by the Allen-Kenen model into the
functioning of an exchange rate union rather than a full monetary union as defined in the
previous chapter. The reason for this is thatt~A, while~g a proper exchange
rate union is not a full monetary union either. However it is certainly closer to being an
..e.--- _ - _ - ~ .......__--...._--
exchange rate union, since each member has its own central bank and currency, and the
various currencies are not perfect substitutes as is required for a full mone~ union.
Thus the analysis is based on the logic that the existence of separate central banks indicates
that there is at least the intention by each to c,arry out independent policy, and this is
demonstrated as being impractical by the model. The reason for this is that it is found that
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the typically high levels of goods and asset market integration of an exchange rate union
promote policy and disturbance transmission through the union, increasing the cost and
decreasing the effectiveness of independent policy, and making at least policy co-ordination
necessary. However, a better solution is seen to be that of full monetary union - a
common currency with a jointly controlled union central bank. The justification for this
argument is concerned with the necessity of the harmonisation of both policy targets and
instruments where integration and interdependence prevail, and the fact that an exchange
rate union rarely accomplishes policy co-ordination as well as a full monetary union.
Indeed, AlIen and Kenen suggest that "the integration of targets may be more harmful than
helpful unless it is accompanied by an appropriate integration of instruments" (pp. 380-
381).
The idea that an exchange rate union will be inferior to a full monetary union was put
forward by early writers (Sohmen, 1969; Johnson, 1963; Ingram, 1962) who advanced
various arguments, for example Ingram's assertion that ca i~ mobility_wQ!:!ld not be
sufficiently accelerated in a mere exchange rate union due to foreign exchange restrictions
required to protect the fixed rate. Other more recent arguments in favour of full monetary
union were advanced in the previous chapter. AlIen and Kenen's argument flows from
their analysis of policy interdependence, and it is the one emphasised here.
The chapter begins with an examination of the portfolio balance approach - that used by
AlIen and Kenen - and its departure from the more conventional Keynesian model. Next
is a summarised version of the two country model and a brief comment on the nature of
goods market characteristics assumed by Allen and Kenen. After that some of the
comparative static solutions of the model are given in tables adopted from Allen and
Kenen, and finally a graphical analysis of policy and disturbance effects under integration
is undertaken.
3.2 THE PORTFOLIO BALANCE APPROACH
The central thesis of the portfolio balance approach is that the short run exchange rate (or
change in reserves) is determined by the capital account. In essence, the exchange rate
is the variable which generates 'portfolio balance' between domestic and foreign assets
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(Krueger, 1983, pp.86-88). This is because the demand for foreign assets is a function
of domestic and foreign interest rates (as is the demand for domestic assets) as well as the
exchange rate. Although one of the domestic assets is money, AlIen and Kenen are quick
to point out the difference between their version of the portfolio approach and the
monetary approach to the BOP. Firstly, they do not assume that money is neutral; instead
they allow for its effects on' real variables and economic activity, which they see as
important, even in the long run. Also, the assumption of money neutrality places
limitations on assumptions of foreign asset holdings and hence preclude a full analysis of
portfolio behaviour.
Secondly, AlIen and Kenen do not see the exchange rate as determined entirely within- the
money market. The exchange rate clears the money market - it is the 'price' of money -
but it is determined jointly by bond markets (as was mentioned). Further, the long run
exchange rate is determined by both asset and goods market behaviour and is not solely
a monetary phenomenon.
How does the portfolio approach expand on the mainstream Keynesian approach? Firstly,
behaviour and equilibrium requirements are ful1y specified in all three asset markets -
domestic money, domestic bonds and foreign bonds. Asset demand is constrained by
wealth which influences and is added to by saving; through its influence on saving, wealth
influences expenditure (Allen and Kenen, 1980, p.9).
In addition, to ensure short run exchange rate determination in asset markets, AlIen and
Kenen make two important assumptions to differentiate asset and goods market behaviour.
Firstly, they assume that the manner of adjustment is other market is fundamentally
different: while goods market adjustment is by flows of goods, asset market adjustment is
by stocks of assets. Thus asset adjustment is immediate and portfolios are continually in
balance. Secondly, the demand for money is determined by the same determinants of the
demand for other assets - interest rates and wealth and not by income as is usually the
case. This assumption is critical to the portfolio approach since if income was made to
affect money demand, goods market disturbances that changed income would impinge on
asset markets and thus the exchange rate. Goods' markets do effect asset markets but only
in the long run - through their effect on the level of saving and thus wealth.
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Although some of these assumptions may seem restrictive, the portfolio approach does
offer a workable explanation for the empirical observation of short run exchange rate
behaviour, and improves on the monetary approach in that it does not need to assume
perfect substitutability between assets, or money neutrality to do this (Krueger, 1983,
p.90).
3.3 THE ALLEN-KENEN TWO COUNTRY MODEL
Allen and Kenen explain that their two country market is designed primarily to analyse
interdependence, since it is interdependence that reflects on the existing amount of policy
autonomy and existing policy autonomy that determines the sacrifice involved in policy
unification. 20 If the existing level of policy autonomy is low due to high interdependence
- then that sacrifice may not be large and the country may stand to derive a net benefit.
Thus Allen and Kenen analyse the effect of interdependence on policy autonomy and the
effect of market integration and the exchange rate regime on interdependence. The model
must therefore be able to accommodate an analysis of interdependence, and the model that
follows does, in that the countries it deals with are large enough and advanced enough to
influence one another.
3.3.1 A Summary
The'two countries are called 'North' and 'South' and trade mutually and with the outside
world, and can affect the prices of each other's output but not the price of 'foreign'
output. 21 There is an unlimited supply of the world bond at a constant interest rate and
each country holds these bonds and each other's bonds, but foreigners do not hold
domestic bonds. There are five assets - North bonds, South bonds and world bonds as
well as North and South money - and three traded goods - North, South and world goods.
Non-traded goods markets are omitted to avoid over-complicating the analysis, but AlIen
20. See AlIen and Kenen (1980), pp.297-320. Reference is also made to their chapter on "Similarities and
Symmetries in Goods and Asset Markets", Chapter 12, pp.321-335.
21. 'Foreign' refers to the outside world; both of the two neighbouring economies are considered
'domestic' .
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and Kenen point out that their omission does not prevent analysis of incomes, interest rates
and exchange rates.
The 'market agents' - firms, households, the central bank, the government and foreigners -
all behave normally; there are no 'quirks' concerning them in the Allen-Kenen model.
Further, markets are perfectly competitive and continuously clearing and transaction costs
and response lags (to price, interest rate changes etc.) are absent.
Finally, asterisked variables are desired quantities, 'barred' variables are exogenous,
superscripted 'f variables are in world prices, superscripted 'prime' variables are in South
prices and all others are in North prices. Subscripted 'zero' variables are world variables
(for example, the world good) and subscripted 'one' and 'two' variables are North and
South variables respectively.
Presentation of the model is shortened by omitting equations for the South or world that
are direct replicas of North equations. Thus the model of country North and the outside
world is presented, and South is a direct replica (unless otherwise specified).22
3.3.2 Production/Labour Market
(3.1)
Production of Good 1, QI is a function of total demand for labour ·E. Gross Domestic
Product is defined as follows:
where PI is the price of Good 1.
Wage income:
w = P1QIE (E)
The wage is equated to the marginal revenue product of labour, PI QlE




Equality of demand and supply of labour:
*E - E = 0 (3.4)
In the classical variant, labour supply is fixed; in the Keynesian variant it is perfectly
elastic at a fixed wage.
3.3.3 Commodity Demand, Savings and Wealth
Northern balance sheet:
(3.5)
(3.6)h f t f t 'Tt h * *' h *W = S d t + [ ( - ) B2 + ( - - -) + ( 'Tt Bo ) -] d t
o 0 'Tt' 'Tt 'Tt' 'Tt
Wh is household wealth, L\' demand for money, 7r the Northern exchange rate (in units
of local currency, 7r' the Southern exchange rate23 , Bh2 holdings of the Southern bond and
Bha holdings of the world bond.
Wealth accumulated through time T in consequence of saving, S, and exchange rate
changes:
Desired saving:
where ra, rt, r2 are the interest rates on the bonds and yd is disposable income:
(3.8)
where the second, third and fourth terms represent interest income and r is taxes.
Northern consumption of all three goods is influenced by total desired consumption, *C,
and all three prices:
(3.9)
23. Thus -rrl7r' represents the exchange rate between the North and South; we have as yet not assumed any







The behaviour of the demand functions ·C i is defined by the following, where eij represents
the cross elasticity of demand for good i in terms of the price of j:
thus the goods are gross substitutes
e·· - Ee.. = 11J IJ
they are homogeneous of degree zero in prices and consumption and:
p··C:e.. = P'*C·e··1 1 IJ J J JI
i, j = 0, 1, 2, i ~ j
The marginal propensities to spend sum to zero:
3.3.4 Government Consumption and Foreign demand
The Government consumes both local and Southern goods but not foreign goods:24
Government expenditure, Gi is policy determined, hence the bar.
(3.12)
(3.13)
24. This omission is made to simplify the analysis; the Northern government's consumption of G2 allows
analysis of fiscal expansion under interdependence. Domestic government consumption of Go would not
contribute much to the analysis.
Foreign demand, ·Cf t , depends on prices and desired overall consumption:
and foreign demand is also exogenous.








The price of foreign output is fixed and supply is perfectly elastic
Pf _ pfo - 0
The markets for both domestic goods clear continuously for the North:




3.3.6 Household Asset Demand





BlO < 0; BB > 0; (3.24)
South bond:
(1TI7r')*Bh2 = B2(ro, rh r2, W
h
) B20 < 0; B21 <0; B22 > 0
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(3.25)
The signs of the partial derivatives imply that the bonds are gross substitutes. Further, all
four of the equations are homogenous of the first degree in wealth. The Budget constraint:
(3.26)
Interest rate semi-elasticities sum to zero, wealth semi-elasticities sum to one:
3.3.7
L·· + ~B·· = 01J 1J
The Central Bank
j = 0, 1,2
The central banks issue money and hold both domestic bonds and foreign exchange
reserves. There are no commercial banks. The Bank's assets are:
(3.27)
WC represents the Bank's wealth - the sum, through time T, of capital gains and losses due
to exchange rate changes:
eft 1t c 'it 'it 1 TtW = [ (- )B2 (- - -) + ( 1t R) -
o It' It It' 1t
(3.28)








Reserve settlements and intervention can take place in two different ways under the model.
The first is 'mandatory asset settlement': here R and R' are held in world currency and
any holdings by a central bank of the partners currency, due to intervention to influence
the bilateral rate, must be redeemed by the partner central bank. The partner must then
undertake open market operations to offset the money supply effects of the change in its
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reserves. Alternatively, R and R' need only be expressed in world currency and still
comprise the partner country's currency, or rather claims on that currency since the two
Banks can under this system agree to accumulate claims on each other's currency. The
accumulated claims would, however, change the partner's money supply and allow future
money supply impacts as the partner's currency is used as a reserve asset. The mandatory
asset settlement arrangement ensures that further money supply effects of intervention do
not take place.
3.3.9 Exchange Rates
Allen and Kenen suggest four separate exchange rate regimes and list their implications
for reserves and exchange rates. Only one is examined - that most relevant to the CMA -
the case of a mutual peg and an external float with foreign exchange intervention25
conducted solely by the north - the dominant nation. This is AlIen and Kenen's 'Case l'
(1980, pp.312-313).
The bilateral exchange rate:
Z = (1rl7r')
is fixed in this case:
z = z
thus




The behaviour of resources in this manner is consistent with mandatory asset settlement. 26
25. This intervention is to stabilize the mutual peg; it does not affect the joint float, which is entirely free
floating.
26. See "Case I" in Alien and Kenen, (1980, Table 11.1, p.313) for a summary of the exchange rate and
reserve effects of the exchange rate regime.
3.3.10 Government Expenditure and Fiscal Policy
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The Government receives taxes, r from residents and transfers, T from non residents as
well as interest income. It spends on N-orthern and Southern goods and pays interest on
domestic bonds.
The Budget deficit is thus:
(3.34)
The fust term in square brackets is interest payments, the second, interest receipts. The
government does not hold foreign bonds, D represents the deficit size and B1 the stock of
public debt.
The stock of bonds is determined by the path of deficits over time T:




Further, deficits are created by tax reductions and are eventually removed by tax hikes to
balance budgets. Allen and Kenen assume that transfers from non residents offset net
domestic interest payments:
(3.37)
The first expression represents interest payments, the second, interest receipts. Thus taxes
Th become the only form of government income and the control of the deficit is, by virtue
of this fact, achieved only by varying them.
3.3.11 Asset Markets
Supply of world bonds is perfectly elastic at a fixed world interest rate:
f O = f o (3.38)
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And market clearing is thus by quantity. Since r1 and r2 are variable, market clearing in
domestic bonds is by interest and exchange rate fluctuation. The market-clearing equations
for bonds and money are:
(3.39)
(3.40)
Further, all desired demands for bonds and assets are realised; there are no frustrated
plans.
·Bc - BC (3.41)1 - 1
*BC - BC (3.42)2 - 2
*Bh - Bh (3.43)1 - 1
·Bh - Bh (3.44)2 - 2
·Lh - Lh (3.45)1 - t
3.3.12 Summarised Equations
It is now possible to write the goods market, bond market and money market equations as
functions of all the endogenous variables.
Goods market:
Ct(Z7r'pfO, Ph ZP'2' yd - ·S) + C't(7r'pfo, Pt /z, P'2' yd, - ·S') +
Cft(pfo, p/Z7r', p/17r', C~ + (Gt/Pt) + (zGt'Ipt) = 8 t(Pt) (3.46)
where






Allen and Kenen point out that Wh and WC can be replaced by the expression for the
histories of savings and capital gains, Equations (3.6) and (3.28), for the comparative
static solutions. Changes in the history of savings variable, WS, and history of public
debt, B1 are described by the following two dynamic equations:
(3.49)
(3.50)
D becomes zero when the government decides to end the deficit at time t = k.
Solving the systems takes place for impact and steady state effects; for the steady state,
savings are set equal to zero. Allen and Kenen prove that the system is stable (Allen and
Kenen, 1980, pp.353-355).
3.4 ON SIMPLIFICATIONS AND SYMMETRIES
In order to reduce the number of parameters in the solutions, Allen and Kenen simplify
-the model by making certain assumptions and imposing symmetry in goods and asset
markets. These are now briefly examined.
3.4.1 The Balance of Payments (BOP)
The following equation is derived:
[(PIC f l + PlC'l + ZG'l) - (PoCo + P2C2 + G2 + [Tf + fo(1rBhO)
+ f2(zBh2 + zBC2) - fl(Bhl , + BCl ')] + [Bhl' - 1rBho - zBh2] = R (3.51)
The first square-bracketed term on line 1 represents the 'visible' part of the current
account, the second the 'invisible' part of the current account. The square-bracketed
expression on line 2 is the capital account.
3.4.2 Propositions
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Since savings and the budget deficit become zero in the long run, so must the
current account.
Overall cancellation of interest income by Tf and Tfl does not require that
each source of interest income is separately cancelled.
Regional transfers are also irrelevant in determining the mutual balance of
North and South with the world.
The joint change in reserves, Rt can be zero even when the bilateral reserve
flow Rh (the net flow between North and South) is not.
One country can be in global balance but have a surplus with the other and
a deficit with the rest of the world.
Goods Market Symmetries
AlIen and Kenen do not assume identical tastes, in order to enable a proper analysis of
integration. Thus they assume that the marginal propensity of each country to spend on
its home good is the same and likewise for the imported good. The marginal propensity
to consume on the imported good is of course less than that on the home good, implying
a bias towards the home good in either country. Formally,
Whenfull scale goods market symmetry is assumed, the following apply: price elasticities
are symmetrical, government and foreign demands are symmetrical, production functions
are the same and employment levels are the same initially. These conditions are assumed
when analysing interdependence, not from the start.
3.4.4 Asset Market Symmetries
Alien and Kenen point out that asset market symmetry is more logical than goods market
symmetry and thus easier to assume. It is easy to assume preference for home bonds over
partner's bonds and preference for partner's bonds over world bonds since the last two are
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respectively bad and worse substitutes for the first. Wealth holders are simply more
secure about home assets, which contain less risk of default (1980, pp.328-330).
1. Northern bonds are not perfect substitutes for Southern or world bonds:
o < - B·· < 00 0 < - B·· < 00 JO = 0, 2u u
2. Northern money is a better substitute for Northern bonds than for other bonds:
o < - LIj < - LII < 00 j = 0, 2
3. Northerners hold more Northern bonds and will buy more for an increase in
wealth than other bonds:
However, quantitative in addition to qualitative symmetry is required, and Allen and
Kenen thus impose further restrictions (p. 331):
1. The initial bilateral exchange rate, Z, equalises stocks of wealth between the
partners (and interest rates are equal).
2. The two money demands are symmetrical in the roles of rt and r2 but identical
with respect to ro
3. The Northern demand for the Northern bond and Southern bond is identical
to the Southern demand for the Southern and Northern bond, respectively.
Furthermore, r t and r2 have symmetrical and opposite roles in the Northern
and Southern asset demand functions. Thus asset demand is symmetrical.
The assumptions mean that money and bond holdings in North and South are initially




The saving function are identical with respect to the role that wealth and income have on
savings level. They are symmetrical in the roles of interest rates:
3.4.6 Bilateral Balancing
Although pzCz = PIC'1 due to symmetry assumptions, bilateral balancing cannot be
assumed because government demands may still be different.
3.4.7 Crowding Out
Allen and Kenen preclude the possibility of large changes in absorption due to interest rate
changes by assuming that saving (the 'mirror' of absorption) is more sensitive to wealth
than to interest rate changes, but that money demand is more sensitive to interest rate
changes than wealth changes.
i = 0, 1, 2
Further, proportionality in interest rate effects on saving and money demand is assumed
in order to preclude ambiguities of changes in ra:
Symmetry assumptions ensure that all these other conditions hold in the South as well.
3.5 COMPARATIVE STATIC RESULTS
The solving of the simultaneous systems is undertaken by Allen and Kenen (pp.336-373).
However, only the summarised results for impact and steady state effects will be
examined, and these will be presented in tables adopted from AlIen and Kenen. Table 3.1
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shows impact effects under a flexible external exchange rate while Table 3.2 shows steady
state effects. A brief breakdown of some of the unencountered terms follows:
oct01 a. shift of consumption from Northern to foreign goods
OC\Y2 a shift of consumption from Southern to foreign goods
These shifts refer to total net consumption on the goods.
oydt a change in total disposable income
or a change in the aggregate interest rate
6ft' a change in the joint float; the 'hat' is a reminder that it is not just the
Southern exchange rate that is changing.
The entries in the tables indicate the sign of the expected change in the column variable
as a result of a change in the row variable. A 'plus' indicates a change in the same
direction and a 'minus' a change in the opposite direction. A 'zero' indicates that no
change is expected and a question mark indicates that the change is indeterminate.
Table 3.1 Impact Effects Under a Flexible External Exchange Rate
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Disturbance Effect
o7f' 1roR ort or2 ort OPl OP2' oyd byd' oyt oyd
oro + 0 ? ? ? + + + + + +
oBl
c + - - - - + + + + + +
oB/' + + - - - + + + + + +
oD 0 0 0 0 0 + + + + + +
oD' 0 0 0 0 0 + + + + + +
oGl 0 0 0 0 0 + ? - ? ? -
oG2' 0 0 0 0 0 ? + ? - ? -
ocOl
t 0 0 0 0 0 - - - - - -
ocm
t 0 0 0 0 0 - - - - - -
Table 3.2 Steady-State Effects Under a Flexible External Rate
Disturbance Effect
o7f' 1roR orl or2 ort OPl op/ oyd oyd' oyt oyd
oro + ? ? ? ? + + + + + +
oBl
c + ? ? ? ? + + + + + +
oB2c1 + ? ? ? - + + + + + +
oBl + ? ? ? + + + + + + +
oB2 ' + ? ? ?, + + + + + + +
oGl + - + - 0 + + - + 1 0
oG2 ' + + - + 0 + + + - 1 0
OCOlt + - + - 0 - + - + 0 0
ocm
t + + - + 0 + - + - 0 0
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3.6 THE EFFECT OF INTEGRATION ON MACROECONOMIC
POLICY IN AN EXCHANGE RATE UNION
What follows is a graphical analysis of macroeconomic policy in an exchange rate union.
Both monetary and fiscal policy are dealt with.
3.6.1 Monetary Policy
First the effects of monetary policy on union aggregates are analysed, and then individual
effects. The aggregate effects do not depend on either the bond traded or the bank
involved, and the individual effects depend only on the bond traded.
3.6. 1. 1 Aggregate Effects
Refer to Fig. 3.lA. Curve WW gives combinations of the average interest rate and
aggregate wealth that clear the bond market, curve MMt are points at which the money
market clears and stst gives points at which desired saving is zero. stst is steeper than
MMt by assumption - that money demand is more responsive to interest rate changes than
saving - WW is negatively sloped because a fall in the interest rate is required to maintain
bond demand for an increase in wealth, whereas MMt and stst are positively sloped
_because a fall in wealth requires a drop in the interest rate to prevent either an increase
in desired saving or an increase in money demand. In Fig. 3.1B, BtBt gives combinations
of the average interest rate and the exchange rate that clear the bond market: a
depreciation which raises wealth27 requires a fall in the interest rate to offset increasing
bond demand. Curve LtLt gives combinations that clear the money market: a depreciation
and the corresponding increase in wealth increases demand for money which must be offset
by a rise in the interest rate.











(8) External exchange rate and
average interest rate
Figure 3.1 Asset market effects of an open-market purchase of either bond
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Figure 3.2 Goods market effects of an open-market purchase of either bond
52
For an open market purchase of either bond by. either bank, WW shifts down to reflect
the increase in demand for bonds and BtBt shifts in Fig. 3.lB. The increase in the money
supply shifts MtM down as well, and L~t likewise shifts out in Fig. 3.lB. The shifts in
WW and MMt show the required fall in the interest rate to maintain demand at the initial
level of wealth. Equilibrium moves to w* and there is dissaving at this point - stst does
not shift on impact.
The depreciation of the currency with the shifts of BlJ3t and L~t can be interpreted as the
rise in the home currency price of foreign bonds to offset the increase in demand for them
due to the increase in the money supply.
The rise in wealth and fall in t reduce saving and thus increase absorption. This effect
is strengthened by expenditure switching due to the depreciation. The effect on income
can be seen with the aid of Fig. 3.2.
In Fig. 3.2A ztzt gives the short run relationship between aggregate nominal income and
the exchange rate: a depreciation causes expenditure switching which raises local prices
and thus local income. ztzt is the analogous long run relationship but is steeper since in
the steady state saving is zero and thus the income boosting effects of a depreciation cannot
be dissipated into saving. The curve 7r' 7r' is the exchange rate schedule which shifts left
and right but is unrelated to income.
The increase in absorption shifts ztzt up and 7r' 7r' shifts right due to the depreciation, short
run equilibrium is displaced and to v' where income is higher. Since v' lies above ztzt
there is dissaving and a current account deficit which results in a further depreciation,
steady state goods market equilibrium moving to v*. In Fig. 3.lA, the zero saving curve
stst shift down to intersect at w*. In Fig. 3.lB, m' shifts out to m* as the exchange rate
depreciates, moving BlBt and L~t out slightly.
In conclusion, an open market purchase raises union income permanently under a flexible
rate, the extent of the increase effect is larger for an increase in substitutability of domestic
and world bonds since the depreciation and the capital outflow are both larger.
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3.6.1.2 Individual Effects
The individual effects depend on the bond involved but not on the bank. Use is made of
a four-quadrant diagram to represent the movements in wealth - Fig. 3.3, Figs. 3.3B and
3.3D are the asset market diagrams for North and South, respectively, in Fig. 3.3C,
WhWbt shows combinations of levels of wealth in North and South for constant aggregate
wealth. Fig. 3.3A shows the relationship between Northern and Southern interest rates.
Curve rtt shows combinations of rl and r2 that are consistent with a constant average
interest rate but curves r1r l and rr show combinations of either interest rate that clear the
Northern and Southern bond markets, respectively. The slope of rr l is less than one
since, although an increase in r2 requires an increase in r l to prevent excess supply of Bh
this increase need not be as large as the r l increase due to the assumption of
Bll > I B12 I .
After the open market purchases of B1, rl falls and substitution of B2 for B1pushes r2 down
as well, but not as much. In Fig. 3.3A, r1rl shifts down and r2r2 up; the fall in r2 is seen
to be less than that of rl. However, capital flows out of both countries and the exchange
rate depreciates. The capital gains due to the depreciation are identical, by symmetry, and
thus each country experiences an equal increase in wealth. Curve WhWht shifts out and
x shifts to x'.
To analyse income effects, refer back to Fig. 3.2B. Curve ylyl shows combinations of
output in North and South that clear the market for Good 1. The slope of ylyl is less
than one since a given increase in Southern income will result in a smaller increase in
Northern income, because Southerners are assumed to prefer the Southern good to the
Northern. Analogously, curve y2y2 has a slope greater than one. Curve ytyt is the locus
of combinations of national levels of income adding up to a constant aggregate income.
(8) Northern interest rate and wealth
(C) Northern and Southern wealth
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(D) Southern interest rate and wealth
Figure 3.3 Individual asset market effects of an open market purchase of the
Northern bond
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Now, because rt falls more than r2 for the open market purchase, Northern absorption rises
more than Southern and demand for Good 1 rise more than demand for Good 2. Thus
ytyt shifts out more than y2y2 and equilibrium falls to q1. Curve ytyt shifts out, but the
increase in aggregate income is distributed uneveniy - Northern income rises by more than
Southern. However, as asset market integration increases, rt and r2 become even closer
linked and the income increase more evenly distributed. In addition, as goods market
integration increases, the links between Pt and P2 become stronger and demand increases
in one country which lead to price charges cause closer price changes in the other country
and hence income changes. Thus market integration decreases policy autonomy in an
exchange rate union.
Towards the steady state, the Northern current account improves less than the Southern
due to its larger income increase. This indicates that Northern dissaving or saving must
increase or improve less, respectively. 28 Thus Wb falls more or rises less than Wbt and
since Wbt is constant, wealth is redistributed to the South. In Fig. 3.3C, equilibrium shifts
to x·. The increase in wealth in the South rises its demand for bonds and r2 falls further,
while the rise in the Northern rate due to its fall in wealth cause the two interest rates to
converge. If a current account deficit occurs with the open market purchase, depreciation
causes aggregate income to rise but Southern income rises faster than Northern due to its
falling interest rate. Thus the income changes in North and South also converge. In Fig.
3.2B, q' moves to q., in Fig. 3.3B v' moves to v·, in Fig 3.3D n' moves to n· and in Fig.
3.3A s' moves to s·.
Although monetary policy was able to influence impact income, it is apparent that in the
steady state, the aggregate changes are far more evenly distributed between the countries,
even in the absence of high market integration. Thus, long-run monetary policy control
over individual steady state income changes in an exchange rate union is not possible.
Wealth and interest rate changes may be controlled; however, they will be larger for the
country in which the bond is purchased.
28. The North can be in a state of dissaving or saving.
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What of the distribution of reserves? Observe that the steady state money market curve of
the North has shifted in slightly and that the Southern money market curve has shifted out.
But this does not imply a distribution of reserves to the South - shift in M1M1would have
taken place even with no change in reserves - and instead the distribution of wealth must
be determined to gauge the outcome. The answer is that reserves are distributed from
North to South, revealed by the movement from x to x· in Fig. 3.3C. Thus the open
market purchase has cost the North in reserves, while failing to provide it with any net
. income improvement over its partner.29
Three things can be concluded from their analysis; firstly, that integration increases the
effect on the partner of an open market purchase and that incomes and interest rates
coverage to the steady state. The income effect is also permanent, unlike that under a
fixed external exchange rate, which AlIen and Kenen analyse elsewhere. Secondly, it is
clear that the partner's income effect on impact is larger the greater the degree of
substitutability between North and Southern bonds, but that the steady state income effect
depends on the goods market responses to the depreciation. Thus, goods market
integration is more important for analysing long-run interdependence of monetary
policy.30 Finally, the central bank engaging in monetary policy must be prepared to lose
reserves to the partner country and these are larger the greater the degree of asset market
symmetry.
3.6.2 Fiscal Policy
The impact and steady state effects of three fiscal instruments are analysed - a balanced
budget increase in government spending, a tax cut and an interval of deficit spending. The
29. AlIen and Kenen do point out, however, that the presence of goods market asymmetries can modify the
outcome.
30. Drawing on the discussion on pages 448-449 it is clear that goods market symmetry must be assumed
to be able to make any clear statement about the paths of individual incomes to the steady state. With
any goods market asymmetry, Southern income can rise by more than Northern income for example,
and thus the central bank needs to know the nature of the asymmetry to be able to control individual
incomes. Goods market asymmetry also makes for ambiguity in current account, individual wealth and
individual interest rate changes. In brief, independent monetary policy is considerably frustrated by
goods market asymmetries.
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last two instruments are different from the first in that they lead to a permanent increase
in the supply of bonds, since the government must issue bonds to finance its expenditure.
With a balanced budget increase in spending, however, the expenditure is financed by a
increase in taxes and the supply of bonds does not change. Fiscal policies have no impact
effects in asset markets and thus, at least under the model, are not affected by the
exchange rate regime. However, their effects on the exchange rate in the steady state must
be determined, and also their effects on the South and its reaction.
3.6.2.1 Impact Effects
Refer to Fig. 3.4. Deficit spending on the Northern good shifts ylyl out to ylfylf, and
Northern and Southern income are raised, the latter due to income and substitution effects
of the increase in the price of Good 1 and the increase in demand for Good 2. Aggregate
income ytyt shifts out to q' which reflects the impact increase in union income. The
increase in y' was due to spillover effects of the northern budget deficit and these increase
as goods market integration increase. Graphically, an increase in goods market integration
reduces the difference in the slopes of ylyl and y2y2. Thus as ylyl gets closer to the
45 0 , the effect of the shift in it will be felt to an increasing degree on Southern income.
An increase in goods market integration, therefore, reduces the extent to which
independent fiscal policy can be pursued (although the effect of a budget deficit on
aggregate income is still the same).
A similar result obtains for decrease in home-goods bias (as ml approaches m2). Here,
the fiscal policy effect is also dissipated to the South in greater measure as home-goods
bias decreases, since the slopes of the income curves become more alike. With a budget
deficit, the larger increase in national income occurs in the country whose good is
purchased.
A tax cut is different from a budget deficit in that it increases income in the country of
origin by less than the deficit. Although the size of the deficit D is the same, not all of
it is spent since individuals will save some of the increase in their income. This means
that less will be spent on Good 1 and ylyl shifts out less. However, y2y2 also shifts out
due to the direct increase in demand for Good 2 producing equilibrium at q', where the
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increase in Y is less than that for a budget deficit but it is larger than the increase in Y',
due to home-goods bias. The results of increasing market integration and decreasing home
goods bias are the same as those for a budget deficit - the income changes become closer
and thus structural interdependence increases.
A balanced budget increase in spending leads to an increase in demand for Good 1 as well
as a decrease due to the increase in personal taxes. However, the increase outweighs the
decrease because not all of the income taxed will be disposable income - some of it will
be savings. Thus curve y1y1in Fig. 3.5 shifts out. However, y2y2 will shift in because
the drop in Northern demand for Southern goods is not matched by an increase in their
government expenditure. Thus y' can increase or decrease depending on whether- the
spillover effects of the Y increase outweigh the direct reduction in demand for Good 2.
As goods market integration increases, the income curves converge to the 45° and the
aggregate income i \.-rease is distributed more and more evenly between them.
With a decrease in home goods bias, however, the curves get closer but the inward shift
of y2y2 is amplified and the chance of a fall in y' is increased. This occurs because, as
home goods bias decreases, the Southern good is assumed to contribute a larger portion
of the Northern expenditure bundle, and with an increase in taxes there is therefore a




Figure 3.4 Effects on individual goods markets of Northern deficit spending

















Figure 3.5 Effects on individual goods markets of a balanced budget increase
in Northern spending on both goods
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The presence of goods market asymmetry can change the extent of income changes in both
countries, but it cannot change the direction (p.478).
3.6.2.2 Policy Interdependence
The degree of policy interdependence depends on the degree of structural interdependence,
i.e. the level of integration and the degree of home goods bias. When structural
interdependence is not high, the income changes in the country undertaking the fiscal
policy will be greater than those in the neighbour but they will still exist. The neighbour
country must then undertake offsetting policy if it objects to the change in its income.
In Fig. 3.6, curve Is-Is is the Northern fiscal reaction curve - it shows level of deficit
spending for a constant level of Northern income and it runs through the origin to indicate
that no change in income is desired. Curve lIs-lIs is the corresponding Southern curve.
A Northern deficit has a stronger effect on Northern income than it does on Southern so
Is-Is has a smaller slope than lIs-lIs. Thus for example, a increase in Northern income
requiring an Ogo deficit in the North will require a deficit of Og in the South. These lie
on the shifted policy reaction curve, Is' -Is' .
Assume the North wishes to raise income in accordance with curve Is' -Is'. It undertakes
.Ogo of deficit spending, assuming there is to be no reaction by the South. However, this
has the equivalent effect on Y' of a deficit of Og2' which lies on the shifted lIs' -lIs' curve
but if it is assumed that the South does not wish to have its income altered, lIs-lIs must be
treated as its policy reaction curve. The South must therefore cut its spending, but this
has the effect of partially offsetting the Northern spending deficit and the North will have
to increase its spending beyond Ogo to accommodate this negative spillover. The required
fiscal policy combination is determined by the intersection of 11 -11 and 1 '-I' where thes s ss,
North must undertake Og3 of spending and the South a spending cut of O~.
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Figure 3.6 Individual policy reaction curves for levels of deficit spending
required to achieve short run income targets
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As structural interdependence increases Is' -Is' becomes steeper and lIs-IIs becomes
shallower, moving the point of intersection further to the northwest and necessitating even
larger compensating fiscal policies. Thus structural interdependence places limitations on
policy interdependence; and the same result holds for the other two types of fiscal policy.
3.6.2.3 Steady-State Effects
The effects on the outcomes of fiscal policy of exchange rate changes have not yet been
determined, and this requires an analysis of the changes to the steady state, when asset
markets are affected by the changes in saving and thus change exchange rates. Firstly
balanced budget changes in spending, which do not alter the supply-of bonds, are
examined, and then deficit spending and a tax cut, both of which do. Under a flexible
rate, changes in the supply of bonds affect wealth and income and are thus important to
analyse.
In Fig. 3.7A, v' represents the short run increase in total income, after the initial increase
in expenditure for a balanced budget increase in spending. The individual effects are
shown in 3.7B, equilibrium being at q'.
The current account deficit at v' is accompanied by dissaving (since v 'lies' above the long
-run curve ztz~ and the exchange rate depreciates. 31 Expenditure switching then causes
an increase in aggregate income, and steady state equilibrium is displaced to v" in Fig.
3.7A.
31. Dissaving causes a decline in desired holdings of bonds and the excess flow supply of Bo results in a
capital inflow as capital is repatriated. The inflow is not large enough to offset the current account
deficit, however, and the depreciation still occurs.
63
o if'







(B) Northern and Southern incomes
Figure 3.7 Goods market effects of a balanced-budget increase in Northern
spending on the Northern good
o
Figure 3.8 Asset market effects of a balanced-
budget increase in Northern spending
on the Northern good
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The asset market effects are explained by Fig. 3.8. WW does not shift because there has
been no increase in the supply of bonds and neither does MtMt since the money supply is
policy determined. Aggregate wealth remains constant because the capital gains conferred
by the depreciation offset the effects of the dissaving and decline in desired bond
holdings. 32 Since wht and rt do not change, stst cannot shift and aggregate disposable
income thus remains constant, implying that steady state aggregate income increases by
the amount of the government expenditure.
The income changes are shown in Fig. 3.7B, ytyt shifts out to yt"yt", representing the
aggregate increase. Since Northern dissaving and its current account deficit are larger than
the South's, wealth is redistributed to the South and r1 rises while r2 falls to clear the bond
markets. 33 These wealth and interest rate movements raise expenditure and thus income
in the South, but Northern demand will fall unless the effect of the depreciation outweighs
the negative interest rate and wealth effects. In Fig. 3.7B it does not, and ylyl shifts in
slightly. Equilibrium moves to q" where yl is higher, but Y can be higher or lower than
it was at q'.
Thus the North's balanced budget spending raises its income as well as that of the South,
but at the expense of reserves (wealth). This parallels the result for monetary policy. An
increase in asset market integration would not change the size of the income increase, but
it reduces the difference between r1 and r2 and thus the 'quantity' change - that of wealth -
to clear the bond markets is larger. An increase in goods market integration narrows the
difference in income changes but does not effect the size of the change in aggregate
income. Allen and Kenen point out however, that the individual effects of the relaxation
of the assumption of goods market symmetry are not clear (p.520).
A tax cut and a budge deficit will change the supply of bonds over time, and this
possibility must be examined. The steady state effects are shown in Fig. 3.9. WW shifts
up due to the increase in supply of bonds for a budget deficit and stst shifts out as
32. Northern disposable income is reduced by the tax increase and so desired saving declines. This accounts
for the dissaving as individuals re-establish equilibrium in their desired savings.
33. Money also moves to the South due to the Wh and Cl effects, and this is tantamount to a redistribution
of reserves from North to South.
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dissaving declines. The interval of dissaving implies on increases in aggregate disposable
income and absorption and this raises yt. The position is represented at point v· in Fig.
3.10A.
The individual interest rate effects are seen in Fig. 3.9B. Curve rIrI shifts up due to the
increase in supply of Bh and spillover effects cause r2 to increase as well. 34 An increase
in asset market integration reduces the difference in the increases of r1 and r2 and thus the
difference in increases in saving and wealth.
Income responses are determined entirely by goods market characteristics, and AlIen and
Kenen show that with full scale goods market symmetry, the individual income increases
are identical regardless of the level of integration. This is occasioned by the fact that the
depreciation will cause symmetrical and equal expenditure switching in both countries and
thus equal changes in absorption.
34. No shift in c2c2 is shown although it could shift up or down. It will shift up if the wealth redistribution
to the South causes an increase in demand for B2•
wht 0




(B) Northern and Southern interest
rates
Figure 3.9 Asset market effects of an increase in the supply of the Northern
bond resulting from a Northern budget deficit
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(A) Aggregate income and external
exchange rate
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Figure 3.10 Goods market effects of an increase in the supply of the Northern
bond resulting from a Northern budget deficit
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3.7 THE EFFECT OF INTEGRATION ON ASSET AND
GOODS MARKET DISTURBANCES IN AN EXCHANGE
RATE UNION
To complete the analysis of an exchange rate union, a brief analysis of the effects of
disturbances on the asset and goods markets is undertaken, and the effects of integration
are carefully examined. However, much of what there is to discover has been discovered
in the previous section, and new sections will not be expanded on in any detail unless they
offer new insights.
3.7. 1 Asset Market Disturbances
3. 7. 1. 1 A Shift in Demand for Bonds
An increase in demand for either B1 or B2 resembles an open market purchase of either of
those bonds except that the money supply does not change. The average interest rate falls
and capital flows out as households increase their holdings of the foreign bond. This
causes a depreciation and further capital gains which increase wealth and the demand for
bonds and lowers the interest rate further. The interest rate decline and depreciation
increase absorption and thus income, which is higher in the steady state than on impact.
Steady state wealth is redistributed away from the country whose bond is involved but that
country experiences a greater initial increase in its income. However, towards the steady
state, incomes converge and the eventual income changes are equal regardless of the level
of integration. If the increase in demand for one bond was mirrored by a fall in demand
for another, i.e. a shift in demand took place, then opposite movements in income and
interest rates occur, causing a drop in output in the country where bond demand has fallen
and a rise in output in the other country. As integration increases, however, the income
affects are averaged out. Indeed, even with normal levels of integration, aggregate
variables do not change and adjustments are seen only in individual variables, which
mirror each other. Thus a demand shift of this nature 'redistributes' income and wealth
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Figure 3.12 Effects on nominal income of an increase in
the foreign interest rate
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3. 7. 1.2 A Rise in the Foreign Interest Rate35
A rise in ro will, assuming a moderate degree of substitutability between bonds, result in
a decline in demand for local bonds and a capital outflow as households increase their
holdings of Bo• The local average interest rate must rise to clear the market at initial
levels of wealth and WW in Fig. 3.11 shifts up. The rise in ro also reduces demand for
domestic money and MMt must shift down so that the interest rate at the present level of
wealth will equal supply. Curve stst is also affected, because the ro increase increases
desired saving, r must fall to offset the increase so that desired saving is zero in the steady
state and this causes stst so shift down.
Although wealth is shown to rise and rt to fall, the change in r is ambiguous: it depends
on the relative slopes of WW and MM. Income rises as lzt and 7(" 7(" shift out (Fig.
3.12) but the steady state rise is less than the impact rise, as saving falls to the steady
state. Thus an increase in ro will increase domestic income, and an increase in union
integration with the outside bond market will amplify the income increase, as well as the
depreciation (pp. 133-134).
What of the individual effects? Due to assumptions about asset and goods market
symmetry, the income, interest rate and wealth effects will be exactly halved between
-North and South. Each therefore experience an equal increase in wealth and income,
although the effects on r1 and r2 are ambiguous. This flows from the fact that the change
in the average interest rate is indeterminate without specific knowledge of the relative
slopes of WW and MtMt.
35. In order to remove ambiguities, we must assume that there is no foreign crowding out, SwL·· -Lt S. > °
(i = 0,.1, 2) zero local crowding out is already assumed but we must also assume that
U
~iSO I> =
LIOS t 1 = 0, 1, 2 (p.126).
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3.7.2 Goods Market Disturbances
3. 7.2. 1 An External Disturbance
An external disturbance is a shift between one of the local goods and a foreign good.
Thus the analysis will focus on a shift from Good 0 to Good 1, arising in any market - the
North, South or foreign.
On impact ztzt shifts up and income rises in Fig. 3.13. However, since z:zt also shifts up
and v' lies below v", the zero saving point for that exchange rate, there is positive saving
and a current account surplus. The current account surplus causes an appreciation and
since wealth and the interest rate do not change (there is no asset market effect), saving
can only be brought back to zero by a fall in disposable income. Thus yt must fall and
this is achieved by the expenditure switching effects of the appreciation. Equilibrium is
established at v·, where income is at its old level. The individual effects are clear only
if goods market symmetry is imposed. On impact, ylyl shifts out to yllyl' in Fig. 3.13B
and y2y2 stays put, thus Y increases more than Y'. In addition, the North runs a current
account surplus due to the increase in demand for its good but the South can have a
surplus or deficit on its current account.
The appreciation caused by the demand shift stimulates a capital outflow as households
restore their value holdings of foreign bonds, this leaves the North in net surplus and the
South in net deficit since the union's BOP is zero by the capital outflow. Hence wtt and
R must rise while Wh' and R' fall, also r1 will fall and r2 rise. These mirror reactions
occur because aggregate variables do not change. In addition, since aggregate income
returns to its initial level, there are equal and opposite changes in Y and Y'. Northern
income will fall by less than Southern, because its wealth rises and its interest rate falls.
Thus Y does not fall all the way back to its initial level but yl falls beyond its own.
As integration increases, the income changes become more equal, i.e. the fall in Y
increases and the fall in y' decreases until, with perfect integration, each returns to its old
level. Thus integration reduces the difference between the changes in income for a shift
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Figure 3.14 Goods market effects of a shift in
demand from the Southern good to
the Northern good
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3. 7.2.2 An Internal Disturbance
We examine the effects of a shift in demand from the Southern good to the Northern
Good.
Firstly, there is no effect on aggregate variables when goods markets are symmetrical.
The increase of Northern income is mirrored by a decrease in Southern income and the
Northern current account surplus is mirrored by the Southern deficit. Thus there is
positive saving in the North and an accumulation of asset holdings while there is Southern
dissaving and a decline in asset holding. This implies a wealth redistribution to the North.
Due to home asset preference, moreover, Northerners will demand fewer Southern bonds
and more Northern bonds than are sold by Southerners and excess demands and supplies
will force rI, down and r2 up. The interest rate movements will then result in a
convergence of saving, until each current account balance becomes zero (p.465). In the
steady state, Northern income, wealth and reserves are higher but those in the South are
lower. In addition rI is lower but r2 is higher than before the demand shift.
In Fig. 3.14 yIyI shifts up but y2y2 shifts in and equilibrium is established at q. in the
steady state. Aggregate income does not change.
With goods market asymmetry, national variables will still move in opposite directions but
the income changes will be different. There will, however, be a permanent appreciation
of the external flexible exchange rate.
3.8 CONCLUSION
It was suggested at the outset that the model would show the sub-optimality of an exchange
rate union between two integrated countries where a more complete form of unification
was possible. This has now been achieved - the analysis has shown clearly how policy
autonomy declines as the level of goods and assets market integration increases. What is
more, it has been argued elsewhere that the formation of an exchange rate union will
enhance financial (asset market) integration implying that the exchange rate union will
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itself be a reason for further unification. Short run monetary control of income is limited
but possible under high integration, long run influence is determined by goods markets and
where these are not closely symmetrical, monetary policy aimed at offsetting individual
countries may not work at all. However, if the countries recognise that they are integrated
- that they resemble a single homogenous country - they may decide to conduct monetary
policy as if they were one country and form a monetary union. This will save reserves
and ensure more effective policy by eliminating the possibility of duplicated policy and
removing the need for offsetting policy. A monetary union will thus guarantee policy
harmonisation and only target harmonisation will then have to be agreed upon.
Further questions arise, however, concerning the operation of fiscal policy betw"een
integrated areas. It has been shown that autonomy in independent fiscal policy declines,
as does monetary autonomy, with increased integration. However, as AlIen and Kenen
point out, goods market integration rarely reaches the.intensity of asset market integration,
and the question of fiscal unification is, for this reason and others, subject to much greater
debate and dispute than that of monetary unification (p.542). What will benefit integrated
areas, exchange rate unions or monetary unions is at least a degree of fiscal policy co-
ordination, since the costs of offsetting policy were seen to increase with integration.
This, however, implies common thinking about treatment and correction of macroeconomic
problems which cannot be assumed to exist between any regions, even highly integrated
ones.
To assist in making a case for or against further monetary unification in Southern Africa
the model will be put to use in Chapter 7 where it will be applied, in some modified form,
to the CMA situation. However, the insights provided by the model into the broad issues








In the preceding chapters theoretical aspects surrounding the analysis and functioning of
a currency area were examined, and the conclusion was reached that the economic
similarity and interdependence of regions is a good general indicator of the viability of the
area as a monetary union. In assessing the case for or against monetary union between
South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland,36 therefore, it is necessary to examine (among
other things) historical and existing monetary interdependence and co-operation between
these countries. This is the purpose of the present chapter, which describes and analyses
the various monetary agreements between the relevant countries, as well as the conditions
that brought them about. This is done after initially examining the monetary and financial
systems of the Three, which it is hoped will provide some understanding of the level of
financial market development in the CMA and the important disparities that exist.
Therefore, this chapter sketches the historical and institutional background of existing
monetary integration and interdependence which is necessary before going on to an
analysis of the functional usefulness of the CMA in later chapters.37
36. These countries will be referred to collectively as 'the Three'.
37. Thus little is said in this chapter concerning the viability of the CMA. The focus is rather on its
evolution as an institution.
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4.2 THE MONETARY SYSTEMS OF SOUTH AFRICA,
LESOTHO AND SWAZllAND
4.2.1 Aspects of the Monetary Systems of Developing Countries
The importance of studying the monetary system in order to understand the ~ature and
behaviour of 'money' in any country is stressed by Nana-Sinkam:
" ... the banking system in any particular country influences to a great extent
the items included in 'money' or excluded from it" ·(1978, p.63).
Thus in order to understand 'monetary integration' more fully it is important to understand
and have a working knowledge of the monetary systems, and their problems, of the
relevant countries.
It is possible to identify certain monetary characteristics and problems which are common
to developing countries. Certain ingrained characteristics forbid adequate realisation of
the goals of sufficient saving, an efficient credit generating mechanism and satisfactory
investment projects, which are, according to Furness (1975, p.23) the three requirements
for creating the desired financial base for development. However, according to Furness
-it is precisely these features that are lacking in most developing countries. Each will be
examined in turn.
Furness argues that the four typical sources of saving in a country (private, corporate,
government and foreign countries) are for the most part inadequate in developing countries
(1975, p.24). Private saving is limited by low incomes, high consumption levels, a lack
of incentive and a limited range of saving options, while corporate saving cannot take
place in any great measure where 'an indigenous entrepreneurial class has scarcely
emerged' (p.24). Government saving is also not normally possible due to the unlikelihood
of an excess of tax revenue over expenditure where the taxable sector of the economy is
small and increasing pressure exists for the provision of public goods (p. 25). External
sources of capital, while present, are often too small to effectively make up for the lack
of internal provision.
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The upshot of the savings problem of developing countries is thus, according to Furness,
a lack of effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policy due to a scarcity of loanable funds
(which would normally, via the interest rate, permit the government to manipulate
economic activity).
The 'savings problem' is often accompanied by the problem of insufficient demand for
credit (Furness, 1975, pp.25 - 26). Whilst a flourishing demand for credit was responsible
for the 'industrialisation and capital accumulation' of developed nations, Furness suggests
that credit demand has fallen off in developing countries as expatriate capital departed and
waned with the breaking away of developing nations from the former colonial powers
(1975, p.26). In essence, 'effective demand for credit from the local population was not
sufficient' and could not substitute for the departed impetus provided by colonial capital
(p.26).
What must happen, then, according to Furness, is that the developing nations must
establish the financial machinery in anticipation of the expanding demand for credit and
thereby facilitate it. This conclusion reached by Furness will be important in the context
of the debate surrounding monetary integration and its effects on the development of the
Three.
There are financial structure problems peculiar to Africa which Robson (1968) and
Nana-Sinkam (1978) have identified. Robson has pointed out the existence of a wide range
of financial systems in the many currency areas38 and has cautioned about the difficulty
of making integration schemes work in this environment (1968, p.73). Nana-Sinkam
identifies four major problems of African systems (1978, pp. 69-74). Firstly, he has
observed a high degree of private credit utilisation by certain governments and warns of
the "rationing of credit to the private sector" and the checks on investment that are
consequent (1978, p.70). In the presence of inadequate saving, as described by Furness,
this crowding-out problem can have serious consequences for growth. Secondly, he notes
that credit expansion has often outstripped the growth of real output, with inflationary
38. Admittedly, the situation has changed somewhat since 1968, but if anything, there has been more
monetary disintegration than the reverse since then. See Nana-Sinkam (1978, pp.75-88).
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effects. Reasons advanced for this include the difficulty of accurately determining gross
domestic product (due in part to the existence of large subsistence sectors), seasonal
fluctuations in the supply of money and a 'narrow conception' of consumer prices (p.71).
Inappropriate use of the interest rate is a third problem that one can identify in
Nana-Sinkam (p.73). Due to interest rates that have been too low in most African
countries, companies have invested their excess resources overseas at more attractive rates,
and thus contributed to the problem of inadequate saving which Furness identified.
Fourthly, the mobilisation of funds is hampered by the underdeveloped financial structure
and Nana-Sinkam does not see government-established development banks and the like as
an appropriate solution "since these institutions are protected from the discipline that the
raising of loans from the market necessarily imposes" (1978, p.74).
Thus one can identify monetary and financial problems of developing countries in general
as well as some specific to African countries. The importance of identifying these
problems will become clear as the monetary systems of the Three (discussed in Section
4.2.2) and the effects of integration on them (later sections) are analysed.
4.2.2 The Monetary Systems and Recent Monetary Events in
South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland
The purpose of this section is to describe in brief the monetary conditions and events in
the Three prior to and after the signing of the Rand Monetary Area (RMA) Agreement in
December 1974. The intention is simply to give an idea of the level of sophistication of
the various monetary systems, and no attempt is made to outline the provisions of the
agreement: this is done later.
4.2.2. 1 Lesotho and Swaziland Prior to the RMA: Common Arrangements
The International Monetary Fund Surveys of African Economies Volume 5 provides a
useful source of information on the state of the monetary systems of Lesotho and
Swaziland for the period of interest (IMF, 1973, pp. 19-27).
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Prior to the RMA,39 neither country had a central bank and neither had a national
currency. The rand was in circulation and legal tender in both and were distributed by the
commercial banks. After 1969, access to the South African capital market was granted
to the two countries and their securities were granted 'approved' status, thereby allowing
them to borrow subject to the same conditions as South African public entities (IMF, 1973,
pp. 19-20). This substituted for their lack of capital market facilities in this early period.
The commercial banks operating at this time were Barclays Bank International Limited and
Standard Bank Limited, which were under legal control from their London head offices
but worked closely with their South African offices. In Lesotho, the Standard Bank
operated as banker to the government while Barclays Bank was banker to the Swaziland
government. Other financial institutions operating in both were postal savings schemes,
development banks (only from 1972 in Lesotho), building societies and insurance
companies (IMF, 1973, pp.20-21).
Interest rates paralleled South Africa's, with commercial banks charging slightly more on
overdrafts to the governments than the South African Reserve Bank's rate. The
commercial banks attracted most of the deposits with relatively higher time deposit interest
rates than other institutions (p.23).
Neither Lesotho nor Swaziland could undertake exchange rate management since the rand's
value was determined by the South African Reserve Bank. From February 1961 to
,December 1971, the rand was pegged at RI = US$l,40 (i. e. one troy ounce of fine gold
= R25), after which it was devalued against the dollar. In August of that year it was
pegged to sterling and depreciated against the dollar when the UK government allowed
sterling to float in June 1972. Thus it was again pegged to the dollar in October 1972 and
only began to float independently in 1979 (IMF, 1973, p.24; Economist Intelligence Unit
(EIU) , 1989a, p.15).
39.. Other writers have made a distinction between the de facto and the de jure monetary union. Here 'the
RMA' will be taken to mean the de jure monetary union.
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The Exchange Control regulations in Lesotho and Swaziland were identical to South
Africa's, in keeping with the policy of a de facto monetary union. The two governments
were expected to enforce South African provisions so as to disallow exchange control
evasion through their monetary systems. There was no exchange control between the
Three. The situation had not been formalised, however, with arrangements resting
"largely on ad hoc exchanges of letters and unwritten understandings" (IMF, 1973, p.25).
Outward capital transfers to non-sterling area countries were more strictly controlled than
sterling area transfers. The latter type were permitted so long as they originated in the
remitting country, thus preventing exchange control evasion (p.26).
This then was the state of affairs in Lesotho and Swaziland in the early 1970s. How- the
situation changed subsequent to the signing of the RMA agreement is discussed next.
4.2.2.2 South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland to the Present
There is a stark contrast between the levels of sophistication and development of the
monetary systems of Lesotho and Swaziland on the one hand and South Africa on the
other. Financial development in South Africa has proceeded to the point of securities
markets and diverse financial institutions, whilst the major financial institutions in Lesotho
and Swaziland are still commercial banks. However, the monetary systems of Lesotho and
-Swaziland have become increasingly sophisticated since the signing of the RMA agreement
although it is not claimed that the agreement was responsible for this development. If
anything, the development of their monetary systems increased the pressure from the
Lesotho and Swaziland governments for a formal agreement. The changes in the formal
arrangements and the reasons for them are discussed in Section 4.3 of this chapter: they
should be understood, though, in the context of the divergent degree of monetary system
sophistication that characterises the RMA. By discussing each monetary system in terms
of money and banking characteristics, currency arrangements, financial markets, financial
institutions, external payments and exchange control arrangements respectively, it is hoped
that this understanding will be facilitated.
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4.2.2.2(a) South Africa
Central Banking in South Africa is carried out by the South African Reserve Bank which
deals with government, commercial banks and discount houses. The Reserve Bank was
established in 1921 in terms of the Banking and Currency Act of 1920, with the following
primary functions:
(1) to be the sole issuer of banks notes in the country,
(2) to be banker to the commercial banks, and
(3) to be 'lender of last resort' to the other financial institutions (Solomon,
1983, pp. 158-159).
The functions of a central bank can be divided into 'active' and 'passive', the latter
conventionally being those associated with monetary policy. Besides these 'passive'
functions outlined above, the Reserve Bank also acts as custodian of the gold and foreign
exchange reserves of the country and acts as banker to the government. It assumed this
latter role in 1927 (Solomon, 1983, pp. 159-160).
The 'active' functions of the reserve bank include manipulation of the Bank Rate, open
market operations and moral suasion.40 Conventional use of the Bank Rate was dropped
in 1982, but then re-introduced in 1985. Open market operations have only recently
(1973) become practicable due to the inadequacy, for a long time, of the long- and short-
term securities markets (Solomon, 1983, pp. 160-162).
The legal categories of financial institutions were established by the Banks Acts of 1965
and 1972. The categories are: commercial bank, merchant bank, general bank and
discount house. Banks fall into categories depending on their major activity, demand
deposits indicating a commercial bank, merchant business a merchant bank, short-term
investiture of funds a discount house and if no activity predominates, the institution is
classified as a general bank.
40. 'Moral suasion' is no longer considered a practical means of achieving monetary policy goals (Solomon,
1983, p.160).
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Today there are five large commercial banks, four discount houses and a range of building
societies (which are allowed to undertake many banking functions, thus the distinction
between banks and building societies is blurring). There are also a number of savings
institutions such as pension institutions and insurance companies (EIU, 1989, p.42).
The increasing sophistication of the financial markets and the increasing mobility of capital
has led to large, unprecedented fluctuations in interest rates and contributed to a high
money supply growth rate. Thus monetary policy has had to become more flexible,
moving from 'direct' controls to more 'market orientated' controls which typify monetary
trends in advanced Western countries. At the time of writing, interest rates have been
allowed to rise fairly sharply to curb excessive credit demand - M3 growth having -far
exceeded its target in 1988 (EIU, 1989, p.43).
The South African currency, the rand, is issued by the South African Reserve Bank in
Pretoria and coins are minted at the South African Mint, also in Pretoria. Its international
value is determined by a 'managed float' system conducted by the Reserve Bank, with dual
values for commercial and financial transactions. The dual exchange rate system was
reintroduced in 1985 in an attempt to reduce the impact of capital outflows on the
commercial exchange rate, which had depreciated severely41 by the end of 1985 and had
boosted inflation as petrol prices and importable finished and intermediate goods prices
rose. The rand has never recovered its pre-1984 values, and although the effective
exchange rate index showed some improvement in 1987, by 1988-89 the index had fallen
again (EIU, 1989, p.16).
The financial markets in South Africa are as sophisticated and advanced as those in any
developed country, with the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) handling the full range
of public and private securities and equity. Net domestic investment has been restrained,
however, more by lack of confidence in the economy than by the high capital flight. The
latter phenomenon, also occasioned presumably by lack of confidence in the economy for
political reasons, has lead to a rise in the proportion of locally owned business to foreign
owned as local management buy out foreign holding companies. Personal savings, after
41. Based on an effective exchange rate index (EIU, 1989, p.16).
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rising from 1980 to 1985, have again fallen up to 1988. Corporate saving has remained
fairly constant since 1986 although government has been a net dissaver since 1983 (EID,
1989, pp.39-40).
Since 1985, South Africa's BOP situation has comprised a capital account deficit (long and
short term flows) and a current account surplus. In 1985 foreign banks withdrew credit
lines to South Africa in protest against the increasing level of political repression practised
by the South African government, and this precipitated a debt crisis. Foreign institutions
called in loans and new credit facilities became unavailable. South Africa has therefore
had to make a concerted effort to redeem foreign debt without the assistance of foreign
banks or the IMF, and this fact combined with the problem of capital flight has meant a
continued forced current account surplus since 1985. Import restrictions in the form of
surcharges have been employed to maintain the current account surplus and these have
been especially necessary in times of net rise in local economic activity (EID, 1989,
pp.46-50).
The freeing-up of exchange controls since 1961 had to be reversed with the 1985 debt
crisis when even non-residents faced restrictions on outward capital movements. All
non-resident capital transactions take place in financial rands (EID,1989,p.51).
4.2.2.2(b) lesotho
Before 1980, the Commissioner of Financial Institutions performed rudimentary central
banking functions after which the Lesotho Monetary Authority took over with the
introduction of the Lesotho currency (see below). The stated functions of the Authority
were to issue and redeem notes, to promote monetary stability and to promote financial
conditions to facilitate development (Barclays Bank, 1981, p.25). In August 1982 the
Central Bank of Lesotho was established, taking over from the Monetary Authority and
assuming all the tasks and responsibilities of a central bank (EID, 1987, p.55). The
Financial Institutions Act regulates the functioning of the four commercial banks: Barclays,
the government-controlled Lesotho Bank, Standard Bank Limited and Standard Bank of
South Africa Limited (Barclays Bank, 1981, p.25). The Act stipulates licencing
requirements, minimum capital and resources and has 'prescribed investments' clauses _
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requirements for certain investments to be held by the registered institutions. In addition
there are liquid assets ration provisions, credit extension restrictions, acceptable securities
stipulations and mandatory audit provisions (Collings et al., 1978, pp.112-114).
The Lesotho Bank (short for Lesotho National Development Bank) operates partially as
a development bank and partially as a commercial bank. It is 100 per cent
government-owned and was established in 1972. The Lesotho Building Finance
Corporation, established in 1976, assists and encourages long term financing of housing
and other building types. The Lesotho Agricultural Development Bank was established
by the government in 1978 with the goals of assisting crop and livestock farming (Barclays
Bank, 1981, pp.25-26 and Collings et al., 1978, p.113). Although there are many
insurance agencies, only four insurance companies operate and only one of them, the
Lesotho National Insurance Company, has a registered office in Lesotho. Thus the
insurance business is fairly small in Lesotho (Barclays Bank, 1981, p.26).
Lesotho's currency, the maloti, was introduced in January 1980 along with the Lesotho
Monetary Authority. 'Maloti' is the plural of 'loti' which is the single currency unit. The
loti is divided into 100 cents: 'lisente', the name being a corruption of the English 'cent'.
Leabua Jonathan, the then Prime Minister announced on its introduction that the rand
should "for the foreseeable future, continue to circulate with it [the maloti], within our
territorial borders" (quoted in Barclays Bank, 1981, p.25). Lesotho has no independent
exchange rate policy and thus has no control over the value of the maloti, which is pegged
to the South African rand in terms of the Rand Monetary Area Agreement and
amendments (see below). Under the Rand Monetary Area Agreement, Lesotho has access
to the South African capital market and this source of investment funding is taken to be
necessary In light of Lesotho's poorly developed financial structure and insufficient
savings: 9 - 15 per cent of disposable income over the past decade (BIU, 1988, p.55).
The Agreement formalised the right of Lesotho and Swaziland to issue public securities
but limited the holdings by South African institutions of these securities to no more than
1,5 per cent of their legal minimum holding of 'prescribed investments' and 'approved
securities' . The situation as regards short term securities is less favourable - neither
Lesotho nor Swaziland has any permanent right to issue Treasury Bills on the South
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African market but the South African Reserve Bank has agreed to act as 'lender of the last
resort' to their central banks in times of crisis (Collings et al., 1978, pp. 104-105).
Movements on the current account of Lesotho's BOP are far greater than capital account
movements, with current account deficits and capital account surpluses typifying the
situation. Migrant labourers' remittances make up the largest positive item within the
current account but they are often only approximately 70 per cent of the merchandise
imports figure. Thus workers remittances partially finance the trade deficit, with capital
inflows comprised of official loans and investment along with inward transfers (on the
invisible account) assisting as well. In 1986 and 1987, however, the Central Banks had
to run down reserves to finance the balance. The Lesotho Highland Water Scheme is
expected to provide relief as funds flow in from South African investors (EIU, 1988,
pp.59-60).
Lesotho receives Official Development Assistance (ODA) aid and in 1987 this accounted
for just over 50 per cent of unrequited transfers (the balance comprising Southern African
Customs Union receipts and 'eastern bloc' grants)42 (BIU, 1988, p.61). Lesotho has a
high ratio of public external debt to GNP - 30 per cent in 1986, and a correspondingly low
debt service ratio due to a large quantity of 'soft' loans with extremely long maturity
periods (EIU, 1988, pp.61-62).
As far as exchange control policy is concerned, the 1974 Agreement did little besides
formalise the de facto agreement whereby Lesotho agreed to enforce South African
exchange controls. There is still no exchange control on movements within the RMA
(Barclays Bank, 1981, p.26). The Agreement did, however, resolve ambiguities in the
informal agreement and specified that foreign transactions originating in a particular
country shall be subject to the sole responsibility of that country's monetary authority.
The South African government has agreed to make foreign exchange available for the
purposes of these approved transactions. Lesotho and Swaziland are expected to follow
South Africa's exchange control policy but may make changes provided these do not result
42. Although not all ODA disbursements are unrequited: loans are included in the ODA figure. However,
at least 25 % of the ODA figure should represent, by requirement, unrequited aid. In the case if
Lesotho, for 1986, just under 90% of ODA disbursements represented grants (EIU, 1988, p.61).
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in looser controls than South Africa's. The Agreement does allow them to depart from
South African policy measures if the adoption of these would be contrary to national
interest (Collings et al., 1978, pp. 105-107).
4.2.2.2(c) Swaziland
Swaziland's Monetary Authority was established in 1974 and had as its functions the
issuance and redemption of legal tender, the promotion of financial stability and the
promotion of conditions suitable for economic development (Collings et al., 1978, p.115).
In 1981 the Monetary Authority became the Central Bank of Swaziland, although the
nature of the Monetary Agreement with South Africa did not permit any greater monetary
independence (EIU, 1988, p.91). The Bank has as its main task the administration of
exchange control procedures, not being able to engage in independent monetary or
exchange rate policy (by own choice since 1986) (Barclays Bank of Swaziland Limited,
1979, p.39). There are three commercial banks and one development bank in Swaziland:
the Bank of Credit and Commerce International, Barclays Bank of Swaziland Limited,
Standard Bank Swaziland Limited and the Swaziland Development and Savings Bank
(established in 1965) (EIU, 1988, p.86). All the commercial banks are locally
incorporated, subject to the Financial Institutions Order of July 1973; the Swaziland
government has a 40 ,per cent equity participation in Barclays and Standard Banks
-(Collings, 1978, p.116).
The Swaziland Development and Savings Bank is publicly owned and managed, and was
established to provide support and aid to the rural 'cash economy'. It thus provides
financial support to agriculture, forestry, housing and small business. Initial capital (in
1965) consisted of grants from UK and USA development aid funds (Barclays Bank, 1979,
p.43; Collings et al., 1978, p.116). Recently, the bank has not been faring well, and it
is reported to be "struggling" (EIU, 1988, p.86).
In September 1974 the Swaziland authorities issued a national currency, the lilangeni
(plural emalangeni, abbreviated 'E'). They did not withdraw from the RMA negotiations
however, and no independent monetary system was established since it was felt that this
may prejudice South African trade and tourist links. The lilangeni circulated alongside the
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rand and was covered fully by interest-earning deposits at the South African Reserve Bank.
Initially, interest was only paid on the rand deposits (i.e. emalangeni in circulation) but
after the South African Reserve Bank agreed to pay interest on all currency in circulation,
thereby obviating the need for a rapid changeover of currencies (Colling, 1978,
pp.114-116). The situation changed in 1986 with the Trilateral Monetary Agreement (see
Section 4.4 below) when the two currencies were de-linked, the rand being finally taken
out of circulation and the Swaziland Central Bank assuming, for the first time, the right
to allow the lilangeni to depart from par with the rand (EIU, 1988, p.69). The reasons
for these developments will be discussed in later sections.
Financial Institutions besides the four banks comprise the Swaziland Royal Insurance
Corporation (est 1974), the Swaziland National Provident Fund (established in 1974), the
Swaziland Building Society and "some savings and credit co-operatives" (CoIlings et al. ,
1978, p.116; EIU, 1988, p.86; Barclays Bank, 1979, p.43). The Insurance Corporation
is majority-owned by the Swaziland government and has "the monopoly of all insurance
business in the Kingdom" (Barclays Bank, 1979, p.43). The National Provident Fund
assists injured, sick or aged, inactive workers, and membership is compulsory for all
economically active Swaziland citizens. The Building Society assists private home
construction (Barclays Bank, 1979, p.43).
As with Lesotho, Swaziland's interest rates parallel those of South Africa and there is free
flow of capital between the two countries in terms of the Monetary Agreement. However,
the Central Bank does have the power to prescribe interest rates in the banking system
(Collings et al., 1978, p.117; EID, 1988, p.84).
Since 1985 Swaziland has run a BOP surplus, with a traditionally large trade deficit being
shrunk considerably in 1986/87, presumably partially due to the depreciation of the
rand-linked lilangeni. Non-visible current account items also improved in the mid 1980s
- interest earnings abroad increased as well as South African migrant labour
remittances. 43 The capital account showed a deficit in 1987 for the first time in five
43. There was also improvement due to the reinsurance claims for the cyclone Demoina damage. However,
this current account assistance is 'one-off.
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years, due to a decrease in government capital borrowing permitted by a narrowed budget
deficit. The direct investment account is still positive, however. ODA assistance
increased in 1986 over the 1982-1985 levels; however, the proportion of loans in the total
has risen substantially. In 1986 ODA grants cOlnprised nearly 60 per cent of the 'official
transfers' figure (EID, 1988, pp.87-90).
While foreign debt levels have risen considerably in the 1980s, this has been largely
occasioned by the depreciation of the rand-linked lilangeni. The depreciation also
increased debt service drastically, although the debt service ratio obviously did not change
much. The ratio, in 1980 equal to 7,1 per cent, has been described as "a modest burden
in comparison with much of the rest of the continent" (EID, 1988, p.90).
As noted earlier, the initial RMA agreement formalised the parallel South African
exchange control policies followed by Lesotho and Swaziland. The 1986 agreement did
not change the situation as regards external flows, however, it does permit Swaziland to
restrict flows of funds between itself and South Africa. As yet, it has not done so
(Gargano, 1986, p.80 and EID, 1988, p.91).
4.3 THE RAND MONETARY AREA AGREEMENT
In the previous section, the monetary systems of the Three were outlined and it was seen
that those of Lesotho and Swaziland are in essence 'monetary satellites' of the large and
sophisticated South African system. Considering this 'natural' integration of the three
markets, then, it is not surprising that a formal monetary union of sorts came into being
between them. It is the rationale behind the monetary union Agreements and their
provisions that are analysed in this chapter, after a short initial section on the history of
monetary affairs in the region.
4.3.1 A History of Money and Monetary Co-operation in
South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland
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Before the 1780s, metal currency in the form of Spanish Silver Dollars and later Dutch
Guilders circulated in the Cape, after which the first paper currency, the rix dollar, was
introduced. With the arrival of the British at the Cape in 1806, Sterling currency was
introduced but became standard only after 1881, with the application of the Imperial
Coinage Act to the Cape and Natal (Goedhuys, 1982, p.29).
In the early Transvaal Republic, the Pretoria Mint produced silver and gold coins for
circulation: florins and Krugerponde, while Natal and the OFS used coins from the Cape
and Transvaal (Goedhuys, 1982, p.29). Both the Free State Republic and Natal
experienced coin shortages, however, with the Free State consequently embarking on a
series of disastrous paper note issues to try and rectify the situation (Solomon, 1983,
p.132). British currency became standard in the Union of South Africa and was minted
from 1923 at the South African Mint in Pretoria. South Africa remained on the gold
standard until 1932, when it decided to abandon the policy, Britain having done so the
previous year. Sterling currency remained in use until February 1961 when it was
replaced by the decimalised rand system (Solomon, 1983, pp.135~137). South Africa
became a Republic the same year.
Lesotho and Swaziland became monetised after the contact of European hunters and traders
in the nin~teenth century. Initially - up to the formation of the Union of South Africa -
'monetary anarchy' typified the situation with various currencies in circulation, and the
situation was rectified only in 1921 with the establishment of the South African Reserve
Bank and the introduction of the South African rand. This became legal tender in the
British protectorates as well (previously Bechuanaland, Basotuland and Swaziland), until
decimalisation in 1961. The rand then remained the sole currency in Swaziland and
Lesotho until the introduction of their own national currencies (1974 and 1980,
respectively) (Collings et aI., 1978, pp.97-98).
Thus a de facto monetary union between the Three was the case from the time the
Protectorates became properly monetised. There were no exchange controls between
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them, and for external transactions residents of Lesotho and Swaziland were treated as
South African citizens. Exchange control regulations were thus informal, as was Bank
Legislation. Financial co-operation between the banks of Lesotho and Swaziland44 and
their associates in South Africa was also close, with deposits from the two being placed
at South African branches and South African branches extending credit in times of need
(CoIlings et aI., 1978, p.99).
This monetary co-operation and interdependence existed against the background of other
economic co-operation, specifically the Customs Union Agreement of 1910 and 1969. In
addition, the South African mines provided work (and still do) for migrant labourers,
particularly Sotho. However, it (the monetary interdependence) deprived the two of
effective monetary control and for the most part interest rates, exchange rates, money
supply and exchange control were completely out of the hands of their authorities.
Collings et al. note, however, that this state of affairs had some benefit: " ... it also
relieved the hard-pressed administrations in the new countries of the need to make difficult
decisions on a wide range of monetary and external issues" (1978, p.l00). The situation
did not remain for long, however, as shall be seen.
4.3.2 Reasons for the RMA Agreement
As has been noted, a de facto monetary union had existed between South Africa, Lesotho
and Swaziland (and Botswana) from the time money had first been introduced to the
Protectorates. 45 It was thus not for the purpose of establishing a monetary union that the
RMA Agreement was signed but rather in order to legalise the informal arrangements and
introduce some new items that appeared to be called for. This section will outline
Lesotho's, Swaziland's and South Africa's reasons for wanting a formal monetary
agreement.
44. These countries shall henceforth, for the sake of convenience, be referred to as 'the Two'.
45. Before they became independent in the late sixties, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland had been
protectorates of the British Empire. They remained members of the British Commonwealth after
independence.
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4.3.2. 1 Lesotho and Swaziland
Goedhuys explains that, since Lesotho and Swaziland did not have currencies of their own,
they forewent the seigniorage gain that would accrue to issuers of currency (1982,
p.18).46 Thus they desired compensation for this forgone income. In addition, Collings
et al. point out that the Two wanted "clarification of the extent of the right to
independently authorise transfers of capital and profits originating in their own territories
to destinations outside the rand area" (1978, pp. 101-102). That is, they desired the right
to exercise their own exchange control over local items. Further, Collings et al. state that
the Two wanted better access to the South African capital market and provision for
consultation of their authorities by South Africa's when monetary and financial changes
that would affect them (the Two) were being considered (1978, p.l02).
This 'agenda' for the Agreement originated against the background of increasing monetary
activity in the Two and the desire by them to ensure the healthy development of their
monetary systems. There was evidence that commercial bank deposits had risen rapidly
in the years immediately after independence: percentage growth figures for 1969, 1970 and
1971 (BLS, all deposits) standing at 16,22 and 23 per cent, respectively (IMF, 1973,
p. 22).47 Other trends which showed a sharp increase in financial activity were the growth
of loans to the private sector (an average growth of 25 per cent between 1968 and 1971)
and an increased use for investment of local savings: the loans/deposits ratio increasing
from 65 per cent in 1968 to 75 per cent in 1970 and 1971 (IMF, 1973, p.23). Hence the
monetary systems of the Two were developing a momentum of their own; it was not
surprising therefore that their authorities wished to facilitate this development by clarifying
their posItion vis-a-vis the South African system.
4.3.2.2 South Africa
The South African authorities had their own reasons for wanting the agreement, although
they probably realised that it would mean some sort of compensation provision on their
46. That is, the gain resulting from the earning of income from investments purchased with a medium of
exchange with a higher face value than its intrinsic value.
47. Of these figures Botswana and Swaziland on average account for 40% of deposit volumes each, and
Lesotho 20% (IMF, 1973, p.22).
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part. Having conducted the new Customs Union Agreement in 1969, Collings et al. point
out that the parties would have desired to "turn attention on some other anomalies of their
situation" (1978, p.101). Primarily, then, to bring the BLS states under control and to
"preclude the growth of unsound banking operations in the area", the South African
authorities would have been prepared to formalise the agreement and "cough up" the
compensation forgone by the Two for such a long time (Collings et al., 1978, p.101).48
A further, more general reason is implied by Muzorewa: capital was not completely
mobile from South Africa to the BLS countries49 and at the time of the article (1972)
Muzorewa claimed that "the less developed members of the rand territory have taken and
are taking measures to reduce the outflow of domestic savings to South Africa" (1972,
pp.52-53). Thus the mobility of capital was being deliberately reduced prior to the
Agreement, and the Agreement was therefore necessary to prevent monetary disintegration
in the area.
Thus it was that negotiations for the formal agreement began in 1973 "towards a
comparable [to SACU] treaty on currency and banking, in order to establish the rights and
obligations of each party in that regard ... " (Goedhuys, 1982, p.19). The details and
provisions of the first Rand Monetary Area Agreement are the topic of the following
section.
4.3.3 Details and Provisions of the RMA Agreement
What follows is a summary of the Monetary Agreement between the governments of South
Africa, Swaziland and Lesotho (Monetary Agreement, 1974). The summary will proceed
by article of the agreement, of which there are eleven. The Agreement, which is legally
a treaty, was signed at Pretoria on 5 December 1974.
48. A Financial Mail article describing the provisions of the agreement is entitled "Monetary agreement:
SA coughs up" (Financial Mail, 1974, p.1043). .
49. Muzorewa cites examples of the limitations imposed by South African authorities on the investment in
BLS of funds exceeding R100 000 (Muzorewa, 1972, p.52).
4.3.3. 1 The Preamble
92
This gives the motives for the Agreement, one of them being the desire "that the
arrangements should encourage the advancement of the less developed members of the
Rand Monetary Area and should afford to all parties equitable benefits ... ".
4.3.3.2 Article 1: Definitions
This article merely defines items such as 'foreign exchange', 'exchange control provisions'
and 'financial institution' .
4.3.3.3 Article 2: Legal Tender
Only the rand is legal tender in the RMA, subject to a provision that the Two may issue
their own "national note and coin" by prior arrangement with the South African
government. 50
4.3.3.4 Article 3: Transfer of Funds within the Rand Monetary Area.
The free movement of funds in the RMA is provided for, subject to three limitations; the
first being those occasioned by legal deposit requirements of local financial institutions.
The second arises from possible measures implemented by respective authorities to
encourage domestic investment and the third, from measures to curtail transfers which are
deemed to be intended "to evade any such requirements prescribed or measures introduced
by any other contracting party".
4.3.3.5 Article 4: Access to the South African Capital and Money Markets
and Related Matters.
Access to the South African capital market is granted to the governments of the Two and
their securities are given 'prescribed investment' or 'approved security' status subject to
two provisions (Paragraph 1). The first provision limits the amount appropriable by the
Two to 1,5 per cent of any financial institution's minimum 'prescribed investment'
50. Note that by the time of the agreement, Swaziland's lilangeni had already been issued.
93
holdings. Secondly, the securities of the Two do not qualify as compulsory investments
for the purposes of financial institution legislation (Paragraph 2). Paragraph- 4 provides
for the concluding of bilateral agreements with the South African government which allow
for the performance of 'lender of last resort' functions for the Two by the South African
Reserve Bank. Collings et al. note that this amounted to a 'partial concession' to the
governments of the Two for the failure by South Africa to agree to allow them to float
Treasury Bills on the South African short term money market. The Two had hoped to
secure the Treasury Bill provision in order to avoid having to continue to rely on
commercial bank overdraft facilities, which were expensive (Collings et al., 1978,
pp. 104-105).
Commenting on the arrangements, the then Secretary for Finance, Gerald Browne, said
of the 1,5 per cent proviso: "This was felt by us to be a reasonable maximum, given the
scale of their economies", and on the absence of a Treasury Bill proviso: "The Reserve
Bank felt it would be going too far to accept outside securities as liquid assets" (quoted
in Financial Mail, 1974, p.l043).
4.3.3.6 Article 5: Gold and Foreign Exchange Transactions.
Each government is made the sole authority for regulating transfers originating in its area
(Paragraph 1). This regulation should be in line with the policies of the RMA and the
exchange control provisions of South Africa, and amendments (Paragraphs 2 and 3) except
that departures from them are allowed where subsequent amendments would adversely
affect a country's "national interest" (Paragraph 3). The South African Reserve Bank shall
provide foreign exchange to the governments of the Two for authorised transactions
(Paragraph 5) and consultation is provided for should it be felt that a foreign exchange
transaction in one country is being undertaken "with the intent or effect of evading the
exchange control provisions of another contracting party" (Paragraph 6).
4.3.3.7 Article 6: Compensatory Payments.
Paragraph 1 explains that the intention is to compensate the Two for the rand currency
circulating in their areas. Although it is not mentioned, this is of course the compensation
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for the (previously discussed) forgone seigniorage of Lesotho and Swaziland.51 The
formula for calculating the amount of compensation is given as 2/3 X per cent of Y, where
X is the rate of return on the most recent issue of South African government stock and Y
is the rand circulation in the relevant area. Sub-paragraphs (d) and (e) explain how Y is
arrived at and how changes in the figure are allowed for. Further, Paragraph 3 specifies
that if either of the Two should issue its own currency then continued compensation would
be subject to further negotiation. Initially, in the case of Swaziland, South Africa paid
compensation on the residual rand in circulation but later agreed to compensate for the
entire currency in circulation (rand and lilangeni). Collings et al. explain that the
two-thirds factor is supposed to approximate the "weighted average earnings on an
appropriate mix of long and short term foreign reserve assets" (Collings et al., 1978,
p.108).
The remaining articles of the agreement are of less economic interest. They include
provisos for collection and exchange of monetary statistics (Article 7), consultation and the
establishment of a commission to sit at least once yearly (Article 8), dispute settlement
(Article 9) and entry into force, accession, termination and withdrawal (Article 10).
The Agreement remained in force until April 1986 when three amending agreements were
signed. These agreements, and the factors that made them necessary are the topics of the
next section.
4.4 THE NEW AGREEMENTS
On 18 April 1986 two bilateral amending agreements between South Africa and Swaziland
and South Africa and Lesotho and a third general amending agreement were signed and
the 'Rand Monetary Area' became known as the 'Common Monetary Area'. The first part
of this section deals with the reasons for the amendments, which were largely to do with
Swaziland's dissatisfaction, and the second half looks at the details and provisions of the
amendments.
51. ~t~ough ~he ~ormula represents estimated income that would have been earned had all the currency
ID circulation ID a country been "wholly in income-eaming assets" (Collings, 1978, p.107).
4.4.1 Reasons for the Amendment of the RMA Agreement
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In 1982, D.W. Goedhuys, advisor to the South African Reserve Bank, said in an address:
"It seems to me that one indispensable condition for maintaining the monetary
union we have ... is to maintain the value of the rand as the central reserve
currency of this union and very probably also of any future constellation of
states" (1982, p.2l).
As it happened, the severe depreciation of the rand in 1985 was one of the more important
reasons given by Swaziland for its dissatisfaction with the status quo, but there were
others, some having been voiced as early as 1981.
In a paper published in 1981, Guma analyses the effect of the institutional arrangements
on the operation of monetary policy in Swaziland (Guma, 1981). He explains that the
fixed rate of exchange between the lilangeni and the rand and the lack of intra-Area
exchange controls (in effect, perfect capital mobility) have precluded the use of monetary
policy by the Swaziland authorities. Swaziland faces an exogenous interest rate for four
reasons; the first is the fact that its marketable assets are a very small proportion of the
RMA total, the second the high ratio of foreign holdings of domestic assets to local
holding of foreign assets,52 the third the absence of restrictions on capital movements
within the RMA and the fourth the small size of local demand for assets in relation to the
whole RMA. Guma backs up his assertions with empirical evidence - he states that there
has in fact been little deviation between the interest rates of Swaziland and the RMA
(p.15). With the interest rate constant, any attempt by the authorities to alter the money
supply will be self-defeating since the change will simply result in local investment or
disinvestment of foreign assets, and the authorities will be forced to buy or sell the
monetary change to enable the foreign transaction to take place (p.19).53 Conversely,
52. Thus a small change in the local interest rate will occasion foreign investors to disinvest while changes
in the foreign rate will result in little reaction by local investors.
53. The example Guma gives is an attempted money supply expansion, local asset holders will increase
their holdings of foreign assets and the central bank will be forced to supply foreign exchange and buy
back local currency. Thus the attempted increase amounts to nothing.
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sterilisation of BOP effects on the local money supply is also not possible under these
conditions (p.21). Guma concludes that Swaziland will thus be unable to practise
monetary policy until either a flexible exchange rate is adopted or some restrictions are
placed on capital movements.
Guma's argument in favour of greater freedom for Swaziland's monetary policy was made
at a time when South Africa's economy was relatively stable. Developments since then,
however, seem to have only added support, if anything, to the call for a change in the
arrangements. A number of authorities have called attention to the detrimental effect on
the Swaziland (and Lesotho) economy of the 1985 depreciation of the rand54 (Gargano,
1986 and Leistner, 1986) but writing before the actual crash, Guma (1985) sounds a
warning of the negative effects of South Africa's exchange rate and BOP policy on
Swaziland and also the harmful trend of the increasing bilateral dependence of Swaziland
(pp. 174-183). With regard to exchange rate policy, Guma explains that South Africa's
actions might impose three separate types of costs on Swaziland. The first set of costs
result from changes in the real value of the Area's external reserves and unfavourable
movements in long term capital resulting from exchange rate fluctuations (p.174).
Secondly, South Africa's import-substituting trade policy distorts import prices and "has
been transmitted to Swaziland and Lesotho as structural elements of their economies"
(p.176). A permanent distortion in the patterns of production of tradeable and
non-tradeable goods and the nature of industrialisation has thus taken place in the Two.
Thirdly, costs are imposed on the Two by South African policy that is irrelevant to their
economic and payments conditions. Guma cites the example of the appreciation of the
rand against the dollar in 1979/80 when the Swaziland export sector badly required a stable
value to remain profitable (p.176). In addition, Guma argues that the fixed exchange rate
and factor mobility permit fast and harmful transmission of South African monetary and
fiscal shocks to the Two, and with no 'monetary means' of sterilising these impulses, they
are forced to accept costly real adjustment. Guma thus concludes that "greater stability
in inflation ra~es, more realistic interest rates and a smoother business cycle could, in
principle, be brought about by choosing an alternative monetary standard" (1985, p.178).
54. They are in fact wrong: Chapter 7 below shows that the depreciation stimulated local growth.
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The economIes of Lesotho and Swaziland also suffered from the effects of South
African-induced high interest rates and tight monetary policy (Gargano, 1986, p.79 and
Leistner, 1986, p.71). Tight credit conditions and high interest rates, while possibly
assisting South African counter-cyclical efforts, have proven "unrealistically high, given
Swaziland's political tranquillity, and a vast pool of liquid reserves sitting unused in the
banks" (Gargano, 1986, p.79). Imported inflation, both as a result of the rand's
depreciation (already discussed) and awry South African demand management, has also
dogged the two countries (EIU, 1986c, p.59; Leistner, 1986, p.71; Gargano, 1986, p.80).
Gargano cites an inflation correlation between South Africa and Swaziland between 1971
and 1983 of 90 per cent, due primarily to the high proportion of South African goods in
Swaziland's imports. However, non-tradeable prices are also affected, although not to the
same degree, according to Gargano (pp.80 - 81). Gargano thus advises that Swaziland
increase its control over its monetary conditions and "diversify its import sources" (p. 81).
This call to increase the level of Swaziland monetary policy autonomy, in the name of
stability and development, thus echoes Guma's earlier-expressed sentiments. It can only
be assumed that the rationale for amending the agreement applied to some extent to
Lesotho, which also experienced a change in its position. These changes are described
next.
4.4.2 Details and Provisions of the Amended Agreements
There are three separate amending agreements, all signed on 18 April 1986 and coming
into force on 1 April. Swaziland's need for a new agreement necessitated the signing of
one with Lesotho since uniform requirements would no longer apply to the Two.
However, since there were provisions remaining from the RMA Agreement that still
applied to both countries, a trilateral amending agreement was signed in addition to the
two bilateral agreements: this section examines each in turn.
4.4.2. 1 The Trilateral Amending Agreement
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This agreement (Trilateral Agreement, 1986) is a short one, comprised largely of
substitutions, additions and deletions to the original agreement (Monetary Agreement,
1974).
The first material change amounts to the deletion of the sixth paragraph of the preamble
- the one which specifies that South Africa is to be responsible for the management of the
gold and foreign exchange reserves of the RMA. The name of the area is changed to
'Common Monetary Area' and in other places the words 'Contracting Party' are
substituted for specific references to South Africa, Lesotho or Swaziland. The effect of
this latter practice is to place Swaziland and Lesotho on a more equal footing with South
Africa in terms of the issue and specification of legal tender (Article 2), gold and foreign
exchange transactions (Article 5) and consultations (Article 8). An appended article,
Article 12, makes provisions for the concluding of separate bilateral agreements between
any two of the 'Contracting Parties' that 'are not incompatible with the provisions of [the
trilateral] Agreement'. A substituted Paragraph 5 of Article 5 specifies that future access
to the South African capital market is regulated by those bilateral agreements.
4.4.2.2 The Bilateral Agreement with Swaziland
Article 2 of the bilateral agreement (Bilateral Agreement (a), 1986) contains the most
important material change: it specifies that each of the country's currency shall be legal
tender in its domain only and further that authorised dealers shall 'convert notes' issued
by either central bank but not at par. Swaziland is also no longer required to cover the
issue of emalangeni with rand deposits at the Reserve Bank. Thus the rand ceases to be
legal tender in Swaziland and exchange rate fixity is no longer specified. The intention
is to allow the lilangeni to remain at par for the time being but to provide for its floating
"later" (Gargano, 1986, p.80). At time of writing, the lilangeni is still at par with the
rand (December 1989).
Article 3 allows for national note and coin to b~ repatriated from the other country and
Article 5 provides for the cessation of compensatory payments to Swaziland, as a result
of the termination of the rand's legal tender status (and thus circulation) in that country.
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Finance Minister, S. Dlamini, stated, however, that shops and hotels may still accept rand
for the convenience of tourists (cited in EID, 1986b, p.53).
Swaziland is given control over its foreign exchange reserves by Article 4 which allows
the Central Bank of Swaziland and authorised dealers access to the South African foreign
exchange market. Swaziland is required, however, to meet its net requirements with its
own reserve holdings. Previously, South Africa had managed all foreign exchange
transactions arising in the RMA.
Article 6 contains the requirements for making changes to the applicable Exchange Control
Provisions. Consultations between the governments are provided far when changes are
envisaged, except in cases of emergency or where the changes amount to stricter controls.
Previously Swaziland had been expected to closely follow South Africa's exchange control
policy and amendments. Article 3 of the 1974 Agreement, which provides for free
intra-Area flow of funds55 remains intact and applicable to Swaziland. As before, both
countries are expected to monitor and prevent transactions in their area which are deemed
to be intended to circumvent the exchange control provisions of the other country (Article
7, Paragraph 2).
4.4.2.3 The Bilateral Agreement wit!J Lesotho
This agreement (Bilateral Agreement (b), 1986) makes no material changes to the
relationship that existed between South Africa and Lesotho under the 1974 Agreement,
save that it provides for joint management by the respective central banks of the pooled
gold and foreign exchange reserves (Article 9). In addition, it specifies that the Lesotho
Central Bank and authorised dealer shall have access to the South African foreign exchange
market for the purposes of their own transactions (Article 10). These and other provisions
are necessitated by the fact that at the time of the original agreement, the Lesotho Central
Bank did not exist.
55. Subject to a few minor restrictions: see Section 4.3.3.4 below.
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4.4.2.4 Summary
The most important effects of the 1986 Agreement were the 'cutting loose' of the lilangeni
from the rand and the provision for its free floating in the future, and the provision for the
managing by Swaziland of its own foreign exchange transactions. These allow Swaziland
a greater degree of monetary autonomy, which it can assume by degrees. Swaziland could
also, in future, apply stricter exchange controls between itself and South Africa, thereby
allowing itself more discretion in interest rate policy. It will thus be easier for Swaziland
to overcome many of the problems raised by Guma and others.
4.5 CONCLUSION
This chapter set out to explain and describe the historical and institutional setting of
monetary co-operation between South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland and to sketch the
evolution of this co-operation. Initially, the relation between the Three were characterised
by the disparities that existed between them: 'co-operation' was in fact more like
'dependence' between the Two and South Africa. However, with the evolution and
sophistication of the economies of the Two, especially Swaziland, the nature of
co-operation has changed and the degree of their potential control over their monetary
systems has increased. This has been illustrated by the advents of firstly a written
-agreement where none existed, and secondly the adjustment of that written agreement to
provide for more equitable treatment. The issue at stake seems to be the lack of control
of the Two over their economies, but the solution is not necessarily the attempted
sundering of links for that path is shown, in later chapters to be difficult and ill-advised.
However, this chapter did not set out to discuss the viability or optirnality of the CMA;
that is the task of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 5
THE CJ!/IA AND OPTIMAL
CURRENCY AREA THEORY
5.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter attempts to place in perspective a recent study of the CMA undertaken by
Viviers (1988). Viviers has applied the OCA characteristics to the CMA situation, and
has found in favour of all requirements save that of political agreement. The nature and
rationale of the OCA approach has been discussed in Chapter 2 and it will be no more than
alluded to here. However, in evaluating the study of OCA characteristics undertaken by
Viviers, it will be worthwhile to bear in mind the arguments, especially those against the
characteristics criteria, of Chapter 2. The evaluation of the monetary area in terms of the
OCA criteria is not a sufficient test for monetary unions, as shall be seen, even against the
background of the 'freeing up' of the CMA.56 One reason for this is that theoretical
considerations demonstrate that an exchange rate union is always inferior (or sub-optimal)
to a full monetary union. These 'theoretical considerations' have been dealt with in the
- ---
third section of Chapter 2. Secondly, it was pointed out in that chapter that certain closely
linked nations may not have the choice of whether or not they are to become integrated:
they may already be thus, the only choice left open is the degree of formal recognition of
this as embodied in a monetary agreement.
5.2 The CMA in terms of OCA Theory
The OCA characteristics evaluated by Viviers include labour and capital mobility,
openness, diversification, inflation rate correspondence, policy integration and "political
56. That is, the advent of the new agreement and the increasing independence granted by South Africa to
the Two, especially Swaziland.
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impetus"S7 (1988, pp. 150-232). Viviers' detailed arguments and data will not be
presented; instead, her main findings and conclusions will be given.
5.2.1 Labour Mobility
Viviers found that a high degree of unidirectional labour mobility exists - i.e. the migrant
labour flows from Swaziland and Lesotho to South Africa - and that this migrant labour
benefits the Two in terms of remittance income as well as South Africa (pp. 159-160).
While noting that sanctions and disinvestment pressures may in future lead to a termination
of the migrant contracts, Viviers holds that at present, the labour mobility criterion for an
OCA is satisfied in the CMA. In this respect, Viviers' thinking is in line with" the
supposed central reason for the CMA; as Guma notes, "it may be argued that Mundell's
analysis of optimum currency areas (focusing on factor mobility) provides the underlying
rationale for the CMA agreement" (Guma, 1985, p.171). Further, the existence of this
labour mobility puts paid to the most important Chapter 2 criticism of this characteristic:
that it would be difficult to rely on labour mobility as a factor enhancing adjustment
between regions because of the unwillingness of workers to migrate to foreign nations for
cultural and social reasons (see Chapter 2, Section 2.2.1.1). However, Viviers has
overlooked an important trend - that the volume of migrant labour to South Africa is
declining with time. This fact is made clear by Bardill and Cobbe (1985). Lesotho, which
Viviers cites as providing approximately 70 per cent of migrant labour in 1986 (p.151),
has experienced steadily declining migrant labour volumes since 1981. While the total
amount of migrant labour has only decreased slightly since 1975 (net), the proponion of
foreign labour has been declining. Bardill and Cobbe hold that it has declined from 77 per
cent to 40 per cent since "the early 1970s" (1985, p.194). With regard to Lesotho, they
predict the following: migrant work opportunities outside mining will "dwindle to zero"
and non-Chamber of Mines employers regarding Lesotho's labour as a "last resort" and
in the presence of increasing local unemployment, will eventually terminate their migrant
opportunities. Although Bardill and Cobbe see the Chamber as continuing its migrant
employment for the foreseeable future, it employs only 100 000 out of approximately
57. What she calls "politieke dryfkrag".
103
140 000 workers. Thus in general, it seems as if labour mobility is declining between the
Three, and this aCA requirement may at some time in the future no longer be satisfied.
5.2.2 Capital Mobility
Also important to an aCA, in terms of the Mundellian requirements, is capital mobility
(or 'financial integration' as it was called in Chapter 2). Viviers' discussion of financial
integration in the CMA is mostly concerned with demonstrating the presence of investment
incentives in the Two and the absence of restrictions on funds flows between the Three
(pp.160~167). In terms of capital flows to South Africa, it was seen in the previous
chapter that banks in the Two had always deposited surplus funds at branches in South
Africa and that the agreements provided for future restriction of these transfers to enforce
minimum legal deposit requirements and to encourage investment (see Chapter 4, Section
4.3.3.4).58 A lack of any other kind of exchange control in the CMA provides that funds
flows from South Africa are only limited by perceptions and preferences of investors.
Viviers states that respectable levels of South African investment in the Two do exist but
that at the same time the Two find it difficult to compete with the decentralisation
incentives offered in the TBVC countries.59 Thus financial integration exists to the extent
that deposits from the Two are made in South Africa and South African investment funds
flow to the Two. However, there can be little doubt that this is not 'financial integration'
in the Chapter 2 sense of the word. Lesotho and Swaziland have small, undeveloped
capital markets, offering nowhere near the range of investments offered by the South
African capital market. 60 Thus in the sense that capital flows take place between markets
offering closely substitutable assets in terms of range and return, the CMA cannot be said
to possess true 'capital mobility'. Instead, the CMA Could be described as possessing a
single capital market with satellite 'investment havens' comprised of the embryonic capital
58. Viviers is thus incorrect when she states that the absence of exchange control could be damaging to the
Two in that they are unable to place any restrictions on funds flows to South Africa (1988, pp. 167-168).
One of the intentions of the RMA agreement was to provide legal means for the Two to ensure some
minimum local placing of surplus funds.
59. 'TBVC' stands for 'Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei': the so-called 'independent' national
states.
60. Swaziland began the establishment of a stock market in February 1990; Lesotho has not as yet done
so.
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markets of the Two, and to a lesser extent, Namibia and the TBVC countries. Viviers
does not take account of these considerations.
5.2.3 Critique
Having apparently demonstrated the existence of labour and capital mobility, Viviers
concludes that factor mobility sufficient for a currency area exists (p.168). However, she
adds that its existence alone is not justification for a currency area, mentioning the
possibility of conflict and disagreement among members, originating in policy
disagreements, discrepancies in the sizes of the parties, volume and direction of trade, etc.
(p.170). Whilst Guma (1985) aptly demonstrated the theoretical possibilities for conflict
(see below) and the existence of costs to the smaller members of the CMA (see Chapter
4, Section 4.4.1), Viviers fails to take account of his more important assertions. Guma
agrees that, with the presence of factor mobility in the CMA, an DCA could be
'approximated', so long as it is capable of steering the bloc toward these goals: "full
employment, price stability and external balance ... " (Guma citing Mundell, 1985,
p.171). In this sense, optimality is not quantitatively but qualitatively gauged - something
that Viviers does not, in her entire analysis, take account of. If optimality is gauged in
terms of the outcome of currency area arrangements, then the existence of conflict
(mentioned by Guma and acknowledged by Viviers), instead of amounting to a separate
consideration alongside 'clinical' economic optimality, feeds into, is part of, and detracts
from, that 'optimality' itself.
In explaining the potential for conflict even alongside 'satisfactory' factor mobility, Guma
firstly points to theoretical impracticalities in the Mundellian thesis. Briefly, his argument
is this: whilst Mundell demonstrated satisfactory adjustment by factor mobility between two
countries of a currency area, the introduction of a third country/outside world complicates
the entire adjustment process in that the symmetry of imbalances between the two is
removed. For example, a situation where Country A shared a deficit with its currency
area partner, Country B and another outside country, Country B would have to run a
global surplus exactly offsetting A's global deficit in order to generate the "correct" factor
movements (Guma, 1985, p.172). This, of course, is improbable, leading Guma to
conclude that "latent or explicit conflict in policy needs is at least as probable as
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symmetry" (p.173) and thus to suggest that exchange rate variation be considered as an
alternative adjustment method.
Finally, Guma describes the characteristics that would occasion the greatest degree of
conflict. Firstly, the closer in economic size the members are the more likely that they
will find attainment of consensus difficult (pp.173-174). Where there is one dominant
member, however, it will be easier to style policy on the "greatest good for the greatest
number". Unfortunately, the smaller members, although not being able to voice strong
arguments for themselves, may be left in unenviable situations. Secondly, the larger and
more diverse is external trade, the greater the likelihood of conflict since the chance that
individual external payments situations are dissimilar is increased (p.174). Thirdly, Guma
holds that differences in exposure to external shocks and different "propensities to
domestic instability" between countries lessens the likelihood of them being able to work
together in a currency area (p.174). It is not suggested that the members of the CMA are
characterised by all these disparities, rather the importance of Guma's arguments lies in
the acknowledgement of the propensity for conflict even with so-called optimal factor
mobility.
5.2.4 Openness
Viviers next measures the degree of openness of the CMA member countries and
concludes that a sufficient degree exists between them to warrant a currency area on the
basis of price stabilisation, especially in the smaller countries. The argument is based on
the ineffectiveness of exchange rate adjustment by small open economies due to low
"exchange rate illusion" (see Chapter 2, Section 2.2.1.2). However, it is questionable
whether being part of a currency area with a plummeting external exchange rate will be
any healthier for a country - since this was the situation recently faced by the Two.
5.2.5 Diversification
In applying the criteria of diversification, Viviers obtains the result that together the Three
(and Botswana) constitute a sufficiently diversified economic grouping for a currency area.
However, it appears as if she has misunderstood the argument for diversification of a
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currency area. Her assertion (p.178) is that small undiversified economies are good
candidates for a currency area, whilst Kenen's original argument is the opposite. He claims
that large, well diversified economies are better conditions for fixed exchange rates and
hence currency areas, and he would hold that small undiversified ones are better off with
flexible exchange rates (Kenen, 1969). Viviers' interpretation of the diversification criteria
is close to that of the openness criteria, one which all credible authorities have recognised
is at odds with Kenen's.61 On finding that the CMA is a diversified area, Viviers should
have rightly concluded, by Kenen's logic, that it is a good candidate for fixed exchange
rates and thus should become part of a larger currency area; it is not an OCA itself.
5.2.6 Similar Inflation Rates
Viviers next measures inflation rate correspondence between the CMA members and finds
that a high degree exists. Thus she counts this as a further argument in favour of a
currency area (p.191). This is not incorrect, although this particular criteria may not be
as important as believed, since some believe that inflation rate equalisation is easily
achieved ex post (Parkin, 1972).
5.2.7 Policy Integration
It is not surprising, given the size of South Africa's economy in relation to the Two and
the integration of goods and asset markets, that Viviers found a high degree of policy
integration between them (pp. 191-206). Viviers does not attempt to determine fiscal policy
integration, but finds that monetary policy integration exists to a high degree and that
exchange rate policy is unified. Whilst this is not disputed, determining that policy in the
CMA is unified and integrated does not amount to a proof that an OCA criterion has been
satisfied. Policy is of necessity integrated, due to the integration of markets, and if
anything, sentiment in the Two, especially Swaziland, has been for an increase in
policy-making independence or at least joint policy-making (Guma, 1985). The policy
integration criteria is to do with similar attitudes to problem solution and policy formation,
not with policy 'dependence' as is the case in the CMA.
61. See for example the assertions made on this point in Presley and Dennis (1976, p.25).
5.2.8 Political Agreement
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Finally, Viviers attempts to determine the "political impetus" (or talks of it) behind the
CMA (pp.206-228). Her conclusion is that, based on the present attitudes of frontline
states towards South Africa, and the gravitation of the Two towards economic groupings
with them, there is little "political impetus" behind the CMA. This, therefore, is the only
criteria that Viviers finds lacking for the CMA, but she holds that this is the most
important for integration (p.231). If anything, the arguments presented later in Chapter
6 of this thesis agree with this assertion, but the reasons behind it are analysed differently.
Chapter 6 examines considerations, both economic and non-economic, that threaten the
cohesion of the CMA.
5.3 CONCLUSION
The 'optimality' of the CMA has thus not been satisfactorily established, but even without
discussing 'political impetus', the economic analysis undertaken by Viviers does not tell
us enough about the functional usefulness of the CMA. This study suffers from the
problems raised against DCA characteristics in the first instance: that they are too vague
and qualitative. In addition, the study appears to suggest that 'monetary integration' is
something decided upon by politicians, not a state that exists between closely linked
nations, that must be recognised and dealt with as such. Neither the true degree of
integration of the members of the CMA nor the true choices open to them is yet known
with clarity, and it will be part of the purpose of the final chapter to establish this.
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CHAPTER 6
ECONOMIC INTEGRA TION VERSUS
DISINTEGRA TION IN THE CMA
6.1 INTRODUCTION
The three members of the CMA are also members of the Southern African Customs Union
(SACU) and two of them - Lesotho and Swaziland - are also members of the Southern
African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), a looser co-operation
arrangement. 62 It would, under normal circumstances, be important to consider the effect
an economic integration arrangement like SACU has on monetary integration
arrangements, however the existence and positioning of SADCC makes the task even more
important. SADCC's most important stated goal is to reduce dependence on South Africa,
and this dependence reduction includes links of a monetary and financial nature as well as
the more obvious trade and infrastructure links. This chapter must therefore assess the
modifying effects of SACU and SADCC membership on the attitudes and practices of
Lesotho and Swaziland with regard to monetary links with South Africa, and it will
achieve this by analysing in detail the objectives and performance of SADCC as well as
the position of the Two within SACU and their prospects concerning withdrawal or
otherwise. In the conclusion to this chapter the implications for monetary integration will
be briefly discussed. The first section (which follows) provides a rationale for developing
country economic integration per se, by examining certain recent theoretical arguments for
and against it.
62. At time of writing, Namibia has declared its intention to achieve monetary independence by 1992 and
it has joined SADCC. It appears, however, that it will remain within SACU. It joined the CMA
recently as well, some time after the commencement of this study.
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6.2 APPROACHES TO ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AMONG
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
The economic integration of an area is normally understood to begin with trade
liberalisation between the specific candidate nations and progress to the formation of a
custom union, or common market and even an economic union. 63 Early writers believed
the benefits attainable from economic integration were limited to countries with large
economies, developed industry and fairly complementary output (see Viner, 1950, p.135).
However, more recent contributions suggest that less developed countries too can benefit
from various forms of integration, although industrial development rather than trade
promotion is the more important goal in this case (Cooper and Massell, 1965). Import
substitution resulting from the trade-diverting effects of customs union formation is held
up by Andic et al. (1971) as a viable strategy for promoting development while Balassa
and Stoutjesdijk (1975) offer the 'project approach' to integration which advocates regional
specialisation in production in order to reap economies of scale. This section will examine
the problems experienced with integration by less developed countries as well as the
motivation for integration and the criteria and goals of successful integration as seen by
certain more recent writers in the field.
6.2.1 Factors Affecting the Success of Economic Integration
among Developing Countries
Where integration between developing countries is undertaken according to strategies
devised for developed countries, such attempted integration is bound to result in problems.
Poumarakis (1979, p.115) argues that the trade discrimination and intra-bloc import
substitution that is called for by the traditional integration formula will only result in trade
diversion inefficiency and inflation within a developing bloc. Pournarakis emphasises that
the"growth of the supply sector" is more important among developing economies than the
liberalisation of trade among countries "which, by definition, have a limited potential to
trade" (p.115). The emphasis on the growth of production as opposed to the growth of
trade and intra-bloc demand will ensure that developing economies do not become
63. A customs union only entails a common external tariff, whereas a common market incorporates intra-
area factor mobility and an economic union, policy unification as well. See Robson (1980), p.2.
110
overloaded with inflation and inefficient production and Pournarakis seems to suggest a
'supply creates demand' logic in advocating this.64
Whilst Pournarakis and others point to the problems of inappropriate 'integration formulas'
for developing countries, still others point to important differences between countries that
retard integration. Penaherrera (1980a) identifies a pattern of problems "which,
notwithstanding the variations due to the particular circumstances of each system, prevails
in all cases" (p.68). He identifies four major areas of conflict, the first two of which are
economic in nature, and thus of interest to us:
(1) Dissimilar development levels having allegedly resulted from the
maldistribution of the benefits of integration.
(2) Structural differences between economies which affect the objectives of
integration.
(3) Incompatibility of political systems.
(4) Problems of political relations between states.65
At the core of problem (1) is the location of industry within the bloc, since industrial
development rather than trade creation is seen by developing countries as the most
important and desirable goal of integration (Penaherrera, 1980a, p.71). Thus initially size
of trade is not as important as its composition, which better reflects the effect of
integration on industrial development. A country will be seen to have benefitted from
participating in the integration scheme if it is 'ahead' in terms of development relatively
better able to "reap the benefits of integration in the industrial field" (1980, p.72).
Penaherrera points out, however, that an absence of homogeneity in development levels
will lead to conflict both because weaker countries will perceive that they will suffer from
an unfair distribution of benefits and costs and because the more advanced countries will
not 'need' the integration as badly. Penaherrera also adds that the overall economic size
of the bloc is important in that it should be sufficiently large, as a market, "to allow the
changes in industrial structure which integration is designed to bring about" (1980, p.73).
64. Or at least a 'supply comes before demand' logic.
65. It is not, however, claimed that (3) and (4) are irrelevant for the CMA; they are taken into account in
the following section of this chapter.
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Goals become unrealised and unrealiseable, then, when bloc members are at different
levels of development and when the bloc itself is unviable in terms of economic size.
Problem (2) is concerned with differences in economic structure, outlook and policy that
cannot easily be modified or removed in the name of integration (Penaherrera, 1980a,
p.75). Thus it is important to distinguish these from policies and structures which do lend
themselves to modification and harmonisation. Integration will cause conflict and be
unsuccessful if it requires of a country "any policy conciliation which might in any way
impose on it a regressive distribution of income" (1980, p.75). An example is the case
of diverging inflation rates between countries - it would not be easy to impose exchange
rate unification in such a case. Where such differences exist at least one country will have
something to lose from integrating its economy with others.
Aside from these general factors affecting integration among developing countries, it is
worthwhile to look at the intra-African environment of co-operation. Mazzeo (1984,
p.229) admits that the "capacity for interaction" in Africa has increased, but mentions
border disputes, ideological differences and growing intercountry inequality as important
barriers to more intense co-operation and integration. Certain structures, attitudes and
perceptions within the countries themselves are also seen by Mazzeo as problematic: the
existence of unsound economic policy and an 'inward looking' approach to development
that militates against true regionalism are factors he mentions (1984, pp.232-233). Thus
he recommends a changed approach to development where regional co-operation is "put
squarely at the service of national development" (1984, p.233). By reconciling national
and regional goals of development, it will be possible to foster more intense forms of co-
operation and remove the perception that integration is more of a burden than a boon.
6.2.2 The Goals of Economic Integration among
Developing Countries
It has been established that integration among developing countries differs from integration
among developed countries in that developing· countries have different agendas and
requirements and thus necessitate different integration formulas. This implies that the
goals of development integration are also different, and it is thus necessary to examine
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them to establish these differences. Penaherrera (1980b, pp.175-176) has identified the
following four goals or motives of countries engaging in integration:
(1) industrial development and technological progress or "change In
industrial structure",
(2) trade expansion and better utilisation of productive capacity,
(3) to enhance the "capacity to negotiate with third parties", and,
(4) to enhance political relations among states.
Again, whilst it is not suggested that items (3) and (4) - the 'political' motives - are
unimportant, it is items (1) and (2) - the 'economic' motives that are more pertinent to this
chapter.
Penaherrera further distinguishes between (1) and (2) on the basis of "intensity" of the
motivation, explaining that item (1) - industrial development or "change in industrial
structure" - is the more intense motivation (1980b, p.176). This idea has been
encountered before; it was said earlier that it could be expected that developing countries
would place more importance on industrial development than trade expansion as a result
of integration (the idea was first advanced by Cooper and Massell, 1965). The importance
of 'intensity' of the motivations to integrate cannot be overstated, it is the relative intensity
of the motivations that will determine the hierarchy of goals and the instruments used to
achieve them. Furthermore, Penaherrera identifies three important country/bloc character-
istics that will have a strong bearing on the intensity of the motivations (198Gb, p.177):
(a) level of development of a particular country;
(b) economic size of the bloc, and the relationship of both of these to the
size of the market required to enable the desired change in industrial
structure; and
(c) the homogeneity, or otherwise, of the bloc in terms of the distribution
of development.
In terms of (a), the higher the level of development achieved by a particular country the
less intense will be its Motive (1), but trade expansion, Motive (2), will be more
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important. For Characteristic (b), the closer the bloc is to the desired size the more
intense the overall motivation for integration. For Characteristic (c), the greater the
degree of homogeneity the more intense the motivation to integrate since there will exist
a "closer agreement on the selection of integration objectives and of the methods to be
used in the process" (Penaherrera, 1980b, p.179).
It is apparent, then, that the achievement of the goals of integration depends on how
intensely these goals are desired (as well as the factors mentioned in Section 6.2.1.1) and
this is determined by the characteristics of the bloc itself and its member countries. Just
how the various characteristics of the bloc affect the achievement of success with
integration is looked at in the next subsection. It will also be possible soon to draw some
conclusions about the CMA bloc's position with regard to these characteristics and their
effect on the success of integration.
6.2.3 Bloc Characteristics and the Success of Integration among
Developing Countries
By postulating an 'ideal type' bloc, Penaherrera permits the comparison and analysis of
various non ideal configurations, and enables speculation on their possibilities for success.
He comes up with the following "ideal" configuration (Penaherrera, 1980b, p.180):
(a) A low level of industrial development of candidate countries and a
large divergence of size between desired bloc economic size and
individual country economic size;
(b) A large bloc economic size and one which is close to the size required
to bring about the desired industrial development;
(c) Homogeneity in the level of industrial development attained among
member countries.
Penaherrera calls this ideal type "Model 1", and by varying Factors (a), (b) and (c) comes
up with another four models. These other models are characterised by the absence of one
or more of the ideal type characteristics. Thus for example, only Factors (b) and (c) are
satisfied in Model 2, i.e. the countries are typified by a high degree of industrial
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development (Factor (a) is reversed). At first glance the CMA area66 would seem to fit
the description of Model 5, in which only Factor (b) is satisfied, there being heterogeneity
in both development level and economic size between the countries.67 According to
Penaherrera, meaningful integration is not possible with this configuration, since the
smaller, less developed countries would find their developing industry and markets at the
mercy of the more advanced members (198Gb, p.185). However, it could be suggested
that the CMA area lies somewhere between Model 5 and Model 4, which is characterised
by heterogeneous countries but with a net low level of industrial development. Admittedly
it is unrealistic to suggest that South Africa has a low level of industrial development, but
not unrealistic to suggest that the CMA (or a larger regional bloc) is characterised by a net
low level of development. To say "South Africa is developed" is inaccurate - apart from
the few developed nodes, the larger area, although densely populated in places, remain
underdeveloped and supports standards of living as low as those found in other
neighbouring states.68 Thus the development motivation would not be unimportant to
South Africa, and this mitigates the apparent absence of characteristic (a) above.
Therefore the area could be analysed instead as a Model 4 type.
Penaherrera's prognOSIS for Model 4 is more encouraging than that for Model 5.
Integration is possible, although conflict is likely between the more developed and less
developed countries around the level of intervention in order to promote development
(Penaherrera, 198Gb, p.183). Since the more developed countries stand to gain by a
laissez-faire approach - which will see market forces steer actively towards them - they
will resist the less developed countries' attempts to institute planned development.
Penaherrera thus suggests that compensating policy and redistribution is necessary to
advance integration beyond the superficial, but that the "main difficulty is to ... induce the
various parties to accept it" (198Gb, p.184). He thus cautions against the problems that
could be created by political considerations in this regard.
66. Or indeed a large subcontinental grouping incorporating South Africa.
67. The nature of economic integration over the CMA area (in the form of SACU and SADCC) is discussed
in Section 4.2 of this chapter.
68. The 'dualistic' nature of development in South Africa is an accepted principle, and one which seems
to permit the perception that South Africa is on the whole a moderately developed country rather than
a highly developed one.
6.2.4 Co-operation versus Integration Among Developing
Countries
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It is the "political considerations" mentioned by Penaherrera that are seen by Mazzeo
(1984, p.233) as the mOSI important determinant of successful integration among
developing countries. Indeed, Mazzeo believes that integration "presupposes the
willingness of states to surrender at least part of their sovereignty", but argues that even
with advanced countries this remains an unrealistic expectation (1984, p.233). Mazzeo's
doubt as to the viability of integration stems from his belief that economic goals could
never supersede political and state goals, therefore preventing the realisation of integration
even where it is clear that its realisation would promote econonlic development. Mazzeo
instead sees regional organisations as "forms of institutionalised diplomacy", having the
political function of diplomatic interaction as opposed to the economic functions associated
with furthering integration (1984, p.234). Further, since meaningful integration is seen
by Mazzeo to require of a country a degree of "self-confidence" born of a high level of
national autonomy, he recommends that it (integration) should aim at "corroborating rather
than debilitating national autonomy or self reliance" (1984, p.235).
Apart from Mazzeo's political reasons for being sceptical about meaningful integration
among developing countries, he also expresses reservations about an important economic
goal of integration: regional economies of scale. 69 This would relate to Penaherrera's
Motive (1) for integration. Firstly, Mazzeo points out that developing countries do not
possess the capital intensive production processes required to exploit economies of scale,
and encouraging them would be foolish in the face of their labour abundant economies.
Secondly, economies of scale require specialisation which militates against diversification
which is seen by Mazzeo as the mark of a developed country (1984, p.236). Thirdly,
capital intensity focuses development in the relatively advanced members of the bloc,
reinforcing skewed development (perhaps this was in Penaherrera's mind when dismissing
his Model 5 configuration). Fourthly, capital-intensive technology may perpetuate
inappropriate, elite consumption patterns. Mazzeo thus sees intra-industry specialisation
as preferable as this will allow diversification to continue. Additionally, Mazzeo envisages
69. Mazzeo's views on the invalidity of the EOS arguments contrast with those of Balassa and Stoutjesdijk
(1975), early proponents of this idea.
116
co-operation In the services sector as a viable alternative to the limited pursuit of
integration of the production sector. 'Services' in this sense include "all abilities and
infrastructures needed to support the national development effort" (1984, p.237).
6.2.5 Conclusion: Integration among Developing Countries
It was established, by reference to Poumarakis (1979) and Penaherrera (1980a), that
integration among developing countries involves an emphasis on the fostering of industrial
development and the growth in productive capacity of these countries. Certain conflict
areas surrounding integration were then examined and it was found that dissimilar
development levels, structural differences and an inward-looking mentality are likely to
hamper integration efforts (Penaherrera, 1980a; Mazzeo, 1984). Drawing on
Penaherrera's analysis (1980b) it was then possible to identify integration goals and the
bloc characteristics that are most likely to permit their attainment, and it was suggested
that the CMA area does possess characteristics favourable to forms of integration.
However, Mazzeo's dissenting views, which were looked at next, suggest that in general,
economic integration among developing countries is unviable due to the sacrifice of
political power required by it and the untenable nature of industrial development driven
by economies of scale (Mazzeo, 1984).
In general, it appears as if the goals of integration among developing countries - industrial
growth through market expansion - do not differ substantially from those of 'developed'
countries. However, there are potentially more difficulties with integration among
developing countries due to heterogeneity in economic and industrial structure and
development levels.
The following section will examine the existing integration and co-operation arrangements
involving the member countries of the CMA, as well as their implications for monetary
integration. Conclusions can also be made on the relevance of the arguments of the
current section to the CMA situation.
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6.3 ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND INTEGRATION
ARRANGEMENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
6.3.1 The Southern African Customs Union
SACU has its origins in the 1889 Customs Union agreement which was originally
concluded between the Orange Free State and the Cape Colony. Basutoland (later
Lesotho) and the two areas that formed Bechuanaland (later Botswana) joined a few years
later, but a new Convention was signed in 1898 which then admitted the Natal colony.
Conventions in 1903 and 1906 included Transvaal and Swaziland, although the latter and
the other protectorates did not have the same status in the Union as the others. The
formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910 resulted in a new customs union agreement
between the protectorates and the Union, which was fairly stable and lasted until 1969
(Maasdorp, 1989, pp.4-16).
The 1969 renegotiation occurred as a result of the dissatisfaction of the BLS countries with
certain South African practices under the old agreement, among them the restrictions on
beef importation, restrictions under the agricultural marketing control boards, high South
African tariffs and quantitative restrictions and the notion that they were not receiving a
fair share of the customs revenue pool (Maasdorp, 1989, pp. 10-14). The 1969 agreement,
which is still in force (though amended), was generally considered to be more favourable
to BLS than any previous arrangement, and incorporated a number of features beneficial
to them. Among these were infant- and pioneer-industry clauses, a larger multiplier in the
revenue-sharing formula and provision for consultation (Maasdorp, 1989, p.17). The
revenue-sharing multiplier ensures that BLS receive 42 per cent more than the value of
revenue earned on imports attributable to them, and this is "to compensate BLS for the
fact that the common external tariff is decided on by the Republic and is geared to protect
South African industries" (Matthews, 1984, p.257). Whether in fact such compensation
is sufficient or appropriate is discussed along with other pertinent issues, in the fourth
section of this chapter, although it is possible, as Maasdorp suggests, that "had South
Africa not followed the policy known as 'apartheid', SACU would have received
significantly less attention than has been the case" (Maasdorp, 1989, p.18). The
"attention" focused on SACU comprises contributions vacillating between outright
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condemnation and tacit acceptance of SACU and South Africa's role in it. In many cases
the effect has been to identify SACU with South Africa's regional destabilisation and
'economic imperialist' roles~ but as shall be seen, this was (and is) not always true.
6.3.2 The Southern African Development Co-ordination
Conference
The Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference is an economic co-operation
arrangement that grew out of a desire by its members to reduce economic links with South
Africa and identify themselves more closely with the struggle for political liberation within
South Africa. It was perceived by the 'frontline states,70 that their dependence on -the
South African economy was incommensurable with their standpoint of political opposition
to South Africa's apanheid policy. At a meeting at Arusha in 1979, the states identified
the need to increase economic co-operation amongst themselves, whilst reducing it with
South Africa - especially since they had inadvertently replaced dependencies on Smith's
Rhodesia with dependencies on South Africa as part of the sanctions campaign against
Rhodesia (Meyns, 1984, pp.201-202). As such, Zimbabwean independence in 1980 lent
impetus to the SADCC initiative, and the frontline states plus Lesotho, Swaziland and
Malawi attended a summit meeting in Lusaka on April 1st 1980 to formalise SADCC and
signify their intentions to advance its objectives. The 1980 Summit was the crystallisation
of almost six years of preliminary meetings and discussions, the most important of which
was the Arusha Conference on 3-4 July 1979. This meeting was the 'Conference' that the
SADCC was named after, although it was formally constituted as a co-operation
arrangement only after the admission of the other states and the Lusaka summit
(Abegunrin, 1985, pp.191-192).
The four 'development objectives' of SADCC are given by Meyns as follows:
(1) reduction of economic dependence on South Africa in particular and the
rest of the world in general;
(2) promotion of intra-SADCC links to create equitable regional integration;
70. Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia, later also Zimbabwe.
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(3) mobilisation of resources to promote national, inter-state and regional
policies; and
(4) action to secure international co-operation with the economic liberation
strategy (Meyns, 1984, p.203).71
Further, Abegunrin points out that the SADCC Programme of Action is part of the
liberation struggles in Namibia and South Africa, that it fits in with Organisation of
African Unity (OAU) policy of promoting regional integration and that dependence
reduction "is central to the achievement of economic development, and to the advancement
of the dignity, and basic human needs of the people of Southern Africa" (Abegunrin,
1985, p.193). The Action Programme is comprised of sectoral projects or co-operation
areas each allocated among the then nine members.72
Transport and communications was identified as the most important sector in terms of
dependence reduction both because of the high degree of dependence on the South African
network and because "the improvement of such links is fundamental to the implementation
of projects in other important areas" (Meyns, 1984, p.203). Other areas of attention
identified were: promotion of energy and electricity independence; self-sufficiency in food
production; promotion of agricultural research; harmonisation of industrialisation; person
power training and foreign aid (Abegunrin, 1985, pp.193-195 and Matthews, 1984,
p.261)73
It is reasonable to assume that a scheme of this nature holds important consequences for
monetary and financial links between its members and South Africa, even though this was
not one of the seven focus areas. In fact monetary and financial independence was also
identified as a priority, and it has specific importance for the CMA. The existence of
SACU is important to that of the CMA, since the former is an economic integration
arrangement over approximately the same area, and the SADCC also has consequences for
SACU, and thus an indirect effect on the CMA. For various reasons, SADCC is not
71. These objectives are laid out in more detail in the Declaration by the SADCC states: Southern Africa,
Towards Economic Liberation, April 1980, Lusaka.
72. Namibia became the tenth member after its independence in 1990.
73. See Meyns (1984, p.205) for the sectoral allocation among members.
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intended to be an integration arrangement and this should not change for the foreseeable
future (Maasdorp, 1986, p.156). However, this fact alone does not preclude it from
having an important effect on the other two integration arrangements in Southern Africa -
SACU and the CMA. These effects are part of the topic of the remainder of this chapter.
6.3.3 The Preferential Trade Area (PTA)
The PTA comprises 19 central, east and southern African states and includes all of the
SADCC members besides Botswana and Angola. 74 The goal of the PTA is 'to liberalise
trade, encourage co-operation in industry, agriculture, transport and communications, and
to create a regional common market' (EIU, 1988, p.93). Hence the PTA is (or is about
to become) an integration arrangement, unlike SADCC, and Lesotho and Swaziland's
membership thus poses direct problems for SACU (or has the potential to). Intra-area
trade liberalisation began on July 1st 1984 and, although there have been a few problems
with the speed of liberalisation and the advent and revision of trade 'rules of origin', the
most recent summit approved final removal of customs barriers by the year 2000 (EIU,
1988, pp.93-94).
The conflicting dual membership of Lesotho and Swaziland of SACU and the PTA is at
present resolved in favour of SACU, with the Two able to export preferentially to PTA
countries but not being obliged to import preferentially from them. Their obligation not
to reciprocate is required under the SACU agreement, and the PTA recognises and makes
temporary allowance for this (Matthews, 1984, p.264).
At present, therefore, the PTA membership of the Two threatens neither SACU or the
CMA, but it could in future. The stated goal of the PTA to form a common market
certainly has long run implications for SACU and the CMA, but this is assuming that the
prospect has some hope of success. Maasdorp (1990b, p.22) is sceptical about the
viability of increased integration in the PTA, and also sees difficulties with even a post-
apartheid South Africa's entry into it. A possible outcome then, is the cementation of the
74. The members are: Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius,
Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and
Zimbabwe.
121
post-apartheid SACU with the departure of the Two from the PTA, and the CMA could
well be strengthened as a result. Even if the PTA did succeed, it is not clear that the Two
would consider compromising the closer ties they have with SACU especially with the
apartheid problem gone.
6.4 THE VIABILITY OF THE SADCC INITIATIVE
Section 6.3.2 laid out the four development objectives of SADCC and suggested that they
held important consequences for SACU and the CMA. This section evaluates SADCC's
prospects and interim performance in achieving the first two: reduction of dependence and
increased intra-SADCC links. Of the four, the first two are clearly of more significance
to the existence and future of SACU and the CMA, thus they are focused on.
6.4.1 The Reduction of Dependence
The motivation for the reduction of dependence has already been established, it is
important next to examine the nature of dependence and the performance of SADCC in
reducing it thus far.
Nine years ago, Nsekela (1981, pp.12-14) cited the reduction of dependence on South
Africa and on the rest of the world as the two most important goals of SADCC.
"Disentanglement" from South Africa was seen as the most important goal of integration
among Southern African states, albeit a "negative" goal in that it involved conditions
which had to be overcome rather than "positive goals to be furthered" (p.12). The
predicament of Namibia and the Two was seen as serious: Nsekela compared them to the
outlying provinces of a single state rather than independent entities. He thus advocated
dependence reduction as a national goal, perceiving that it would take more than simply
a commitment to regional co-operation where its "possible achievements and limitations
have to date been clouded by a greater degree of generalised moderate verbal enthusiasm
than of serious posing of questions ... " (p.13).
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Before examining the success of SADCC's dependence reduction Programme of Action,
it is necessary to outline the types of dependence and their degree.75
6.4.1.1 Forms of SADCC Dependence on South Africa
Migrant labour dependence is often cited as one of the more important forms. The
countries affected are, in order of dependence, Lesotho, Mozambique, Botswana,
Swaziland and Zimbabwe (not officially), which have tens of thousands of citizens
employed in South Africa, primarily in mining production (Hardy, 1987, p.45).76 The
incomes generated by migrant workers are an important source of foreign exchange for the
countries (Abegunrin, 1985, p.196).
Dependence on South Africa's transport system is acute, with all the SADCC countries
besides Angola, Tanzania and Mozambique relying heavily on South African rail and
harbour facilities for import and export trade. Chingambo shows that in the early 1980s,
whilst only 18 per cent of SADCC trade was with South Africa, over 90 per cent of
Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi and Zimbabwe's trade passed through South Africa (1988,
p.399). For the other countries the figure was 80 per cent.
Trade dependence is also high for all but Angola and Tanzania. Chingambo cites the
results of an ODI study that showed that, an average, 30 per cent of SADCC imports came
from South Africa but their exports to South Africa were only 7 per cent (1988, p.399).
Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana and Zimbabwe are the most dependent on trade with South
Africa, but with imports exceeding exports. The problem is underscored by the fact that,
on average, there is more SADCC-South Africa trade than intra-SADCC trade
(Chingambo, 1988, p.398), and that SADCC's imports comprise what Abegunrin calls
"survival products" (1985, p. 197).77
75. The dependencies described apply to the late 1970s/early 1980s era. Any changes in the situation are
described later in this section when evaluating SADCC's success in dependence reduction.
76. Hardy's statistics are for the years 1965-1977, it should be noted however, that migrant labour volumes
have been declining (Maasdorp, 1986, p.159). Malawi has terminated migrant labour flows to SA out
of protest against the Chamber of Mines' compulsory AIDS testing.
77. For example, fuels, maize, canned food, beverages, fertilizer, iron and steel (Abegunrin, 1985, p.197).
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Certain SADCC countries are also dependent on South Africa for energy provision.
Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Malawi are all dependent,
to varying degrees, on South Africa's electricity and/or petroleum provision (Chingambo,
1988, p.399). South Africa is also not averse to using this as a weapon against these
countries: Abegunrin cites the incident on 6 September, 1981, when South Africa delayed
Zimbabwe's fuel deliveries and caused a dangerous shortage (1985, p.197).
SACU countries receive payments from the customs revenue pool, and, especially in the
case of Lesotho and Swaziland, these payments are a large proportion of government
revenue. Whether this amounts to "dependence" - as Chingambo (1988, p.398) suggests -
is, however, a debatable issue. Whilst the revenue payments are doubtless important to
BLS, their withdrawal from SACU would not mean an end to customs revenue, it would
merely be collected by the countries themselves. Collection could, however, pose
problems for the countries (Hanlon, 1986, p.88).
The 'dependence' relationships are not the only form of South African influence over
SADCC, South Africa also has business interests in certain SADCC states. South Africa
owns most industrial and mining concerns in Lesotho and Swaziland, and a "high
proportion" in Botswana; they also own all "breweries, food-processing and grain-milling
enterprises in addition to most wholesale and retail trade outlets" (Hardy, 1987, p.45).
There are also "substantial links" with Zimbabwe and lesser ones with Zambia, Angola
and Mozambique (p.46). To some extent the relocation of South African industries in BLS
from 1985 on has been a "sanctions-busting" exercise (Maasdorp, 1988, p.39).
6.4.1.2 Success of Dependence Reduction to Date
The preceding description of the nature of dependence is based on data and information
from the 'late seventies/early eighties' period - in other words the pre-SADCC or early
SADCC period. The SADCC Programme of Action was intended to make inroads into
the reduction of these dependencies, and although no time horizon was set, investigation
into the situation ten years on will give a good indication of SADCC's interim success.
Hawkins (1990) has exhaustively analysed SADCC's sectoral performance, and reference
will be made to this study.
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Whilst showing that SADCC has made "little progress" in reducing dependence, Hawkins
nevertheless explains that "dependency reduction is a mirage in backward economies
whose development necessitates infusions of capital, technology, expertise and foreign
exchange" (p.20). Not only was the policy misguided, but the region experienced
economic decline throughout the period, frustrating attempts at dependence reduction and
"planned trade" (pp.4-18).78 The latter policy refers to the attempt to reduce imports
from South Africa and other developed countries to reduce 'trade dependence'. As
Hawkins has pointed out, however, trade is vital for economic growth in developing
countries, not least in SADCC. The failure of planned trade is confirmed by the existence
of an absolute and a relative fall in intra-SADCC trade from 1981 to 1986 (p.21) -
reflecting the fact that external trade had increased. A further setback, especially in light
of SADCC plans to promote equitable development, has been the increased concentration
of industrial development, notably in Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi (p.22).
Whilst the official figures reflect small decreases in SADCC trade with South Africa,
Hawkins is convinced that they "almost certainly understate the level of trade" (Hawkins,
1990, p.23). Furthermore, SADCC-South African trade remains greater than intra-
SADCC trade - the ratio being three-to-one, and the composition of SADCC imports from
South Africa has not changed: they are still what Abegunrin called "survival products"
(Hawkins, 1990, pp.22-23). Thus SADCC has been unable to reduce trade dependence
on South Africa and still relies on the latter for provision of manufactures and capital
goods.
SADCC dependency on the South African transport system has been reduced over the
decade. Zambia has begun to use Dar es Salaam and Beira for its copper shipments and
Zimbabwe has increased its use of Beira, although the unavailability of the Maputo line
has meant that it has had to resort to South African ports for certain traffic. Hawkins is
cautiously optimistic about the prospects for decreased transport dependence .(pp.26-27).
78. For the period 1980-1988, per capita incomes in the SADCC region declined by 13 per cent (Hawkins,
1990, p.4)
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As far as energy dependence is concerned, the situation appears to have changed little,
with BLS and Mozambique remaining highly dependent on South Africa and Zimbabwe
receiving much of its fuel requirements via South Africa (Hawkins, 1990, pp.27-28).
Although migrant worker numbers have declined, this 'reduction of dependence' amounts
to little, since the SADCC countries have been unable to replace the lost jobs and have
seen increases in domestic unemployment and underemployment (Hawkins, 1990, p.16).
In any event, migrant numbers show an increase again to 1986 after reaching a low in
1982, although 1986 numbers are still below those of 1978. Further, reduction in migrant
numbers may have been more a result of the Chamber of Mines' policy than SADCC-
inspired action.79 Data on Black migrant worker numbers are shown in Table 6.1
overleaf.
In general, then, dependence reduction initiatives have shown little success. The next
section will examine the reasons for the lack of success and will differentiate between
those of an exogenous nature and those related to failed policy.
Table 6.1 Black Foreign Workers in South Africa, 1978-1986
Country 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986
Lesotho 155623 140746 140719 138443 138193
Malawi 38525 32319 27558 29268 31411
Mozambique 49168 56424 52323 60407 73186
Botswana 34464 23200 26261 26433 28244
Swaziland 14054 19853 13659 16823 21914
Zimbabwe 27494 10377 11332 7492 7304
Angola 341 291 120 48 22
Zambia 843 918 787 1274 2421
TOTAL 320661 284128 279760 280188 302685
SOURCE: Cattaneo, 1990, p.52
79. The Chamber of Mines has stipulated that all migrants have to submit to AIDS testing and this has
resulted in withdrawals by certain countries. The Chamber has also adopted a policy of increasing local
employment at the expense of migrant employment.
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6.4.1.3 Sources of SADCC's Poor Performance
The sources of SADCC's problems can be divided into three main groups: endogenous Le.
policy related; war and upheaval; and truly exogenous factors. These will be looked at
in turn, starting with exogenous factors.
The region has been beset by natural disasters in the forms of sustained droughts and
sudden floods over the decade, and these have taken their toll on the agriculturally-
intensive economies of the SADCC countries. Little could be done, either, about the
world recession of the early eighties and its effect on demand for, and prices of, SADC~'s
primary product exports. However, Maasdorp cautions against allowing these factors to
screen the mistakes made by policy makers in not encouraging the maximisation of "the
amount of local value-added in exports", or import substitution (1990a, p.12). Attention
to these areas could have helped cushion the effects of the recession. Furthermore, certain
economies suffered as a result of their failure to promote diversification of their output,
for example Zambia (p.6). Thus the problems experienced by SADCC as a result of
unfavourable terms of trade were not entirely unavoidable.
There is no doubt that the sustained conflicts and instability in Angola and Mozambique
-have caused untold problems not only for those countries but also for their SADCC
neighbours. In addition, South Africa's role in instigating and fuelling these conflicts is
undeniable, however, the war conditions are also not entirely exogenous, nor is South
Africa's destabilisation the only cause of the economies collapse caused by the war.
Nevertheless, the war conditions have seriously hampered SADCC, especially since
Angola and Mozambique possess ports crucial for SADCC trade. In fact, Abegunrin
suggests that one of the purposes of South Africa's role in the conflict is "to sabotage
SADCC's efforts at promoting co-operation and liberation in the subcontinent" (1985,
p.198). A SADCC study estimated the cost of the conflict at $10 billion for the period
1980-1984, an amount which is in excess of the total of foreign loans and grants received
by SADCC for the same period (Hardy, 1987, p.46).
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The war impact can be divided into effects on the countries directly involved and those on
their neighbours, as is done by Maasdorp (1990a). Maasdorp cites Angola and
Mozambique's investment loss (despite natural resource endowment), refugee and
migration problems, loss of harbour and transport earnings, collapse of output in certain
sectors and large defence budgets (out of scarce foreign exchange) as their most important
costs of the war (pp. 3-4). Angola and Mozambique's landlocked neighbours also suffer
as a result of the wars. Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Swaziland are forced to channel
their trade to distant ports and via more roundabout routes, entailing greater direct expense
and time wastage (p.4). In addition, Zimbabwe, zambia, Tanzania and Malawi have
incurred varying degrees of military expenditure in maintaining border security and have
also been left with refugee problems as a result of the wars. It is clear then, that the
internal instability of these countries and South African destabilisation has cost the SADCC
economies much, and it is to be hoped that recent peace initiatives in both Angola and
Mozambique will bear fruit.
However, much of the blame for SADCC's poor performance can be laid at the door of
its policy makers. Maasdorp points out that
"in vivid contrast to the South East Asian 'newly industrialised countries' where
the prevailing philosophy has been one of economic growth with a strong
private sector input, no fewer than five of the SADCC countries adopted
policies of either outright statism or of strong state interference in the
economy" (1990a, p.5)
The countries concerned are Tanzania, Zambia, Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, but
all have now implemented structural adjustment programmes and appear to be taking a
more market oriented path (Maasdorp, 1990a, p.7). Whilst these countries have suffered
economic stagnation and regression brought about by failed industrialisation policies,
foreign exchange and capital goods shortages and excessive state intervention, the BLS
countries have fared somewhat better. Maasdorp explains that their membership of SACU
and the CMA (in the case of the Two) has played a role in their relative success, ensuring
them goods supplies and foreign exchange and also contributing to their attractiveness to
South African investors (pp. 10-12).
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Thus much of what the SADCC states have done to build up their economies and reduce,
their dependence on South Africa and the outside has been in vain. The BLS countries,
although closely integrated with South Africa, have emerged relatively unscathed from a
decade of stagnation and reversal, and have seen the goal of dependence reduction
thwarted. It is to be expected therefore, that the SADCC influence on BLS integration
with South Africa will remain minimal, so long as SADCC itself fails to make ground
towards its stated objectives.
6.4.2 Increased Links Between States.
6.4.2. 1 Prospects for Closer Co-operation and Integration
SADCC's second objective is "the forging of links to create a genuine and equitable
regional integration" (Meyns, 1984, p.203). Although SADCC itself is not a regional
integration arrangement, the promotion of links is seen as part of the process of fostering
collective self reliance. Meyns argues that this is important to the process of dependence
reduction in that it enhances the ability of the member states to negotiate with the
developed world (p.220). At the same time, increased integration among developing
nations will promote factor mobility and improve resource allocation in general.
SADCC's proponents are quick to point out, however, that integration should proceed
slowly and should initially be of a low intensity so that its stability is not threatened.
Maldistribution of integration benefits and polarisation of development industrialisation are
seen as problems that could arise as a result of attempts at too rapid integration (Nsekela,
1981, p.92). Indeed, lack of agreement on policy and resultant polarisation are given as
the causes of the demise of the East African Community (EAC) (Meyns, 1984, p.215) and
this has consequently made SADCC's policy makers more cautious. Also,it is seen as
imperative that SADCC states are not forced to relinquish too much of their national
sovereignty as a result of increased integration, lest this lead to new dependencies and
distortions, and weaken the arrangement. This requirement naturally places limits on the
degree of integration, but in itself this is not seen as a problem - the forms of co-operation
and integration adopted must in the first instance conform to the goal of dependence
reduction on South Africa (Nsekela, 1981, p.15; Meyns, 1984, pp.215-216).
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Finally, it is important to note that the "degree of priority or commitment to regional
integration, especially in terms of ability to bear costs, varies markedly" (Nsekela, 1981,
p.17). This is especially pertinent to the BLS countries which are more closely integrated
with South Africa than the others. When closer integration with SADCC implies
disintegration from South Africa, the BLS have the most 'work' to do and will bear the
highest costs. This must also be taken into account when assessing the response of BLS
to the SADCC initiative.
6.4.2.2 Enhancing Trade Links
As has been emphasised, SADCC is not an integration arrangement. However, this does
not mean that it cannot have as one of its goals, the enhancement of integration between
members, especially if this stands to further its overall objective. Indeed, it is held that
"intra-SADCC mobility of factors of production, goods and services is fundamental to the
SADCC objective of collective self reliance" (Ng'andwe, 1987, p.181). However,
although intra-trade grew in the early SADCC period, it has remained insignificant as a
proportion of external trade - 5 per cent in 1985 was the early 'peak' (Chingambo, 1988,
pp.393-394). Further, it has been pointed out elsewhere that SADCC-South African trade
greatly exceeds this figure - Table 6.2 below clearly shows that this was the case for 1985.
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Table 6.2 Direction of SADCC Trade, 1985 ($ million)
Country SA (%) SADCC Africa DCs LDCs WORLD
Angola X 0 0,0 9,2 1675,0 482,6 2190,3





Malawi X 7 25,3 58,9 225,8 71,7 302,3 -
M 40 29,1 133,6 101,4 149,6 255,6
Mozambique X 3 16,6 25,7 56,0 88,0 174,3
M 12 34,5 60,7 246,7 182,4 480,2
Swaziland X 37
M 83
Tanzania X 0 3,5 14,5 196,4 76,0 283,9
M 0 12,2 64,9 664,3 349,7 1028,0
Zambia X 1 21,6 31,6 494,9 238,7 738,1
M 21 40,6 42,7 354,8 180,1 537,5
Zimbabwe X 10 106,5 153,6 511,6 264,0 798,1
M 18 85,2 92,4 350,7 135,7 624,9
MEAN/TOTAL• 12 173,5 293,6 3159,7 1221,0 4487,2
39 202,9 397,2 2574,2 1437,2 4245,0
Notes: X and M stand for exports and imports, respectively.
Missing entries denote unavailable data.
8 Entry in first column is a mean, others are totals.
SOURCE: Chingambo, 1988, p.395
Maasdorp places part of the blame for this on the initial SADCCemphasis on transport
and communications rather than directly on intra-trade, although he points out that
recently, there has been more direct emphasis on the latter (1990a, p.12). This has gone
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hand in hand with a more positive attitude to industrialisation and investment and a
realisation of the important role that the private sector has to play in achieving these goals.
The absence of preferential tariff reduction incentives to intra-trade has been a cause of
concern for some writers. Ng'andwe suggests that this may be an "overcautious
approach" and points out that the enhancing of intra-SADCC trade will ultimately require
co-ordination of monetary and fiscal policy (1987, p.182). However, due to the significant
overlap of the PTA and SADCC, many see a future resolution to policy impediments of
furthered integration in the merging of these two blocs (Ng'andwe, 1987, p.182;
Abegunrin, 1985, p.202; Maasdorp, 1990b, p.19).
6.4.2.3 Monetary and Financial Links
SADCC's plans for enhanced monetary links are of particular relevance to this thesis.
Whilst SADCC's dependence reduction and intra-trade policies affect the CMA indirectly-
through SACU - direct action, in the monetary sphere is obviously of direct importance
to the CMA.
The monetary systems of SADCC's members are dissimilar. The predominantly socialist
countries - Tanzania, Mozambique and Angola - have state-owned monetary systems while
Zambia's system is part private and part state owned and the rest are mostly privately
owned. All countries have nominally independent currencies, although Swaziland and
Lesotho's are linked to the rand, the latter's irreversibly. 80 The rest operate fixed
exchange rate regimes. The non-BLS members operate strict exchange control policies
whilst Lesotho and Swaziland implement South Africa's policies (see Chapter 4) and
Botswana has comparatively loose, independent exchange controls (Nsekela, 1981, pp.93-
94)81
80. In terms of the current arrangements: see Chapter 4.
81. The level of participation by the state in the SADCC economies is changing. Hawkins points out that
all countries except Botswana and Swaziland have implemented IMF or World Bank structural
adjustment programmes (1990, p.5).
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As with the fostering of trade links, co-operation in the monetary sphere is held to be
necessary for furtherance of collective self reliance in SADCC. Ng'andwe argues that
monetary, as well as fiscal policy co-ordination is necessary to place regional resources
at the disposal of the group, and to set up broad markets to facilitate regional industrial
expansion (1987, p.183). Furthermore, co-ordination ensures that polarisation and
distortions in resource allocation do not arise and the existence, if possible, of a "political
umbrella" over the group allows benefits to be spread equitably (pp. 183-185).
Monetary co-ordination can help to facilitate capital mobility, which is "basic to the flow
of goods and services" and will thus promote intra-regional trade (Ng'andwe, 1987,
p.187). A further goal is the improvement of convertibility of SADCC currencies, which
will also promote intra-trade by removing the need for third currencies as media of
exchange. 82 This strategy goes hand in hand with the reorganisation of production so that
output is more geared to regional needs, rather than those of the industrialised trading
partners. All this entails promotion in the end, of collective self reliance.
What degrees of monetary co-operation are called for? The most extreme form, as has
been indicated elsewhere, is a monetary union with a single central bank and a 'common
currency'. The advantages of this system include the promotion of intra-trade due to lack
of foreign exchange requirement, pooled external reserves, economies of scale in currency
administration, an increase in the ease of 'commercial calculations' and the possibility of
a trade payments credit mechanism (Nsekela, 1981, pp.95-96). The most important
problem, however, and one which renders this form inappropriate for developing
countries, is the sacrifice of policy autonomy involved - national monetary policies are not
possible and national fiscal policy is limited (see Chapter 2). The lack of a high degree
of 'political co-operation' among SADCC members thus leads Nsekela to dismiss monetary
union as a viable option for SADCC for the foreseeable future (p.96).83
82. Ng'andwe points out that "trade between [SADCC] countries is usually through the medium of the
internationally recognised currencies" (1987, p.187)..
83. ~~all'h?wever, that ,the Allen-Kenen model showed that independent monetary policy may be severely
hmIted In any case, If goods and asset market integration is intense enough.
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A less intense form of monetary integration is involved in an 'exchange rate union' or
'currency area'. This was defined above as involving a number of countries with a
common peg but national central banks and national monetary policy. Theoretical
arguments presented in earlier chapters suggested that it is an arrangement inferior to a full
monetary union, but it does permit members a higher degree of policy autonomy. Nsekela
considers this as a possible arrangement for SADCC but dismisses it on the basis that the
required policy co-ordination necessitates excessive sacrifice of sovereignty, even though
less sovereignty is sacrificed than in the case of a full monetary union. He cites the
demise of the East African Currency Board as an example of the inappropriateness of this
sort of arrangement to African conditions, and sees similar 'political differences' and
'structural inequalities' in SADCC as were present between the members of the EACB
(1981, p.97).
Instead of integration then, it is argued that only policy co-ordination is possible between
SADCC's members. The goals of monetary policy co-ordination have already been
discussed - capital mobility and intra-trade is encouraged by increasing the substitutability
of members' currencies - but fiscal policy co-ordination is called for as well, for the same
reasons. Ng'andwe holds that joint fiscal policies should be "aimed at promoting intra-
regional trade while protecting regional industries from outside competition" (1987,
p.189). In addition, he calls for 'compensating mechanisms' to offset trade diversion, but
cautions that previous arrangements along this line have not been effective enough, leaving
weaker countries disadvantaged. As such, concerted fiscal policy co-ordination is vital to
the success of the SADCC industrialisation programme (pp. 189-190).
Other measures of monetary and financial integration that are recommended include a
credit clearing house for intra-regional payments, agreement on policies to smooth and
speed up, intra-regional payments and the enlargement and expansion of the East African
Development Bank (Nsekela, 1981, pp.28-30).
Monetary disengagement from South Africa is considered a special problem for the BLS .
countries and Namibia, due to their high degree of integration with South Africa. Based
on trade volumes with South Africa, Nsekela argues that Namibia could disengage most
easily - setting up a national central bank and currency with "little difficulty" (1981,
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p.107). In fact, the recently independent Namibia has, at time of writing, set up a central
bank and plans to have fully introduced a national currency by 1992. 84
Trade volumes between BLS and South Africa reflect a higher degree of market integration
than between South Africa and Namibia, and disengagement/dependence reduction is thus
seen as a more difficult task. 85 What is more, Nsekela points out that monetary
disengagement by itself is pointless and that it is meaningful only alongside "broader
restructuring of the numerous basic relationships with RSA production, trade, ownership,
capital and labour flows" (1981, p.108). Granted that these "basic relationships" amount
to high integration, it is doubtful whether BLS would be willing to bear the costs of
severing them, especially in light of the fragility of their developing economies. 86
The debate around the role of SACU in modifying BLS behaviour (as SADCC members)
now comes into view. It is necessary to assess the degree to which SACU acts as a
binding force between South Africa and BLS, as this binding force necessarily promotes
monetary links as well. This task is undertaken next.
6.5 THE ROLE OF THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN
CUSTOMS UNION
Many writers, in identifying SACU with the South African state, have portrayed it as a
burden to BLS and have attempted to make a case for their withdrawal. The intention of
this section is to consider both these arguments and others suggesting a more constructive
role for SACU. Lastly, the prospects for BLS withdrawal are reviewed.
84. The prospects for, and methods of, disengagement are analysed in detail by Goedhuys (1990).
85. See Nsekela (1981), Table p.l0?
86. The extent of this integration is detennined in the following chapter according to the Allen-Kenen
defmitions as presented in Chapter 3.
6.5.1 The Position of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland
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The assertions to the effect that BLS are prejudiced by SACU are normally backed up by
a number of reasons. Firstly, it is held that BLS do not receive sufficient compensation
for being in a customs union with a more developed country, or that there is something
wrong with the compensatory mechanism. Cobbe (1980, pp.330-331) has pointed out that
the stabilisation amendment that was introduced in 1976 has rendered the compensation
rate indeterminate, since the revenue may only fluctuate between the 17 - 23 per cent
limits. Secondly, the average rate of revenue of 20 per cent is based on South African
imports and is a determining factor in the formula. However, if BLS imports differ in
their duty content, then their actual revenue received' amounts to either a net transfer to,
or a net transfer from, South Africa. Cobbe suggests that the latter is the case.
Henderson (1985, pp.230-232) points out that there is a two-year lag between actual
receipts of revenue and revenue earnings, and that this amounts to an interest free loan to
South Africa. The fact that the South African members of the technical subcommittee of
SACU agreed that this was unfair is seen by Henderson as an indictment against the South
African government for refusing to renegotiate this individual article. More importantly,
Henderson holds that the customs revenue to the BLS has fostered dependence on South
Africa, and has permitted South Africa to maintain a 'dominant role' in their economies
(pp.230-231).
A second source of problems for BLS is to be found in South Africa's import substituting
approach to industrialisation and in its consequences for the use of trade barriers.
Specifically, Cobbe has explained that South Africa's emphasis on quantitative restrictions
has cost BLS both in terms of revenue foregone and also because the prices of various
BLS imports from South Africa have been raised as a result of the non tariff barriers
(1980, pp.331-332).
A related problem for BLS is their inability to take autonomous decisions and implement
policies relating to trade policy. This entails the loss of a degree of fiscal policy
autonomy. Maasdorp explains that this could mean a declining amount of revenue to BLS
- since the size of the customs pool is determined only by South Africa, regardless of the
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percentage share of BLS (1988, pp.42-43). Thus, for example, South Africa's adoption
of GST in 1987 meant falling revenue for BLS as the import surcharge was phased out and
they were faced with having to implement their own sales tax systems, which are complex,
expensive and regressive (Hanlon, 1986, p.82; Maasdorp, 1988, p.43). The regressivity
of South Africa's indirect tax structure is demonstrated by Cobbe, who thus concludes that
BLS's lack of fiscal sovereignty has resulted in negative distributional effects in those
countries (1980, p.332).
SACU's effect on industrial location is another area of contention. It is argued that South
Africa's free access to BLS markets has prevented industrialisation in these countries, and
that they have thus been unable to generate significant internal linkages - something which
is important for industrial - led growth. Instead, their predominantly external linkages
mean their expenditures on South African imports contribute to South African growth: they
are more like the outlying regions of an industrial hub than separate countries with their
own growth engines (Hanlon, 1986, pp.84-85).
Secondly, South Africa has implemented measures to encourage decentralisation to its
lesser developed areas, especially the bantustans, and BLS are thus forced to 'compete'
for investment by attempting to match or better the incentives offered. 87 Hanlon holds
that BLS have been unsuccessful at this, and have lost more jobs this way than they have
gained through SACU. In addition, he gives examples of cases where South Africa has
actively worked against industrial projects in BLS, using its economic power to make these
projects unviable. Henderson concludes that BLS were "very naive", believing that the
1969 Agreement was "about money" and not taking into account its broader development
effects (1986, pp.85-86).
Maasdorp (1988; 1989) has questioned several of the assertions made against the customs
union. Firstly, he shows that the compensation factor is not in fact indeterminate as Cobbe
(1980) and others believe, rather, the stabilisation amendment is "superimposed" on the
fixed rate, it does not supersede it (1988, his footnote 43). Secondly, he points out that
it is BLS who emphasise the revenue benefits of SACU rather than the development
87. It should be noted, however, that BLS do enjoy access to EC markets through the Lome Convention.
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effects, and that the compensation received is intended for the polarisation, trade diversion
and fiscal policy loss effects of the union. Thirdly, even without the compensation factor,
the formula fav~urs BLS at the expense of South Africa for various reasons, one of which
is the inclusion of excise duties and sales tax in the formula. Fourthly, the 'two-year lag'
argument is incorrect since the formula 'forecasts' revenue based on a constant growth
rate. Thus payments will only be incorrect if estimation methods are lagging behind.
Walters (1989, p.43) also makes this point. With regard to industrial polarisation,
Maasdorp concedes that SACU has been an impediment to BLS industrialisation, but he
points out that action by South Africa to impede specific industries has only occurred when
those industries "would have penetrated the South African market by flouting non-tariff
barriers applicable there" (1989, p.27).88 Moreover, Maasdorp has shown that BLS have
failed to make adequate use of Articles 6,7 and 11 of the agreement, which allow qualified
protection of industries in their economies (1988, pp.37-38). Henderson does, however,
concede that aspects of these articles are ambiguous, and thus suggests that BLS seek to
clarify them (1989, p.27).
Maasdorp also considers the argument that SACU has imposed South African tax
structures, consumption and production preferences on BLS to their detriment, but finds
it unconvincing. Whilst not denying the structural closeness of SACU economies,
Maasdorp (citing Cobbe) emphasises that this 'integration' is not the result of SACU, but
rather of "geographical, historical and economic" factors that bring the countries together
(1988, p.45).
6.5.2 The Practicability and Desirability of BLS Withdrawal
from SACU
Can a valid case for BLS withdrawal stand then? Meyns (1984, p.210) points out that
BLS membership of SACU does not preclude them from full participation in SADCC,
although such membership hardly seems consistent with SADCC's goals. It appears
though, that the decision to withdraw is regarded by SADCC as one which must be taken
nationally, and in national interests.
88. One could still, however, attempt to justify BLS action, on the basis that they receive no benefit from
non-tariff barriers but might experience costs due to these South Africa protectionist measures.
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The difficulties that will be faced by BLS will not be easily overcome. Firstly, they will
have to set up administrative customs and excise structures to replace those of South
Africa, and will have to police their 'porous' borders to prevent illegal trafficking of
goods. Secondly, BLS have no import houses and are reliant on South African importers.
Contacts will have to be made and structures established from scratch in order to permit
BLS access to foreign goods. Thirdly, South Africa may retaliate by hampering BLS
goods whilst they are in transit on the South African transport network. Given BLS
dependence on the South African system, this could be a serious impediment to their trade
(Hanlon, 1986, pp.88-89). In addition, it is doubtful whether BLS would be able to fully
replace the lost customs revenue by implementing their own tariff, since the amount they
receive now is, of course, enlarged by the compensation factor.
Another option is the scaling down of the customs union into a free trade area. This
would permit BLS to become more involved in SADCC and Lesotho and Swaziland could
reciprocate in the PTA, however, as Matthews (1984, pp.257-258) has pointed out, BLS
customs revenue would still fall since there would be reason for reducing the compensation
factor.
It appears though, that withdrawal is both undesirable and unnecessary. Maasdorp (1988,
pp.45-46) has criticised several of the traditional arguments against BLS membership, and
has cited other writers (Hudson, 1981; Lipton, 1978) who advocate modifications to
arrangement but not withdrawal. Maasdorp himself recommends that BLS push for
renegotiation and cites Walters (1989) that "BLS ... now believe that no fundamental
changes to the agreement are required" (1989, p.28) (my emphasis); Furthermore, with
the changing political climate in South Africa, it is likely that BLS's political reservations
about being in SACU will soon disappear.
6.6 FUTURE PROSPECTS
Having examined the roles of SACU and SADCC from the perspective of BLS, it will be
worthwhile to assess the future prospects of these two arrangements. The task is made
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interesting by the inter-relationships between the two: their futures are connected in many
respects and both could undergo serious change or even cease to exist in the near future.
6.6.1 SADCC's Prospects
An important question that raises itself is: will integration in SADCC increase, decrease
or change little? Hawkins (1990, pp.28-30) feels that, whilst "deepening" (Le. increasing)
integration is vital for SADCC, it stands to experience considerable problems in furthering
it. Hawkins outlines four problem areas in this regard: firstly the problem of the non-
acceptance by member states of the need for increased integration, although the SADCC
secretariat sees its necessity. Secondly, the unwillingness on the part of members to
relinquish 'the levers of economic power', thirdly the lack of sufficient technical expertise
and fourthly, differences in levels of development and in policy application (pp.29-30).
What is more, Hawkins finds that little coherence exists between members as regards their
trade and investment/industrialisation approaches when harmonisation of these strategies
is a prerequisite for successful deepening (pp.30-33). With regard to industrialisation the
advent of a strategy to ensure the equitable distribution of industry is seen as imperative
by Hawkins.
With regard to SADCC's relations with South Africa, there is every reason to believe that
political change in the latter will lead to a thawing of attitudes, although, as Maasdorp
(1990a, p.16) points out, South Africa must terminate all destabilisation activities in the
subcontinent. A number of writers see the possibility of a regional common market in
future, at least covering the area of the customs union, although fears are also expressed
that South Africa could dominate the weaker countries to their detriment (Maasdorp,
1990a, p.16; Hawkins, 1990, p.35; Cattaneo, 1990, p.57). Hawkins feels that this threat
would preclude integration of SADCC with the South African bloc, although co-operation
would still be possible.
Thus it is argued that SADCC should either broaden itself - include additional countries
to increase its strength in relation to South Africa - or it should seek close co-ordination
with South Africa in the form of transport, energy and tourism agreements under a modus
vivendi (Hawkins, 1990, pp.36-37). Either way though, it must do something about the
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threat of South A rican economic dominance. Hawkins further suggests a two-stage
agenda for the strengthening of SADCC: (a) it must 'cement' itself and increase
convergence between members and, (b) it must ensure equitable distribution of the benefits
of industrial development (pp.41-42). Thus hopefully will it survive the setbacks of the
1980s and the decline in importance of its original goal of dependence reduction on
apartheid South Africa.
6.6.2 SACU's Prospects
There is much evidence to suggest that, despite many of the points made against the
customs union, it is in most respects a successful arrangement with basically satisfied
members. Maasdorp (1990b, p.14) ascribes its success to the disparity in sizes of its
members and particularly the smallness of BLS. He argues that the diminutive economies
of BLS make import replacement industrialisation unviable for them, whilst their free
access to the large SACU market benefits their export industries. This same fact makes
customs union membership for other SADCC countries a less advisable proposition
(Maasdorp, 1990b, p.15).
But although it appears as if the customs union is a satisfactory arrangement, the
desirability of increased integration is not established. For BLS, the primary advantage
in a common market would be labour migration effects, since their own economies do not
seem capable of growing at the pace of their labour forces (Maasdorp, 1989, p.33).
However, South Africa has its own unemployment problem, and if migration statistics are
anything to go by, the possibility of it welcoming the labour inflows of its neighbours in
a common market are slight. Thus the case for a common market is not clear, either
between the present members of SACU or over a wider area incorporating SADCC
countries.
Another approach is to make alternatives to SACU, especially in light of the
revenue/development dichotomy. Maasdorp (1988, p.47) suggests however, that a shift
to the emphasis of development as opposed to revenue generation necessitates a planned
approach. In particular, provisions ensuring fair distribution of industry are necessary, as
well as attention on transport links, investment incentives and funds allocation.
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Finally, whilst a post-apartheid South Africa will remove any political obstructions to co-
operation with South Africa, many economic problems will remain, especially those
relating to South Africa's domination of the regional economy. It is questionable though,
whether South Africa's new government will actually assist its neighbours in reducing
dependence on it, rather it will be up to those neighbours to push for equitable
development, and not to allow dependencies to increase and disparities to widen. A
prerequisite is the securing of co-operation in restructuring the regional economy and
implementing a regional development strategy, and SACU could provide a channel for
this.
6.7 CONCLUSION
At the outset it was stated that the membership of economic integration and co-operation
arrangements of the CMA countries was 'important' in that it would have modifying
effects on their behaviour and possibly affect the viability of the CMA. However,
Botswana's non-membership of the CMA seems to imply that such membership is not a
prerequisite for gainful membership of the SACU.89 This idea does seem to have some
validity, although the possibility that the Two benefit additionally from the SACU by
virtue of their CMA membership is strong. If the goods market integration fostered by the
SACU is beneficial for the Two, then the monetary integration agreement, which facilitates
goods market integration,90 must also be worthwhile. The fact that the SACU is beneficial
for the Two has been established in this chapter: it was indicated above that, whilst
SADCC had struggled in its bid to reduce its dependence on South Africa and had
experienced economic regression, SACU had ensured BLS of steady flows of imports,
markets for exports and, in the case of the Two, access to foreign exchange. SACU was
held to be 'fundamentally sound' and it was established that BLS are basically satisfied
with the arrangement. Moreover, SADCC's ability to modify BLS' actions appears to be
minimal: there are a number of impediments to 'deepening' within SADCC, and while it
struggles to improve links between its members, it cannot expect them to reduce their links
with non members, especially if these links are as intense as those in SACU. In addition
89. Chapter 8 below analyses the Botswana situation and finds that its degree of monetary autonomy is not
as significant as may be assumed, and further that its experience is not entirely transferable to the Two.
90. The rationale behind this process was described in Chapter 2.
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the prospect of political change in South Africa will remove political barriers to economic
co-operation with it and thus also BLS 'embarrassment' at participation in SACU. It will
then be left for BLS to push for their desired modifications to the SACU agreement.
SACU's long run viability will thus depend on its ability to distribute the benefits of
integration equitably among its members and to contribute towards balanced regional
development. The considerations of section 6.2 of this chapter suggest as much: SACU
as a model 4-type bloc is most compromised by its lack of homogeneity of industrial
development levels. Furthermore, the evidence from the remainder of this chapter
supports this fact. However if SACU has a role to play in a regional development strategy
then so has the CMA, both indirectly as an arrangement supportive and facilitative to
SACU and goods market integration, and directly as an enhancer of allocative efficiency
and investment in the region. The function of this chapter has been to confirm that
economic integration in the region has a role and a future, and therefore that monetary
integration does as well; the function of the next is to illustrate, analyse and confirm the
level of this integration.
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CHAPTER 7
THE EXTENT AND IMPLICATIONS
OF GOODS AND ASSET MARKET
INTEGRA TION IN THE CMA
7.1 INTRODUCTION
The task of this chapter is to confirm what has been taken for granted throughout this
thesis, namely that there exists a high degree of asset and goods market integration
between South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland, the members of the CMA. However this
is not the only task of this chapter: it will also be necessary to assess fully the implications
of any established integration levels for policy interdependence and disturbance
transmission before recommendations and pronouncements can be made on the desirability
of the current institutional arrangements. As was seen in Chapters 2 and 5, it is useless
to attempt to assess the 'optimality' of a monetary area; what is required is an analysis of
the effects such an arrangement has on economies, and whether the negative effects can
be removed. Thus a better approach is to optimise the effects of a monetary arrangement -
to ensure the benefits and costs are spread evenly among the members, and this goal is
furthered by the adaption of bloc economic policy to the conditions which are created by
goods and asset market integration. The Allen-Kenen model provides a valuable tool for
assessing these conditions and their consequences, and the largest portion of this chapter
will be dedicated to the application of this model to the CMA scenario. For the purposes
of the application of the model, Swaziland will play the role of 'South' and South Africa,
'North'. Initially, however, it will be necessary to say something about the important
limitations of the model and to justify the focus on Swaziland.
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7.2 JUSTIFICATION FOR THE FOCUS ON SWAZILAND
Firstly a somewhat trivial-seeming though important reason - the Allen-Kenen model
analyses only a two country monetary union, and thus it is necessary to chose two of the
members of the CMA. One could alternatively analyse the South AfricalSwaziland and
South AfricalLesotho situations separately (a Swaziland/Lesotho scenario would be of little
help), but this would entail unnecessary effort and would add little to the usefulness of the
study.
The most important reason for looking at Swaziland alone is one that arises from the
'qualitative' hypothesis of the model, i.e. that greater monetary unification, or at the least
greater monetary co-operation is called for rather than less. This idea rests on the
existence of high costs relating to policy dependence that result at high levels of asset and
goods market integration. Since Lesotho is more highly integrated with South Africa than
Swaziland91 , it would be easier to prove the quantitative hypothesis and imply the
qualitative hypothesis if it were used rather than Swaziland. Thus the focus on Swaziland
puts the burden of proof on the alternative hypothesis and ensures more credible results.
Finally, data availability suggests that Swaziland is a better bet, since Lesotho statistics are
less detailed and reliable. Meaningful application of the model requires that about a
-decade of quarterly observations are used, and Swaziland data are more likely to be
available in this detail.
7.3 THE LIMITATIONS OF THE MODEL
There are two broad categories of 'limitation': those inherent in the model itself and those
that arise from the application of the model to a real world, non typical situation (for thus
must the CMA situation be viewed).
91. Table 6.2 in the previous chapter confirms that Lesotho's goods market is more highly integrated with
South Africa's than Swaziland's. The fact that Swaziland opted for a national currency and central bank
before Lesotho, and that it was first to voice feelings about de-linking suggest that its asset market is
less integrated with South Africa's than Lesotho's.
7.3.1 Inherent Limitations
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The following are identified by Allen and Kenen themselves (1980, pp.203-209):
(1) Capital formation and claims to capital (equities) are omitted. Thus the
analysis of investment and investor behaviour is limited.
(2) Continuous clearing of markets and immediate optimisation of portfolios is
assumed, thus forbidding analysis of disequilibrium in the markets.
(3) The demand for money depends on wealth and interest rates rather than
income, this is a characteristic of the portfolio-balance approach.
(4) Expectations are stationary, thus there is no planning or contingency action
since no change is expected.
Any economic model has to make limiting assumptions in order to be workable, and these
limitations should be seen in this context. Other models which have been used as readily
have been simpler and have contained more limitations, for example Richard Marston's,
which was devised after Allen and Kenen's (see Marston, 1982, pp.407-442).
7.3.2 Limitations Arising From the Adaption of the Model
Before a theoretical model can be applied, the real world scenario must be analysed to
detect areas of incompatibility between the actual scenario and the conditions assumed by
the theoretical model. A number of discrepancies appear in this regard:
(1) Interdependence does not apply in the CMA as it does in the model. Instead,
the relationship is closer to one of dependence of the Two on South Africa.
Whilst this may appear to be a serious problem, it can be partially
circumvented by simplifying the model: specifically by
(a) disallowing 'effects' that run from South (Swaziland) to North (South Africa),
and,
(b) treating certain variables as exogenous from the point of view of view of the
South.
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Modification (a) is of limited interest and importance since it is the reverse
relationship between the Two and South Africa that is of interest. Modification (b)
is a less trivial one, albeit necessary to maintain the simplicity and thus clarity of the
estimated model - it is simply beyond the scope of this thesis to attempt a full
simulation of the Allen-Kenen model and we are in any event only interested in 'one
side of the story': the consequences of the dependence of the Two on South Africa.
Thus the predictions of the model will be assumed only to hold true to the Two and
the results of the model will be interpreted as such.
(2) 'Integration', as it is understood in the context of the model can not be said
to apply in the strict sense to the CMA: there is no perfect substitutability
between the assets or goods of the countries. However a form of integration
exists which very probably has the same effects as the type defined under the
model. So long as the Two conduct a large portion of their trade with South
Africa and maintain strong capital market links (as described in Chapter 4),
the conditions will produce results that are the same, or very similar to those
produced by true Allen-Kenen integration. Thus the test will be whether the
model predicts well or not.
(3) The model is based on the assumption that both countries are capable
(assuming no complications arising from integration) of conducting 'mature'
monetary and fiscal policy, but this is in doubt as regards Swaziland and
Lesotho.92 Furness (1975, pp.234-238) questions the ability of developing
nations to undertake conventional monetary and fiscal policy. As regards
monetary policy, open market operations are limited because the volume of
securities and number of transactions are low and the government is obliged
to keep bond prices stable to maintain market confidence. Direct controls are
likewise limited: the nature of ownership of financial institutions often permits
them to draw on international reserves when liquidity is tight. On the other
hand, fiscal policy is limited due to the strong pressure to constantly expand
92. South Africa itself was only able to begin conducting open market operations in 1972, when capital
markets were sufficiently developed.
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government spending to accommodate the needs of the growing economy.
Also, tax policy is limited since sources are few and collection problematic.
These considerations must be borne in mind when interpreting the results of
the model. As it happens, the model does show that monetary policy is
limited in Swaziland, but this is also a consequence of integration.
These considerations suggest caution in the application and interpretation of the model,
though none seem to suggest that the exercise will not be of some use.
7.4 THE MODEL
7.4. 1 The Objectives of the Model
The intention is to use the Allen-Kenen model to estimate the extent of goods and asset
market integration between South Africa and Swaziland. The 'quantitative' hypothesis is
that integration exists, but judgement will have to be used to assess whether the
'qualitative' hypothesis - that this integration is high enough to have an important bearing
on the response of Swaziland to South African policy and disturbances - has some validity.
If the latter can be ascertained with reasonable certainty it will give support to a central
theme of this thesis: that greater levels of monetary unification, or at least co-operation,
is required rather than less, which especially Swaziland has attempted to bring about
recently. This will be achieved by testing only the reduced-form 'integration' functions
of the larger Allen-Kenen model.
7.4.2 The Data
Quarterly data spanning the decade 1980-1990 is used. 93 All nominal values have been
converted to real values for reasons advanced below. All variables that have been
93. The data series for Swaziland GDP and government expenditure (SWGDPR and SWGOVR respectively)
have been 'converted' to quarterly series by simply replicating the annual entries. This is unfortunate
but necessary since quarterly national accounts data for Swaziland are simply not available. However,
if anything, this 'modification' is an ally of the null hypothesis in that there is less available variation
to account for.
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converted to real values have an 'R' appended. Since lag structures are used, the time
period of the regressions is not the full decade but this does not prevent the attainment of
satisfactory results, as shall be seen. In addition, certain series - such as GDP and money
supply - have been seasonally adjusted. The data is presented in the Appendix, along with
a description of its sources and other information about the estimated relationships.
7.4.3
7.4.3. 1
Asset Market Integration - Estimating The r2r2 Curve
The Theoretical Relationship
In Chapter 3, asset market integration was said to exist between two countries when there
existed a degree of substitutability between the bonds of those two countries. As asset
market integration increases, the interest rates of the respective countries begin to move
together since any differentials between these interest rates are offset by funds flows
between capital markets. In the case of complete asset market integration, interest rate
changes must be exactly equal to maintain equilibrium. In Section 3.3.1 above, the
prospects for monetary policy under various degrees of asset market integration was
analysed, and it was found that the scope for effective individual monetary policy declines
as the degree of integration increases. The existence of high degrees of asset market
integration thus strengthens the argument for monetary union, or at least monetary policy
co-ordination. Section 3.6.1.2 introduced the asset market curves of the two integrated
countries and it was shown that the asset market responses are reflected in the slopes of
the rIrI and rr curves (Fig. 3.3 above). As integration increases, the slopes of the curves
approach unity since the differential between the individually-felt impacts for bond specific
disturbances declines. Thus if Swaziland is treated as the 'South' and South Africa as the
'North', estimation of the r2r2 curve will permit analysis of the degree of integration
between the two countries, specifically the degree of Swaziland's integration with the much
larger South African capital and money markets. The United Kingdom (UK) is treated as
'the outside world' because it is Swaziland's most important trading partner.94
94. South African direction of trade data have been unavailable for some years, and so the 'outside world'
country is chosen from the Swazi perspective. Direction of trade data for Swaziland show that, for the
portion of the sample for which data are available, the United Kingdom was Swaziland's next most
important trading partner after South Africa. The trade volumes to particular centres do fluctuate
however -see the Swaziland Annual Statistical Bulletin, 1985, which seems to have the most detailed
data on direction of trade.
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The equation for the r;'2 curve is given by Allen and Kenen (1980, p.435) as:
a1t a--et a- b a hs b awhsl b aB'ar =b ar +b 2 - +b 3 B2 +b 4 r a+ 5 W + 6 + 7 22 1 1 1t
The terms are defined in Chapter 3, but will be briefly re-defined:
(7.1)
r2 The Southern interest rate.
r I The Northern interest rate.
1r The external flexible exchange rate.
B2
ct This represents total (North + South) central bank holdings of the Southern
bond.
ra The world interest rate
Whs Northern savings.
Whs , Southern savings.
B2' This represents total Southern bonds outstanding.
The coefficients are combinations of other parameters, whose detailed definition is not
especially important here. However, their predicted signs are important for the task at
hand.
Predicted signs are as follows:
The signs of these changes (and others) have also been given in the tables in chapter 3,
and certain of them were implicitly explained in that chapter. What follows is an explicit,
though brief explanation of each of them.
The existence of any degree of asset market integration requires that bI be positive since
sympathetic movement in union interest rates is required to maintain union portfolio
balance.
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The sign of b2 is indeterminate under the model. This outcome is a result of the primacy
within the model of the asset market in determining the short run exchange rate. However,
the money market and bond market effects of exchange rate changes are at odds in their
effect on the local interest rate. To illustrate, consider a depreciation due to an autonomous
capital outflow. The depreciation instantly increases wealth as value holdings of the foreign
bond rise, and households must increase their value holdings of local bonds and money to
maintain portfolio balance. This shifts WW down and MMt up, rendering indeterminate
the fmal sign of the change in r (specific knowledge of the relative slopes of WW and
M~ is required). Since the sign of the change in r is unknown, so too are the signs of
the changes in r1 and r.
The sign of b3 is negative and its explanation is straightforward. As central bank holdings
of the Southern bond increase, there is an increase in liquidity and an increase in demand
for both bonds. Thus r2 will fall as W
2W2 shifts down, reflecting the increase in demand
for B2•
Coefficient b4 is indeterminate under the theoretical model since r2 could rise or fall for
a rise in ro. Gross substitutability of local and world bonds suggests that r2 and ro should
move together, and the bond market excess supply that immediately results from a rise in
ro puts pressure on r2 to rise as well. However, there is a money market effect as well -
The ro rise reduces local demand for money (the model assumes that money demand varies
inversely with all three interest rates) and puts pressure on r2 to fall to clear the money
market. Thus a rise in ro sets off conflicting forces on r2 and the eventual change depends
on the relative strengths of these forces. Graphically, the final change depends on the
slopes and relative shifts of WW and MtM in Fig. 3.11 of Chapter 3. This particular
diagram shows a net fall in rt and implies that r1 and r2 fall as well, due to symmetry. The
actual change in r2 is indeterminate however.
The sign of bs will be discussed after coefficient b6 has been discussed, for reasons of
economy. Both expected signs are negative for very similar reasons.
Firstly, a mistake in AlIen and Kenen's definition of the rr curve must be pointed out.
On page 435, their equation for the r2r curve gives a positive expected coefficient for b6,
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whilst bs is shown as negative and the corresponding coefficients for the rIr
l curve are also
given as negative. Now there is no possibility of an asymmetrical effect of this sort, given
the symmetry assumptions of the model, and one must conclude that the positive sign for
bs in the rr equation should be negative, as is the corresponding coefficient for bs in the
rIr l equation. To illustrate the negative relationship, consider the following: assume
Southern disposable income increases, setting off an interval of saving. The positive saving
adds to wealth, and this increases desired holdings of all three bonds and local money.
Since both bond and money demands are homogenous of the first degree in wealth, WM2
shifts up and W2W2 shifts down, making the initial part of the change in f 2 indeterminate,
as in the previous case. However, the chain of causality does not stop here. The increase
in Southern demand for BI will shift WIW
I down and reduce rh raising Nonhem demand
for B2, which is relatively more attractive. As demand for B2 increases, WW shifts down
again, dragging r2 below its previous level since there is no money market effect this time.
The expected sign of b6 is thus negative, both intuitively and by demonstration.
It should thus be clear as to why the expected sign of bs is also negative. Above it was
shown that r l would fall for an increase in Southern saving, by virtue of the bond market
effect. Invoking symmetry, it is thus clear that the effect on r2 of an increase in Northern
saving will also be negative.
Finally, the positive expected sign of b7 must be explained. Under the model, deficit
financing is undertaken by issuing the home bond, in this case B2• As the supply of B2
increases, then, its traded price falls, raising its return and putting upward pressure on the
local interest rate. Therefore the supply of local bonds is positive~y related to the interest
rate.
The exogenous variables have bars over them, all others are endogenous according to the
assumptions of the model. Where these assumptions appear unrealistic in the context of
the real model, they will be changed. The intuitive reasoning behind the new assumptions
about exogeneity and endogeneity will be given when the econometric variables are
discussed below.
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The equation is already in the reduced form, thus suggesting that its solution requires a full
simulation of the simultaneous model summarised by Equations 44, 45 and 46 in
Chapter 3. This would be the case if it were not possible to modify the model and
increase the proportion of exogenous variables to allow direct estimation of the r2r2
equation as if it were a structural equation. This is in fact possible, since the discrepancy
in sizes of the Swaziland and South African markets implies that certain 'endogenous'
variables are actually exogenous to Swaziland. As was discussed in Section 7.3.4,
'integration' as it is understood in the context of the theoretical model would appear not
to be the case in the CMA, since there is no true interdependence and interaction of
markets. Rather, there appears to be a one-way dependence of the Swaziland markets on
the larger and more sophisticated South African markets, and this implies that many ofthe
variables of the model are not mutually determined, as would be the case if the countries
were truly interdependent. 95 These considerations affect the way the theoretical model
is interpreted and applied, and, if anything, permit its simplification. As will be seen,
direct estimation of Equation 7.1 is possible, since many of the variables can be interpreted
as exogenous for the reasons given.
7.4.3.2 The Estimated Relationship
Thus the assumptions of endogeneity made under the model are simply not realistic in the
.context of the CMA, and certain variables that will be listed below will hence be treated
as exogenous. For the purposes of estimation, the variables in Equation 7.1 above will
be designated and interpreted as follows:
r2 Called SWINT, the endogenous Swaziland interest rate. Two measures of
SWINT are used, SWINT1 is the Swaziland Central bank discount rate and
SWINT2 is the Swaziland prime overdraft rate. Both are tested but the final
model will utilise the better of the two.
95. Such as would be the case if the countries were of similar economic size, as is the case in the Allen-
Kenen model.
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r1 SAINT is the exogenous South African interest rate, also interpreted as
SAINTl and SAINT2. SAINT is exogenous in the estimated model for the
reasons given above.
ro The world interest rate, WINT2, is the United Kingdom treasury bill rate.
EXR is the nominal South Africa/UK exchange rate in units of the foreign
currency. Thus the expected sign of EXR will be opposite to that of 'Tr, since
the exchange rate under the model is designated in units of the local currency.
EXR is also exogenous. 96
B2
ct Combined central bank holdings of the Southern bond will be interpreted as
SWOMO, Swaziland central bank holdings of Swaziland government stocks
and bonds. Changes in this variable can thus be interpreted as open market
operations, and its influence will give an indication of the ability of Swaziland
monetary policy to affect SWINT. It is exogenous.
Whs South African savings, SASAV, are exogenous to the model.
WhSf Swaziland savings and time deposits, SWSAV, are potentially endogenous,
however it is not deemed a major violation to treat them as exogenous
initially. SWSAV will certainly be comprised of a large proportion of
corporate and government deposits and the role of SWINT in influencing
savings from these sources is less certain. 97
B/ Total Swaziland government stocks and bonds outstanding are called
SWBOND and are exogenous under the theoretical model. It is possible that
96. Since events inSwaziland are unlikely to have any significant effect on the rand/pound exchange rate,
given Swaziland's economic size.
97. In the theoretical model, ¥r' is household saving, and it responds to the same set of variables as do
bond and money demand. The relevance of this behaviour to the Swazi environment is in doubt. See
also Section 7.3.2.2 above.
154
they are not truly exogenous under the estimated model, and this possibility
will be looked into.
Tables of all data series are given in the Appendix. For the econometric work, all series
have been converted to real terms, this is in keeping with the fundamentals of the Allen-
Kenen model, which does not permit analysis of inflation as a process. AlIen and Kenen
point out that:
" ... the way in which our model is constructed - with stationary expectations,
the continuous clearing of all markets and a well-defined stationary state -
precludes consideration of inflation as a process. Prices do move up or down
in response to disturbances, but these are once-for-all price changes, even
though they are drawn out over time." (p201)
The question arises as to the choice of an appropriate deflator. It was decided to use the
Swazi consumer price index (CPI) for the Swazi data, this being the only available Swazi
price index and also the index normally used to calculate 'inflation'. For the sake of
consistency, the South Africa CPI was thus used for the South African data.
Of the series, SWOMO, SASAV, SWSAV and SWBOND were simply deflated by the
CPl's, becoming SWOMOR, SASAVR, SWSAVR and SWBNDR respectively. However,
EXR was converted into a bilateral real exchange rate as follows:
RER = (SAPRIC/UKPRIC).EXR
Where SAPRIC and UKPRIC are the South African and British consumer price indices,
respectively. SWPRIC is the Swazi CPI. SAPRIC, SWPRIC and UKPRIC were then used
to generate SAINF2, SWINF2 and UKINF2, the year-on-year inflation rate indices for the
three countries. The real interest rates SAINTR, SWINTR and WINTR were then
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calculated by simply deducting the inflation rate series from the interest rate series
SAINT2, SWINT2 and WINTI. 98 •
The final model has the form:
SWINTR = {3oC + {31SAINTR + f32RE~-3 + {33WINTR
+ {34SWSAVRt-4 + {35SWBNDRt_2 (7.2)
The econometric results, along with the relevant signs, are presented in Table 7.1 overleaf,
however, before discussing them it is necessary to say something about the variables in
Equation 7.1 that do not appear in the estimated equation:
SWOMOR:
Swaziland Central Bank holdings of the government bond are negligible. In
July 1990, the last date for which there are figures, the Central Bank held
only 6,8 per cent of total bonds outstanding. This was a recent purchase - for
most of 1989 the Bank held no government bonds at all.
SASAVR:
This variable is insignificant in the determination of SWINTR: the other
variables are able to explain most of its variation. This is probably due to the
fact that, whilst Swaziland savings may end up in South Africa, it is unlikely
that South African savings would be directed to Swaziland since there is no
shortage of areas of application of such funds in South Africa.
The regression output indicates a satisfactory fit. The adjusted R2 indicates that together,
the variables explain 75 % of variation in SWINTR. The F statistic far exceeds 3,75, the
critical value at the 95 % confidence level, indicating that the overall regression and the
R2 figure are highly credible. The Durbin-Watson (DW) statistic is comfortably within the
98. Two other real interest rates were calculated for the countries, using different inflation rates. Firstly,
a quarter-on-quarter inflation rate was generated and multiplied by four to generate a 'yearly' series.
This was then subtracted from the nominal interest rate to generate the real interest rate. The other
method was to generate a three-month moving average of the quarter-on-quarter inflation rate and
convert to 'yearly' to generate the real interest rate. These series were less successful than the true
year-on-year real interest rates however.
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rejection band of 0,192 on either side of 2, at the 95% confidence level. At the 99%
confidence level, DW is easily within the rejection band of 0,409 on either side of 2.
Visual inspection of the residuals reveals no discernible indication of heter~skedasticity
over the sample range, and a residual plot is included in the appendix to confirm this.
Finally, all variables are significant at the 95 % confidence level and three of them,
SAINTR, RER and WINTR are significant at the 99 % confidence level.
Table 7.1 Asset Market Regression Results
Sample: 1981.1 - 1989.2
34 Observations
Ordinary Least Squares // Dependent Variable is SWINTR
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR T-STAT 2-TAIL SIG
C 31.5307320 12.1891780 2.5867807 0.015
SAINTR 0.8778325 0.1417072 6.1946934 0.000
RER(-3) -31.8365520 11.0313800 -2.8859990 0.007
WINTR 1.1856268 0.4255876 2.7858588 0.009
SWSAVR(-4) -0.1326961 0.0508108 -2.6115717 0.014
SWBNDR(-2) -1.0045655 0.4882344 -2.0575475 0.049
R-squared 0.787041 Mean of dependent var 1.98549
Adjusted R-squared 0.749013 S.D. of dependent var 5.15631
S.E. of regression 2.583239 Sum of squared resid 186.84751
Durbin-Watson stat 2.062169 F-statistic 20.69620
Although the results in Table 7.1 are good, it is worth noting that a nominal version of the
same regression produces even better results, with only RER being less significant in
nominal form. This could indicate that, except for the exchange rate, economic agents act
on nominal variables, and are subject to a degree of money illusion in the asset markets.
This supposition seems tenable, given the nature of the variables. Unfortunately, however,
there is no way to analyse this with the Allen-Kenen model. 99
99. Also of interest, the R2 of the nominal regression is much higher, at 95,6%, implying that the real
. regression explains less well than the nominal regression. This need not be the case, if, as is likely,
the additional 'randomness' of SWINTR is due to.the effect of the inflation rate, since SWINTR is
a function of SWINT2 as well as the inflation rate. At any rate, a lower R2 need not indicate a
'worse' model, since: " ... in regression analysis, our objective is not to obtain a high R2 per se but
rather to obtain dependable estimates of the true population regression coefficients and draw statistical
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Turning to the variables themselves, it is plain that SAINTR plays a very important role
in the determination of SWINTR. The relationship holds almost as strongly when SAINT1
and SWINT1 are used for SAINTR and SWI1'.llR and it is clear that whichever SAINT
is used, it remains the most important determinant of SWINT. The coefficient of SAINTR
is approximately 0,88, indicating a strongly positive, near-unitary relationship between the
real interest rates. Again, a nominal regression of Equation 7.2 shows an almost exact
.linear relationship, indicating the presence of money illusion.
The coefficient of SAINTR can be interpreted as the slope of the rr curve of Chapter 3,
and since it is close to 1, we can infer a high degree of asset market integration between
South Africa and Swaziland. Reasons have already been given why 'integration' in the
theoretical sense does not apply strictly to the CMA, and these will not be repeated.
However, the extremely high coefficient of SAINTR does suggest that the Swaziland
capital market is highly integrated with South Africa's, and this is one of the points that
this chapter set out to prove.
Recall that it was impossible, a priori, to specify the expected sign of RER due to the
ambiguity of the combined money market and bond market effects. Thus the negative sign
on RER in the regression could indicate that, for the CMA, the money market effect of
an exchange rate change outweighs the bond market effect. This result should be
interpreted with caution since it is unlikely that significant capital mobility existed between
the CMA and the rest of the world over the sample period, as a result of disinvestment and
financial sanctions. The negative sign on RER is probably a result of the monetary
authorities' attempts to slow capital flight with high interest rates when these capital
outflows were depreciating the rand. 100 Although external capital mobility is probably
low, this need not affect intra-CMA capital mobility, which is the sort that characterises
asset market integration. The fact that the Swazi interest rate had to rise when the rand
depreciated implies that the asset markets are highly integrated, but it also shows up one
inferences about them" (Gujarati, 1988, p.186). As will be seen, the real regression model is more
dependable.
lOO. Gerson and Kahn (1988) identified capital flight as the most important determinant of real exchange
rate change in South Africa over the eighties.
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of the negative results of integration - that of the transmission of shocks within the
monetary union.
The coefficient of WINTR, the real 'world' interest rate is positive, and its magnitude
implies that a unitary increase will cause a 20% greater increase in SWINTR, ceteris
paribus. One could interpret this result as the dominance of the bond n1arket effect over
the money market effect for interest rate changes; the reverse of the scenario for exchange
rate changes, but for the reasons given above regarding external capital mobility, it is
unlikely that the 'pure' mechanisms are operating. It is more likely, however, that they are
operating correctly for world interest rate changes than for exchange rate changes, given
the 'role' that has been allocated to the former by the monetary authorities for the
combatting of capital flight. For world interest rate changes, however, changes in the local
interest rates would be required to be sympathetic, assuming that the bond market effect
is stronger than the money market effect.
The negative sign of SWSAVR is consistent with the theoretical relationship, but again,
one must exercise caution in interpreting it. The coefficient b6 is negative due to the
'indirect' effect of savings changes on the Southern interest rate, the 'direct' effect is
ambiguous because it depends on W1W1and M1M1 (see Section 7.4.3.1 above). However,
an estimated b6 could be negative because of the direct effect as well - if in reality the
Southern bond market effect outweighs its money market effect. Due to the discrepancy
in economic sizes between South Africa and Swaziland there is no possibility of the
indirect effect from Swazi savings to SWINTR, therefore the regression result implies that
the direct effect has been proven negative ie. the bond market effect outweighs the money
market effect. Positive Swazi savings add to wealth, increase the demand for assets, raise
the supply of loanable funds and thus decrease the interest rate. The nature of this process
also seems to support the four-period lag on SWSAYR. The overall finding of a stronger
bond market effect seems reasonable, since the Allen-Kenen assumption of a money
demand based primarily on wealth is somewhat heroic, and if only partially valid would
be consistent with a weak money market effect.
Finally, SWBNDR is the least significant of the variables and has the wrong sign; for
some reason the supply of local bonds is negatively related to the interest rate. This is
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likely due to some endogeneity on the part of SWBOND - a high Swaziland interest rate
(result of a high South African interest rate) means government will be obliged to pay
higher rates of return on new issues of bonds, and will thus turn to other sources of
finance. Thus the interest rate will have an inverse effect on the volume of bonds, and this
is an example of the fiscal policy constraints of the monetary union. It also confirms the
high level of integration of the Swaziland capital market with that of South Africa.
7.4.3.3 Making Use of the Results
The results of the estimation of the asset market relationship can be used for both
structural analysis and policy evaluation.
It has been demonstrated that the Swaziland capital market is closely linked to that of
South Africa, and that this 'linking' resembles, but is not exactly like, the asset market
integration described by Allen and Kenen. Nevertheless, whatever the nature of the
integration, the consequences for markets and policy implementation are the same, Le. the
scope for independent monetary policy, at least by Swaziland, is limited. This is borne
out by the fact that the Swaziland Central Bank does not attempt purchases or sales of the
government bond at any significant level and likewise seems passive as regards direct
manipulation of interest rates. 101 This section has shown that it may not have much
choice in the matter102 at extant levels of integration and, as has been pointed out
elsewhere, the best option is therefore to participate in a true monetary union with South
Africa and Lesotho.
101. For the period analysed.
102. Cf. the comments under "Monetary Developments" in the 1989/90 Central Bank of Swaziland
Annual Report, (1990, p.12): " ... to encourage domestic borrowing, the prime lending rate was
kept at a widening margin versus that prevailing in the Republic throughout the year." If the
findings of this section are correct then this sort of practice - direct control over the interest rate -
will not be tenable in the long run. Section 7.4.5 below addresses the issue of SA/Swazi interest rate
differentials in more detail.
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7.4.4 Goods Market Integration - Estimating the y2y2 Curve
7.4.4. 1 The Theoretical Relationship
'Goods market integration', in the sense it has been used throughout this thesis, refers to
the state of substitutability between the goods of two (or more) nations that comes about
when there is high mutual trade between them. Like the bonds of the two countries, the
goods are gross substitutes, and thus a price change in one market will lead to quantity
adjustment in all others. The degree of intensity of the responses indicates the degree of
goods market integration: as the quantity responses increase in proportion to the size of
the price changes (i.e. the cross elasticities of demand are increasing), the level of goods
market integration is said to be increasing. In perfect, or complete goods market
integration there is no scope for price differentials since goods flows and market responses
completely offset them. Thus prices and incomes move closer and closer together as
goods market integration increases. In Fig. 3.2 the y2y2 curve was used to depict the
Southern goods market response to changes in Northern income, and it was shown that its
slope approaches unity as integration increases. The logic behind this is the same as that
behind the slope of the r2r2 curve: as integration increases the differential between the
individually-felt impacts for market specific disturbances declines. Thus at perfect
integration both countries experience the same change in income for a disturbance,
- regardless of which goods market it arises in. An obvious consequence is that, as
integration increases, the degree of insulation from the partner country's policy (or
disturbances) declines and offsetting policy becomes necessary. However the magnitude
of required offsetting action also increases, until it becomes untenable. It is at this point
that co-ordinated policy is called for - and this may lead to the creation of a monetary or
fiscal union, especially if asset market integration is also high. The estimated model,
which follows in the next section, attempts to establish the y2y2 relationship so that
conclusions can be drawn about these considerations.
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Where y' is Southern Income, Y is Northern income, W and Wh' are Northern and
Southern wealth, respectively, oemt is a total shift from Good 2 to Good 0, G1 and G2 are
Northern government purchases of Goods 1 and 2 respectively, G1' and G2' are Southern
government purchases of Goods 1 and 2 respectively, and D and D' are the Northern and
Southern budget deficits, respectively.
All these variables have been encountered before and are also defined in Chapter 3.
Again, the coefficients a j are combinations of other parameters and are employed to
simplify the expression. Their expected signs are as follows:
Signs of interest are: at - this is positive since goods market changes in one market are felt
strongly in the other, due to goods market integration; a2 is positive since a depreciation
(7r increases) will cause expenditure switching; a3 and a4 are negative since an interest rate
fall causes a depreciation due to capital outflows and this causes expenditure switching;
as is positive because a rise in ro results in a capital outflow and the consequent
depreciation causes expenditure switching; ag is negative since a shift away from Good 2
will have obvious negative effects on Southern income; the signs of the fiscal policy and
wealth variables are self explanatory.
7.4.4.2 The Estimated Relationship
As with Equation 7.1, direct estimation of Equation 7.3 is possible due to the special
nature of Swaziland's 'integration' with South Africa (as discussed above, Section
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7.4.3.1). In addition, all data series have been converted into real terms in keeping with,
the approach adopted in Section 7.4.3.2.
Since the meaning and interpretation of the three interest rates and the exchange rate
(SWINTR, SAINTR, WINTR and RER) have already been given they will not be
explained again here. The other variables need to be explained though:
Y' Swaziland real GDP is denoted SWGDPR
Y South African real GDP is denoted SAGDP1. To give meaning to its
coefficient, however, it is scaled down to SAGDP2 the ratio of SAGDPl to
the ratio SAGDP1 t=/SWGDPRt =l. This means that in the regression on
SAGDP2, both GDP series have the same initial value. This is done because
in the theoretical model, both countries have the same economic size and thus
al ranges from 0 (no integration) to 1 (perfect integration). Because South
Africa is so much larger than Swaziland, straight regression of SAGDP1 on
SWGDPR would yield a minuscule al. However, scaling SAGDP1 down
gives a value for al that is meaningful in the context of the model and permits
comparison with the value for bl.
Wh' and Wh
Swaziland wealth, SWWR is defined as the sum of M2, foreign assets and
bonds outstanding. This is the closest possible approximation to the definition
given by Allen and Kenen (p.304; also Equation 3.5 above). South African
wealth, W h, is defined similarly for the sake of consistency and symmetry.
oct02 This represents a total (North + South + World) switch of demand from the
Southern good to the world good. The best interpretation of it would be to
generate a variable that is the sum of Swaziland consumption, the bilateral
Swaziland/South Africa balance of trade and the Swaziland/world balance of
trade. In the event, both bilateral trade data and Swaziland consumption data
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are scant103 and only Swaziland/world trade data are available in any detail.
It was thus decided to use SWBOTR, the real balance of trade, which,
although it is not a perfect approximation of oct02, is still a good one. Any
change in exports is a cnange in oct02 , and any change in imports not
associated with a parallel change in income is also a change in oct02• Thus
most of the variation in SWBOTR is also variation in oct02 •
0 1,02,0.' and O2' :
Swaziland and South African real government expenditure on goods 1 and 2
respectively. Of these, G2 is unlikely and probably negligible if it does exist
while G.' is possibly more likely although difficult to get detailed data for (as
with Swaziland/South Africa trade data). Thus only G1, SAGOVR and G/,
SWGOVR are used in the estimation.
D, D' :
The South African and Swaziland real budget deficits, respectively.
Inspection of the definitional equation, Equation 3.31 above, reveals that G
and Th are the most important components of the deficit. This fact suggests
caution in using either deficit in the estimation, since they will be collinear
with SWGOVR and SAGOVR.
¥
The most successful model has the form:
SWGDPR = aoe + a 1SAGDP2 + a2RE~_3 + a3SAINTR t_3
+ a4SWGOVR + a5SWBOT~_3 (7.4)
Besides SWWR, all omitted variables proved insignificant in the estimation of SWGDPR.
SWWR was omitted in order to make room for SAGDP2, with which it is highly
correlated,and because it is seen as less important as an explanatory variable, due to
suspected endogeneity. This is most likely true of the M2 component of SWWR.
103. Data are available, but they are yearly data only and incomplete over the decade.
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The initial regression of equation 7.4 produced good looking results, but the DW statistic
fell into the 'inconclusive' band at the 95 % confidence level. Since the R2 was very high
it was decided that a degree of inertia in the quarterly data rather than specification bias
was the likely cause. It was assumed that autocorrclation was of the first order type, and
the data were transformed using the Durbin two-stage method to estimate the coefficient
of autocorrelation. 104 The transformed variables have been prefixed with 'X's to
distinguish them from the original variables (thus some 'R' suffixes have had to be
dropped). Both sets have been included in the appendix however. Besides raising DW, the
generalised least squares method reduced the R2 and F statistics somewhat, but this was
expected.
The econometric results are presented below in Table 7.2.
Table 7.2 Goods Market Regression Results
SAMPLE: 1981.3 - 1989.2
32 Observations
Generalised Least Squares // Dependent Variable is XSWGDP
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR T-STAT 2-TAIL SIG
C -11 .7599870 8.4710092 -1.3882628 0.177
XSWGOV 4.3976212 0.6097724 7.2119057 0.000
XSAINT(-3) -0.4924982 0.1132543 -4.3486041 0.000
XSAGDP 0.6317232 0.1494271 4.2276355 0.000
XRER(-3) -25.6110600 6.4265958 -3.9851673 0.000
XSWBOT(-3) 0.0579992 0.0148954 3.8937698 0.001
R-squared 0.914031 Mean of dependent var 61.89910
Adjusted R-squared 0.897498 SD of dependent var 5.99188
SE of regression 1.918353 Sum of squared resid 95.68206
Durbin-Watson stat 1.903773 F-statistic 55.28680
104. Although the Cochrane-Orcutt method is generally more widely used, in this case convergence could
not be achieved after the requisite number of iterations. The Cochrane-Orcutt two-step and Durbin-
Watson techniques were also attempted, but they tended to overcorrect the autocorrelation and thus
reduce the significance of the regression.
165
Again the results indicate a good fit. The R2 and F statistic indicate that the variables
explain SWGDPR ·well, whilst the DW comes out at above 1,81, the relevant upper limit
for acceptance. Visual inspection of the residuals and a residual plot (see the Appendix)
suggest that heteroscedasticity is not a problem. All variables, with the exception of the
constant term, are significant at the 99 per cent confidence level.
As with the asset market estimation, the above results indicate that integration between
South Africa and Swaziland is significant. The variable of most interest is obviously
SAGDP2, which is the third most significant in the regression. 105 If SWGDPR and
SAGDP2 were the GDP data sets for two completely unconnected countries, al might still
exist and indeed, may exceed the value generated above. All this would tell us is that one
country grew faster, or slower than the other, it would not imply that integration existed
between the two countries. However, in the present situation it is known that integration
exists, therefore the decision has been taken to test a model of integration against the data
and ascertain the extent of this integration. The coefficient of SAGDP2 is thus an
important indicator of the extent of integration - it is not a coincidental or spurious value.
Since we know with confidence that Swaziland is integrated with South Africa's goods
market - facts like its membership of SACU and its high level of trade with South Africa
suggest this lO6 - we can confidently interpret the coefficient of SAGDP2 as a measure
. of the integration of the Swaziland goods market with South Africa's. Indeed, this
coefficient gives us some idea of the slope of the y2y2 curve - the curve that, in the Allen-
Kenen model, reflects the consequences of integration in goods markets on national
incomes. Since al is 0,632 we conclude that, were South Africa and Swaziland of similar
size (in this case reality must be altered to suit the mode!!), every additional rand earned
as national income by South Africa would increase Swaziland national income by
approximately 63 lisente as a direct result of the integration of the markets of the two -
both asset and goods. The y2y2 curve has thus been estimated - it has a slope of
approximately 0,63.
105. For the purposes of the discussion, the original names, rather than the 'X' names will be used. This
prevents confusion between for example, SAGD~l and SAGDP2.
106. Swaziland/South Africa imports were 81 per cent of total in 1985 (Swaziland Annual Statistical
Bulletin, 1985) while South Africa/Swaziland exports were 38,8 per cent of the total in 1986
(Swaziland Annual Statistical Bulletin, 1986).
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The South African real interest rate, SAINTR has the correct sign and is highly significant
when lagged by three periods. What is most interesting about SAINTR's effect on
SWGDPR is that it completely outweighs SWINTR's effect - which is insignificant and
thus omitted from the regression. It has already been established that SWINTR is largely
determined by the South African capital markets, but this result illustrates pristinely how
South African capital markets impinge on real economic activity in Swaziland as well. In
conventional macroeconomics, the negative relationship between the interest rate and GDP
arises from the investment effects of interest rate changes. Since the Allen-Kenen model
does not accommodate capital accumulation, this conclusion does not apply to the
theoretical model. Here an interest rate change forces an exchange rate change in the
same direction107 , and the exchange rate change alters income through expenditure
switching. This is the 'indirect' channel of influence of the interest rate on absorption.
There is also a direct channel though - an interest rate change alters savings in the same
direction, and thus there is an opposite change in absorption. The true mechanism lying
behind the coefficient of SAINTR probably incorporates all three effects, and it is beyond
the scope of this essay to attempt to estimate a detailed CMA transmission mechanism.
What has been proved is that the intra-CMA transmission mechanism is strong, and an
obvious consequence of goods and asset market integration.
When RER is lagged by three periods, its negative effect on SWGDPR is strongest, and
this effect is consistent with the predictions of the model. As pointed out elsewhere, an
exchange rate change causes expenditure switching, which pushes income in the opposite
direction to the exchange rate change. The high significance and coefficient value of RER
can be attributed to the stimulatory effect the rand/lilangeni depreciation had on SWGDPR.
If a greater percentage of Swaziland exports went to South Africa (see Footnote 106 for
relevant figures), Swaziland would have likely benefitted less from the depreciation. On
the other hand, the high percentage of Swaziland/South Africa imports has meant that
Swaziland has not suffered significantly from the depreciation in terms of rising import
costs.
107. Note that a depreciation is understood as an 'exchange rate fall' for the purposes of analysis in this
chapter.
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Government spending, SWGOVR, has a strongly stimulatory effect on SWGDPR, and this
is possibly one of the reasons Swaziland has been able to grow faster than South Africa
over the decade. The government expenditure multiplier is given by the value of a4 - 4,4.
By contrast, the lagged SWBOTR has a small effect on SWGDPR: an improvement in the
balance of trade will only increase GDP by 0,06 of the improvement. It would have been
interesting, but for the lack of data, to have determined the full effect of octm. This latter
variable probably accounts for some of the unexplained variation in SWGDPR.
7.4.4.3 Making Use of the Results
The model has permitted structural analysis of the Swaziland income function and _has
revealed that goods market integration - as a result of high trade levels between Swaziland
and South Africa - means that South African income changes have an important impact on
Swaziland income. In terms of policy evaluation, this suggests that a degree of policy
dependence on the part of Swaziland does exist. Specifically, if South Africa was similar
in economic size to Swaziland, South African fiscal or monetary policy that changed South
African GDP by x rand would change Swaziland GDP by 0,63x emalangeni and would
require offsetting fiscal policy on the part of Swaziland to the extent of 0,63(l/4,4)x =
-0,14x. If the South African fiscal multiplier was similar in size to that of Swaziland, the
offsetting policy would be approximately 63 per cent of the size of the original South
African fiscal operation. Although the actual offsetting policy coefficient depends on the
size of the coefficient of SAGDP1, not SAGDP2, the scaled-down version is considerably
smaller (about 130 times smaller). Note that it is not the fact of a minuscule coefficient
that determines the significance of offsetting policy but the relative size of the changes in
policy operation and consequent GDP change. For example, if South Africa conducts a
fiscal operation of magnitude x that causes a change in GDP of 4,4x,108 the change in
Swaziland income is 0,00485(4,4)x and offsetting policy is thus: 109
O,00485(4,4)x/4,4 = O,00485x
108. We are assuming here that the South African fiscal multiplier is the same as the estimated Swaziland
fiscal multiplier.
109. The figure 0,00485 is 0,63/130, the approximate scaled-down coefficient of SAGDP2.
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Whilst 0,00485 appears insignificant, x is a large figure, and thus 0,00485x is still a large
change in government spending, relative to the size of the economy. In fact it is still 63
per cent of the size of the South African operation, in relative terms. ,
7.4.5 Conclusion to the Model
At the outset it was pointed out that there were a number of important shortcomings with
the model,and particularly with its adaption to the CMA situation. The estimated models
appeared successful, although it was pointed out that certain of the theoretical relationships
were unlikely to hold in their true sense in the CMA. Nevertheless, the undertaking would
have been worthwhile had it only amounted to an attempt to assess the degree of
integration between the members of the CMA, since this is the starting point of an analysis
of monetary union in Southern Africa. To the extent that this has been achieved, the
'quantitative' hypothesis of the model has been proven. However there was also a
'qualitative hypothesis': that this integration was significant enough to have important
bearing on the response of Swaziland to South African policy and disturbances. This has
also been achieved in that it has been shown that Swaziland faces both fiscal and monetary
policy constraints due to policy dependence on South Africa. Swazi fiscal policy must be
large to offset the effect of changes in South Africa economic activity on Swazi economic
activity, if this is desired. On the other hand, asset market integration and institutional
links have resulted in a very close relationship between South African and Swazi interest
rates for the period analysed. The Swazi capital markets are not sophisticated enough to
permit open-market operations, and so an absence of these cannot be ascribed to policy
interdependence. However, the Swazi central bank is capable of administering the interest
rate directly, as does the South African Reserve Bank, although failure to take 'market'
conditions into account could lead to financial crises, especially in the presence of capital
mobility. 110
110. Whittaker and Theunissen (1987) have clarified and analysed the nature of monetary policy in South
Africa, and have shown that the interest rate is the primary policy instrument of the Reserve Bank.
This fact need not affect the results of the model, so long as the Reserve Bank reacts in adjusting the
interest rate approximately in the same way as an endogenous interest rate would react to economic
events.
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For most of the period analysed by the model, SAINT and SWINT diverged minimally,
implying a high degree of asset market integration. However, from the first quarter of
1989, the Swazi Central Bank introduced a larger differential by keeping the lending rate
as much as six percentage points below that of South Africa. However, a large differential
should not be sustainable for any length of time if the asset markets are in fact fairly well
integrated. Table 7.3 below presents statistics on Swazi monetary variables that should
throw some light on the issue. The variables are given in nominal terms since the last
complete year for which Swazi CPI data are available is 1989, but the data set must
include 1990 data as well. To get an idea of real magnitudes, however,the next best option
is to 'read' the Swazi data at some aggregate inflation rate differential. The aggregate
inflation rate differential for the second half of the decade was 2,86%, and this must be
extrapolated the data in Table 7.3, primarily to gauge the real interest rate differential. III
To assess the meaning of a 'significant' differential, one must also take into account the
impact of the transactions, information and communication costs of transferring
investments across borders. If it is assumed that a real differential of two or less is
insufficient to justify an intra-CMA transfer, then a 'crucial' differential, in terms of Table
7.3, becomes one which is greater than five percentage points. 112
The general trend of the differentials in Table 7.3 is towards 'crucial' levels from 1989,
and this therefore is the period of interest. The implications of integration are that these
differentials should not be sustainable. Rather, a significant differential would be expected
to generate equilibriating or partially equilibriating capital flows.
Examining Table 7.3 more closely, it seems clear that the lending and deposit rate
differentials of 1989 and 1990 have had important effects. In 1990, private sector claims
(CPS) grew massively by 38 % whilst total private deposits declined in real terms by at
least 10%, reducing the overall liquidity ratio by 19% from 1988. This could be explained
by financial integration - as the differential increases, lenders tend to lend across border
and bo"rrowers borrow locally, reducing the local availability of loanable funds. This is the
111. The mean of SAINF2 over quarterly data, 1985 to the first quarter of 1990 is 15,59%; the
corresponding mean of SWINF2 is 12,73 %; the difference between them is 2,89 %.
112. Or less than one, but the differentials in table 7.3 which are less than one are only fractionally thus,
therefore they will not be considered.
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analog, in the Allen-Kenen model, of portfolio alteration. One problem is that there is no
way of gauging intra-CMA funds flows from the available macro data, and it must be
assumed that a large reduction in local private deposits, as in 1990, was due to cross-
border depositing at higher interest rates. Similarly it is possible that the large increase in
CPS was accounted for by cross-border borrowing. As has been pointed out, the provisions
of the CMA agreement permit the free flow of funds within the CMA and provide for full
convertibility of the currencies.
Table 7.3: Swazi Monetary Trends: 1984 - 1990
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Oep. Rate (SW) 16.50 10.19 5.75 4.81 9.23 8.92 8.85
Oep. Rate (SA) 18.29 17.02 10.98 8.70 13.54 18.13 18.86
Oep. Rate Oiff. 1.79 6.83 5.23 3.89 4.31 9.21 10.01
Demand Oep. (SW) 48.74 56.55 86.60 94.94 110.42 131.67 146.90
Time +Savings Oep(SW) 161.15 166.84 202.55 240.46 319.26 435.43 430.19
Total Private Oep. A 209.89 223.39 289.15 335.40 429.68 567.10 577.09
%Change in Pvt Oep 18.09 6.43 29.44 16.00 28.11 31.98 1.76
Lending Rate (SW) 22.00 17.00 12.50 11.88 15.00 14.50 14.50
Lending Rate (SA) 22.33 21.50 14.33 12.50 15.33 19.83 21.00
Lending Rate Oiff. 0.33 4.50 1.83 0.62 0.33 5.33 6.50
Claims on Pvt SectB 152.54 151.94 161.24 202.62 280.87 335.83 465.99
%Change in CPS 6.48 -0.39 6.12 25.66 38.62 19.57 38.76
Domestic Liquidity Ratio C 1.38 1.47 1.79 1.66 1.53 1.69 1.24
SOURCE: International Financial Statistics, September, 1991
NOTES:
A Demand deposits plus time and savings deposits. Entry for 1983 has been omitted.
B Entry for 1983 has been omitted.
C Ratio of total private deposits to claims on private sector.
The figures for deposits and lending for 1989 are not consistent with those for 1990,
despite the large differential, and this must be explained. In 1989, private capital flows to
Swaziland increased by approximately 195 %, a result of sharply increased direct
investment, reinvestment of earnings by foreign countries and new loans (Central Bank of
Swaziland, Annual Report 1990, pp.8-9). These capital inflows were therefore of a long
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term nature, and not directly connected to interest rate movements. The capital inflow
increased the money supply, as evidenced by a sharp rise in total private deposits for that
year, and unrelated to the interest rate differential. In fact this permitted the maintenance
of the differential in order to reduce liquidity which had risen by 10,5 % from 1988.
Assuming a more moderate capital inflow in 1990113 , it is easy to see why the interest
rate differential impacted on domestic liquidity as expected in that year. The implication
of the events of 1990 is that, in the absence of exogenous capital inflows, Swazi private
liquidity is partially dependent on its interest rate differential with South Africa,
confirming the existence of asset market integration
Table 7.4: Swazi Monetary Trends: December 1989 - March 1991
89.4 90.1 90.2 90.3 90.4 91.1
Dep. Rate (SW) 8.92 8.92 8.40 8.85 10.25
Dep. Rate (SA) 19.08 19.50 18.62 18.25 17.63
Dep. Rate Diff. 10.16 10.58 10.22 9.40 7.38
Demand Dep. (SW) 131 .67 117.09 139.07 124.61 146.90 138.93
Time + Savings Dep(SW) 435.43 454.04 498.18 521.41 430.19 480.65
Total Private Dep. A 567.10 571 .13 637.25 646.02 577.09 619.58
%Change in Pvt Dep 0.71 11.58 1.38 -10.67 7.36
Lending Rate (SW) 14.50 14.50 14.50 14.50 15.75
Lending Rate (SA) 21.00 21.00 21.00 21.00 20.67
Lending Rate Diff. 6.50 6.50 6.50 6.50 4.92
Claims on Pvt Sect 335.83 410.05 493.11 563.02 465.99 541.63
%Change in CPS 22.10 20.26 14.18 -17.23 16.23
Domestic Liquidity RatioS 1.39 1.29 1.15 1.24 1.14
SOURCE: International Financial Statistics, September, 1991
NOTES:
A Demand deposits plus time and savings deposits.
B Ratio of total private deposits to claims on private sector.
113. ~xact da~ for Sw~zi capital inflows for 1990 are not available at time of writing, however the
mcrease m net foreign assets in 1990 was only half the size of the 1989 increase, suggesting that
ceteris paribus, the 1990 capital inflow was more moderate. '
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Table 7.4 shows the same monetary variables over the period March 1990 to March 1991.
For that period there was only an 8% nominal increase in total private deposits, but a 32 %
nominal increase in CPS. The fact that the Swazi interest rates increased in 1991 even
though South Africa rates decreased, thereby reducing the differential just below the
'crucial' level, is thus not unexpected.
The models, therefore, seem to have told us something about integration in the CMA that
was not known before, at least in quantitative terms. In graphical terms, the scatter
diagrams for the rr and y2y2 curves are given in the appendix, as well as line graphs
indicating the accuracy of the fitted values for SWINTR and SWGDPR (Figs. A.3 and
A.6).
7.5 CONCLUSION
Despite the limitations of the model it has provided valuable insights into the state of goods
and asset market integration between South Africa and Swaziland and the consequences
of this integration for policy and disturbance transmission through the CMA. Asset market
integration is extremely high, and forbids effective independent monetary policy by
Swaziland (and Lesotho by implication). Whilst goods market integration is less intense,
it also introduces a degree of policy dependence on the part of Swaziland and means
compensatory policy is necessary if that country does not wish to be 'dragged along' with
South Africa's fluctuations in economic activity, whether policy-induced or otherwise.
South Africa, due to its size, experiences no such effects and can thus not be expected to
pay attention to them. It is the responsibility of Lesotho and Swaziland to bring these
issues to the attention of the South African authorities so that dialogue can be initiated on
the creation of a true monetary union with representation for the Two. Thus it will be that
their interests are also taken account of when policy is implemented.
South Africa does not experience integration costs as do the Two, and its motivation for
the increased unification is therefore not directly economic. A minority-ruled South Africa
was motivated to enter into integration schemes with its neighbours in order to score
political mileage from the apparent cooperation with other African states (as with SACU);
a majority-ruled, democratic South Africa might be motivated by genuine altruism. It is
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not clear at this stage whether a new South Africa would be prepared to step up, or even
maintain integration schemes with its neighbours, but if it became part of the PTA and
SADCC this would certainly be on the agenda. The integration of South Africa with the
BLS countries would then in all likelihood increase, as extant structures are built on in
order to facilitate greater Southern African integration.
Having concluded in favour of increased monetary unification, it is necessary to reassess
the opposing views that the Two, or at least Swaziland, would be better off in a situation
of greater monetary autonomy. This is undertaken in the following penultimate chapter.
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CHAPTER 8
THE DEBATE FOR MORE OR LESS MONETARY
UNIFleA TION: THE CMA OR FLEXIBILITY?
8.1 INTRODUCTION
One of the most compelling arguments for withdrawal from the CMA by the Two is the
case of Botswana. Over the last decade, Botswana has consistently experienced lower
interest and inflation rates, higher external reserves and a higher external currency value
than the members of the CMA, and the question that arises is: could Swaziland or
Lesotho benefit similarly if they withdrew from the CMA? Botswana's currency is
flexible against the rand and it has imposed exchange control between itself and South
Africa; it is therefore as financially independent from South Africa as is Zimbabwe,
despite being a member of the SACU. In order to sustain the conclusions reached in the
precious chapter, therefore, it is necessary to examine the case of Botswana in detail and
investigate the following questions:
(1) How has Botswana benefitted from monetary autonomy?
(2) How important is Botswana's flexible exchange rate? And,
(3) Is the case of Botswana transferable to the Two?
The main task of this chapter will be to address these questions. However, before this is
done, an attempt will be made to briefly describe the nature of South Africa's financial
crisis - since one of the results of integration has been the forced participation by the Two
in this crisis. Secondly, the theoretical case for monetary integration will be briefly
restated, and further arguments relating to the choice between fixed and flexible exchange
rates for developing countries will be examined. Finally, after the Botswana case has been
analysed, the debate for Swaziland's withdrawal will be briefly reassessed, and certain of
the possible advantages of continued participation in the CMA will be examined.
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8.2 SOUTH AFRICA'S FINANCIAL CRISIS
The most important motivating factor for CMA withdrawal by the Two has been their
forced participation in the South Africa financial crisis of the 80's. Over this period. The
rand lost more than half its value, external debt reached crisis proportions and South
Africa became a capital exporter. In addition, interest rates fluctuated wildly as the
Reserve Bank vacillated between too strict and too lenient monetary control.
Firstly, the exchange rate depreciation that began at the beginning of 1981 is surely the
most 'prominent' of SA's financial woes. In brief, the most important negative effects of
the depreciation have been:
(a) inflation as the cost of imported finished and intermediate goods rose,
and,
(b) a sharp increase in the foreign currency value of external debt, leading
to a BOP crisis.
In addition, Kahn (1989) has shown that the depreciation disadvantaged wage earners by
redistributing wealth away from them toward owners of capital, and by increasing the
profit share in national income relative to the wage share.
Secondly, SA's loss of capital because of political crises and sanctions / disinvestment has
strengthened the resolve of the monetary authorities to maintain a low value of the
exchange rate and to promote high interest rates. The low value of the exchange rate
discourages repatriation of capital by foreigners, due to capital losses, and also promotes
export competitiveness which can help alleviate the foreign exchange shortage. High
interest rates relative to other investment centres helps slow capital flight and encourages
offshore trade financing, protecting the foreign exchange reserves.
By virtue of their membership of the CMA, Swaziland and Lesotho have been subjected
to these SA-based financial shocks and therefore the possibility of them having avoided
them (and any future shocks) by withdrawing from the CMA seems to be an important
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issue for the debate. What is more important, however, is whether these 'shocks' actually
impacted negatively on the Two or whether they experienced minimal effects or even
benefitted from them. Furthermore, it is possible that these effects were unavoidable
merely by altering the exchange rate regime, ,uld this will also be looked into. Finally,
there is also the strong possibility that these shocks were 'once-off', at least in terms of
degree, and thus would not warrant withdrawal from the CMA by the Two.
8.3 THE THEORETICAL CASE FOR FIXITY
Monetary integration arrangements are entered into by nations because such arrangements
tend to have the following positive results (discussed in Chapter 2):
(1) Monetary integration promotes investment in the bloc;
(2) it enhances allocative efficiency;
(3) it enhances goods and asset market integration, i.e. it increases the
substitutability of candidate nations' assets and goods;
(4) it permits reserve pooling and thus reduces opportunity costs of
external transactions; and
(5) it is a sensible option between certain nations since the usefulness of
national currencies under flexible exchange rates declines the smaller
and more open are the countries.
Items (1) - (4) are 'positive' in that they amount to gains that the candidate nations can
expect with monetary integration, item (5) is 'negative' in that it amounts to a 'loss' or
inefficiency that can be avoided through monetary integration.
In addition to these factors, however, further insights into the issue can be gleaned from
the literature on exchange rate regime choice for developing countries. The issue of the
degree of fixity can also be elucidated by brief reference to this literature.
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An important advantage of exchange rate flexibility was given, in the early literature, as
the freedom to choose the optimal home inflation rate. In pointing out that, in the absence
of money illusion, this freedom will not permit adjustment of the unemployment rate,
Wickham (1985, p.262) shows that it is not given that flexibility will always permit greater
control over internal balance. This is, in fact, a restatement of point (5) above.
The freedom to choose the home inflation rate may also be desired so that the gains
accruing to taxation on money balances are optimised. This suggests that the gains
increase with the inflation rate. However, misuse of monetary anatomy for this purpose
promises high welfare costs and resource misallocation, whilst the long term benefits are
less clear. The possibility of entrenching inflation and accelerating it is strong and thus
" ... for some developing countries the constraints on internal policies implicit
in the maintenance of a fixed link to an external standard may not be
unwelcome because they provide a framework within which to organise
consistent monetary, fiscal and demand-management policies" (Wickham,
1985, p.262)
Another advantage of pegging to an external standard is the reduction of exchange rate
uncertainty and risks. Provided the small country pegs to the currency of the country with
which it undenakes most of its external transactions, the risk faced by traders in exchange
losses can be minimised (Wickham, 1985, pp.275-276). This can only benefit trade
between the small country and the outside world. However, it will also benefit investment
if the small country also has important financial links with the partner country, and this
should be a consideration in the choice of the peg.
In opting for a peg, a country must also decide whether to peg to a single currency or to
a basket of currencies (a multi-peg). The single peg stabilises the effective exchange rate
less than a multi-peg does, since the multi-peg is an average of foreign exchange rates
weighted according to trade volumes. Collier and Joshi (1989, p.102) argue that a multi-
peg bestows greater insulation from third currency fluctuation (with a single peg) that
would impact on the local economy as macroeconomic shocks. Thus a multi-peg is
superior in terms of the attainment and maintenance of internal and external balance. As
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far as the attainment of microeconomic efficiency (reduction of exchange risk and
uncertainty) is concerned, Collier and Joshi (1989) are less certain, although it seems
obvious that a single peg would be preferable the greater the volume of trade with the
partner country. The same logic applies if financial integration is important. If there is
a high degree of financial integration with one country, then a multi-peg would most likely
reduce capital mobility since it would introduce exchange risk on investments and distort
interest rates between the two countries. Thus a multi-peg is only better if financial
integration with a single country is unimportant, and if the single peg consistently
frustrates the attainment of internal and external balance.
A fully floating exchange rate is not regarded as a viable option for developing countries
because of its effect of reducing anti-inflationary discipline and because of its tendency to
instability. The inherent instability of a floating exchange rate is likely to result in
consistent misalignment of the equilibrium exchange rate, adversely affecting internal
balance and microeconomic efficiency. There are also almost no examples of this regime
having been successfully implemented by a developing country (Collier and Joshi, 1989,
pp. 103-104).
The theoretical case for fixity for developing countries therefore seems strong, and
individual circumstances would dictate the form that this takes - whether monetary union,
single peg or multi-peg. Collier and Joshi (1989) argue that a crawling single or multi-peg
is the best option 'on paper', but again, this assumes that the specialised case of monetary
union, with its special advantages is not an option. It is argued here that the existence of
the advantages of monetary union, which go beyond the facilitation of trade, support the
implementation of the single peg as opposed to a multi-peg or a crawling-peg without
monetary union.
8.4 THE CASE OF BOTSWANA
It becomes clear, even after cursory investigation, that Botswana is unique among sub-
Saharan African countries. It is especially unusual in terms of its GDP growth rate,
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external financial strength and domestic monetary stability. Table 8.1 below presents some
statistics that illustrate these assertions The table contains data for six low-income African
countries (Mozambique, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, zaire and Zambia) and four middle-
income countries (Botswana, SA, Angola, Zimbabwe)(World Bank, 1990). Botswana is
striking in that its GDP growth rate is at least three times greater than any of the others,
its external debt is second lowest (also as a percentage of GDP), its import cover is nearly
five times greater than the best of the others and its interest and inflation rates are lowest
and second lowest, respectively.
Table 8.1: KEY ECONOMIC VARIABLES FOR 10 AFRICAN COUNTRIES:





CURRNT IMP NET K INFLA-
ACC· COVERb FLOW TION
LEND
RATE
Botswana 1010 11.4 499 309 17.7 40 10 7.83
South Africa 2290 1.3 1207 1.1 4 13.9 15.33
Angola 367
Kenya 370 4.2 5888 -711 1.3 7 9.6 15
Lesotho 420 2.9 281 -130 1.2 21 12.2 13.67
Malawi 170 2.6 1349 -134 3.7 0 12.6 22.25
Mozambique 100 -2.8 4406 -733 0 33.6
Zaire 170 1.9 8475 -888 1.4 11 56.1
Zambia 290 0.7 6498 -234 1.2 0 33.5 18.39
Zimbabwe 650 2.7 2659 -56 2.2 4 12.1 13
Averages 607.8 2.8 3757 -100.3 3.7 9.7 21.5 15.1
SOURCE: World Bank Development Report 1990, World Bank
NOTES:
Growth rates and inflation rates are aggregates for the period 1980-1988
A Current account before official transfers.
B Import cover in number of months.
What is important in terms of this thesis is whether Botswana's absence from the CMA
contributed in any way towards its strong economic situation. If so, then the question
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arises as to whether Lesotho or Swaziland can benefit from a scaling down of their
participation in the CMA. If this is the case then the recommendations of Chapter 7 - that
monetary unification be enhanced or at least not scaled down - will appear substantially
less credible. Thus the current section of this chapter has to evaluate the degree of
Botswana's monetary independence and draw conclusions as to the implications for
Swaziland's and Lesotho's participation in the CMA.
8.4.1 The Nature & Implications of Botswana's Economy
Botswana's economy is extremely undiversified. In 1989, mining and quarrying output
comprised 51 % of GDP, and diamond sales alone comprised 77% of total exports. From
1980 to 1989, the average annual increase in exports was 27 %, reflecting the opening of
a new diamond mine in 1982 (EID, 1990). Besides being undiversified in output and
export production, Botswana is also undiversified in its import sources - 79% of which
came from South Africa in 1987. By contrast, only 4% of its exports went to South
Africa in 1987, since diamond exports are sold via the Central Selling Organisation in
Switzerland (Botswana Central Statistical Office, 1987).
The income generated by diamond sales has accounted for BOP surpluses since 1985,
permitting Botswana to build up massive foreign exchange and foreign asset reserves.
Botswana's external financial surplus distinguishes it markedly from other sub-Saharan
African countries, and is the most important reason behind the relative success of its
attempts to gain monetary autonomy from South Africa. Specifically, there have been two
primary effects of the external financial surplus. One is the expansion of the local money
supply and consequent excess liquidity in the banking sector (banks are the most important
financial intermediaries). The other is the virtual absence of a BOP constraint to
importation and foreign borrowing, since foreign assets exist in abundance. The financial
surplus has thus permitted Botswana to adopt relatively lenient exchange control measures,
and this is another distinguishing characteristic of Botswana's financial structure.
In 1986 a package was introduced which considerably relaxed exchange controls, placed
ceilings on commercial bank interest rates and lowered central bank lending rates. The
justification for the package was given as the excess liquidity in the banking system (Bank
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of Botswana, 1989, p.24). However, as far back as 1976, the Botswana authorities had
made clear the fact that they did not intend to use exchange controls as an important tool
of economic policy (Harvey and Lewis, 1990, p.201). They had to wait, however, until
conditions permitted the liberalisation of the exchange controls - Botswana's diamond sales
increased substantially from the early eighties.
Partly because of the lenient exchange controls, Botswana was able to attract private
investment when other countries could not. However, it also achieved remarkable success
in attracting foreign aid, and in 1984 it had succeeded in securing the largest aid package
for a sub-Saharan country (Lavrencic, 1986; World Bank, 1984). Thus for a number of
reasons Botswana benefitted from an extremely favourable external financial position for
most of the 80's. The conditions which led to this surplus are, however, unique to
Botswana, and hence the degree of monetary autonomy from South Africa which it did
attain would be far more difficult for the Two to attain given the differences in economic
structure and trade composition.
8.4.2 The Realities of Botswana's Flexible Exchange Rate
On the 23rd of August 1976 the Bank of Botswana introduced the pula as the national
currency of Botswana, and the rand ceased to be legal tender. Initially -the pula was
pegged to the dollar at R1,00 = $1,11 which created a unitary parity with the rand, but
in April 1977 it was revalued by 5 % to offset inflationary pressure on imports from SA,
terminating parity. CoIlings argues that Botswana was more capable of withdrawal from
the RMA than either of the Two because a large portion of its investment was into export
industries directed at world markets (1978, p.110). This amounts to a lower degree of
goods market integration.
In June 1980 the pula was de-linked from the dollar and pegged to a trade-weighted basket
of currencies in which the rand is dominant, reflecting South Africa's importance in
Botswana's trade. It was not enough, however, to have the rand weighted at 65 % in the
basket for most of the decade, and a series of devaluations were necessary to keep the pula
182
in line with the rand. 1l4 Fig. 8.1 below illustrates the paths of the real and nominal
pulaJrand exchange rates for most of the decade. By the end of the decade, real unitary
parity existed again between the rand and the pula, and it is evident that the amount of real
deviation from unitary parity over the decade was minimal. Thus almost all of the
nominal pula's appreciation over the decade can be explained by Botswana's preference
for a lower inflation rate and this, therefore, was the primary advantage of the pula's
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Figure 8.1 Botswana Nominal (PRER) and Real (PREXR)
exchange rates against South African rand
There were costs too, however, the most important being the loss of competitiveness of
Botswana's exports when the pula did appreciate. Harvey and Lewis point out that the
major real appreciation of the pula that could have occurred as a result of the BOP
114. The weighting of the rand was increased to 75 % in 1985 but later reduced to 65 % (EIU, 1990, p.9)
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surpluses was averted by successive devaluations, in order to spare the export-sector and
the import-substituting industries (1990, pp.218-219). However, the net effect was to keep
the pula fairly close, in real terms, to the rand, suggesting that the real path of the rand
over the decade has not been that severe, and that parity with it could not have been
entirely harmful for the Two. 115
The initial emphasis of exchange rate policy was on offsetting inflationary pressure from
SA, and the first revaluation in 1977 was intended to have this effect, However, whilst
after the initial revaluation importers did appear to pass savings on to consumers, this was
apparently not the case after two subsequent revaluations, and the emphasis of exchange
rate policy was thus changed to that of export protection (Harvey and Lewis, 1990,
pp.221-222). This meant that the authorities were more inclined to allow downward
pressure on the pula to take its course, and in fact the most important revisions in the
value of the exchange rate since 1982 have been devaluations. The largest appreciation
of the pula against the rand - 20% in 1989 - was followed by the largest devaluation of the
bilateral exchange rate - by 15 % - and the real rate has actually been slightly below parity
since 1986.
A further issue of importance is the weighting of the rand in the pula basket. If 65 % is
regarded as the'optimal' weighting given South Africa's volume of trade with Botswana,
then the weighting of the rand in a lilangeni or Maloti basket will be considerably higher.
In 1987 Botswana conducted a total of 41,5% of its external trade with SA, while the
figure for Swaziland was 66,5% (EID, 1990, p.31). Swaziland thus conducts
approximately 60% more external trade with South Africa than does Botswana. However,
if the rand had a 60 % greater weighting in a lilangeni basket than in a pula basket, it
would be 100% dominant in the lilangeni basket, implying that unitary parity with South
Africa would be optimal as long as trade volumes remained approximately the same.
Given that there are unlikely to be any major changes in these trade volumes for the
foreseeable future, exchange rate parity on the basis of goods market integration between
South Africa and the Two thus seems entirely reasonable.
115. In the fmal section of this chapter it is shown that Swaziland in fact benefitted from the rand's
depreciation. This was also pointed out in the previous chapter where it was shown that the rand's
depreciation had a strongly stimulatory effect on Swazi GDP.
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The reality of Botswana's flexible exchange rate is thus that little flexibility actually seems
to be necessary, at least in the real rate. Thus it is doubtful whether Lesotho and
Swaziland would benefit from any degree of flexibility viz-a-viz the rand. Although de-
linking would permit them to reduce their inflation rates by allowing their currencies to
appreciate, their goods would become more expensive in South Africa, and they export far
more to South Africa than does Botswana.
8.4.3 Botswana's Monetary Independence: Qualifications
The 'trappings' of monetary independence which Botswana enjoys are in many respects
illusory. Exchange control liberalisation has been permitted by the returns to a unique
resource endowment, whilst exchange rate flexibility has not led to any major revision in
the external value of the currency. Internal financial liberalisation has also borne little
fruit, with Botswana facing the same long term financing constraints as many other
developing countries, with the possible exception of Lesotho and Swaziland which have
free access to the South Africa financial markets. Harvey (1980, pp.40-41) has shown
that, prior to withdrawal from the RMA, Botswana experienced few financial problems and
in fact enjoyed many benefits from membership of the RMA. Specifically, it was able to
freely attract investment from South Africa due to the absence of exchange risk and
exchange control constraints, and thus experienced no shortage of long term capital as it
does now. Secondly, tourism from South Africa was encouraged by the common currency
and the absence of exchange control. Thirdly, commercial banks grew rapidly, and there
was no shortage of loanable funds or government finance in Botswana, despite the inability
of the Botswana government to issue short term paper. Finally, membership of the RMA
imposed discipline on spending and money creation by the Botswana authorities, something
which other developing countries have gone without to their detriment.
After withdrawal, exchange rate and exchange control policy were tailored to meet the
needs of the country, and the nature and success of these changes have been examined
above. However, the liberalisation of the internal financial sector was also attempted,
specifically in the promotion of financial deepening and the implementation of controls on
. lending and borrowing. These are examined next.
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The objectives of interest rate policy were to:
(1) stimulate commercial bank lending;
(2) to encourage external capital movements complementary to the state of
the BOP;
(3) to encourage long term saving and financial intermediation;
(4) to provide cheap finance for parastatals; and
(5) to avoid negative real interest rates (Harvey and Lewis, 1990, pp.237-
238).
To achieve these objectives, the authorities implemented various policy measures over the
decade, among them interest rate ceilings and restrictions on foreign investments by the
banks, but despite their efforts, they were only successful in achieving objectives (2) and
(4). Objective (1) was partially successful, but was achieved only as regards short term
lending, and only at cos~ to the commercial banking sector. The Bank of Botswana placed
restrictions on foreign investment by the banks, thereby forcing up domestic liquidity and
forcing down interest rates. Consequently, for most of the decade, excess liquidity in the
banking sector was high, but the commercial banks were unwilling to lend long term
according to the desires of the Bank of Botswana. Long term lending is not traditionally
part of commercial bank business, and they were reluctant to play a role normally assigned
to other types of financial intermediaries. However, when the Bank of Botswana
implemented contractionary monetary policy in 1982, it worked very successfully, bringing
about a sharp decrease in the rate of growth of private borrowing. Thus there appeared
to be a policy asymmetry - successful contractionary policy but unsuccessful expansionary
policy (Harvey and Lewis, 1990, pp.223-227). The financial sector was just not developed
enough to play the role assigned to it by the authorities.
Attempts to increase longer-term private savings (objective (4» by adjusting interest rates
were unsuccessful, and so it appears as if the authorities decided to keep interest rates
down, hoping to promote lending and knowing that savings would continue at their usual
slow rate. Unfortunately, the negative interest rates that dominated the decade constituted
"a de facto tax on a significant portion of the population" (Harvey and Lewis, 1990,
p.239).
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Thus objective (5) was forgone in favour of attempts to increase lending, attempts which
were for the most part unsuccessful. Besides the harmful effects of the negative real
interest rates on the saving population, there appears to be wide opinion that they are
generally harmful to the developing economy. Fry (1982) has shown that higher interest
rates increase the resources available for capital formation and improve the efficiency of
investment, while negative interest rates and other forms of financial repression actually
destabilise the economy and reduce growth. Harvey (1991) and Killick (1991) confirm
that interest rate ceilings discourage savings in financial asset form, and thereby prevent
financial deepening, and Harvey (1991, pp.3-4) points to three other drawbacks of such
policy. Firstly, they tend to favour certain groups at the expense of others, since cheap
loans are allocated to the less remote and the better off. Secondly, they increase
borrowing for trade financing and crowd out smaller borrowers and thirdly, and most
importantly, they tend to encourage substitution of cheap capital for more expensive
labour, something which is anathema in the developing world. Between 1976 and 1986,
Botswana's real interest rate was positive for only a year and a half (between September
1982 and March 1984), indicating a high degree of financial repression.
Financial repression was also one of the reasons for the slow rate of financial deepening
(the growth of financial assets relative to GDP), a process which it is believed is necessary
for successful development. Further reasons were the slow rate of borrowing by
government and parastatals and the absence of a stock exchange. It is also alleged that the
available long term savings were misdirected, being channelled into urban property rather
than the investment sectors that really needed them (Harvey and Lewis, 1990, pp.235-
237).
Thus although departure from the RMA permitted Botswana greater monetary autonomy,
this autonomy did not give rise to successful financial deepening, and the policy to reduce
interest rates below those in the CMA was in all likelihood counterproductive. It was
shown that Botswana enjoyed many benefits from membership of the RMA and thus one
must conclude that the decision to leave was more political than economic. In the absence
of political barriers to further cooperation, and in the knowledge that Botswana's case is
unique and not transferable to the Two, it seems reasonable to suggest that they remain
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in the CMA and work on its improvement rather than consider scaling it down at this late
stage.
8.5 THE CASE OF SWAZILAND
Chapter 7 presented a case, based on estimated integration functions, for the maintenance
and improvement of the CMA, but the view that monetary unification be increased is at
odds with those of Guma and others who argue for greater autonomy for Swaziland. It
has been argued above that the case of Botswana does not provide much of a case -for
withdrawal by either of the Two, but it is still necessary to briefly address the arguments
concerning Swaziland's withdrawal. This is undertaken next, and a final section describing
the possible benefits to Swaziland of remaining in the CMA follows on.
8.5.1 The Case for Withdrawal
Guma (1981) argues that Swaziland should de-link its currency from the rand and
implement exchange controls in order to permit it greater monetary policy autonomy. He
suggests that South African monetary conditions are irrelevant to Swaziland and that it
should therefore attempt to insulate itself from them in this way. However, three out of
the four reasons he gives for Swaziland's 'exogenous' interest rate simply reflect the lack
of sophistication of Swaziland's asset market and its high integration with South Africa's.
These characteristics would remain even if a flexible interest rate was introduced. They
are:
(1) the fact that Swaziland marketable assets are a small proportion of
CMA marketable assets;
(2) the fact that Swaziland is characterised by a high proportion of foreign
holdings of domestic assets to domestic holdings of foreign assets; and
(3) the fact that Swaziland domestic demand for assets is a small
proportion of total CMA demand.
188
A flexible exchange rate would not help Swaziland improve its position because its asset
market would remain highly integrated with South Africa's. However, a flexible rate
could do it hann, since it would increase the risk in foreign investment and limit
Swaziland's access to South African capital markets, something which Swaziland, without
a proper domestic capital market, cannot afford to let happen. If anything therefore, the
above reasons support the case for maintaining monetary unification. A fourth point given
by Guma - that of there being no exchange control between South Africa and Swaziland,
is incorrect - special provisions relating to the discretionary use of exchange controls by
a member of the CMA are provided for in the agreement. This was outlined in Section
4.3.3.4 above.
A second set of arguments for de-linking centre around the purported negative impact on
Swaziland of South African exchange rate and inflation rate movements. Guma (1985)
holds that South African exchange rate fluctuations are irrelevant to goods market
conditions in Swaziland, and that a flexible exchange rate would offer Swaziland insulation
from this. This is in doubt however; firstly, so long as Swaziland conducts such a high
proportion of its trade with South Africa it is pan of South Africa's goods market, for
better or for worse. This consequence of high goods market integration is one of the
lessons of the Allen-Kenen model. Besides, the appreciation that would supposedly follow
the de-linking would almost certainly worsen Swaziland's trade balance as imports from
South Africa rise and exports to South Africa and the rest of the world fall.
Gargano (1986) suggests that Swaziland diversify its import sources as a remedy for
inherited South African inflation and exchange rate fluctuations. However, this is easier
said than done. This would involve a scaling down of Swaziland's participation in SACU
but alternative sources of reliable and easily accessed imports would not be easy to find.
Arguments in favour of BLS continued participation in SACU were presented in
Chapter 6.
Finally, the negative effects for Swaziland of the mid 1980 depreciation of the rand have
not been proven. In contrast, the results of the goods market regressions presented in
Chapter 7 suggest the opposite: that the depreciation had a stimulatory effect on the
Swaziland economy. This is confrrmed by comments in the Swaziland Central Bank Annual
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Repon (1990), which attribute a marked improvement in the BOP to the depreciation. In
addition, it was shown above that Botswana's pula had depreciated part of the way with
the rand, and that the depreciation was even aided by Botswana authorities.
Doubtless there are negative effects for Lesotho and Swaziland due to their integration
with South Africa, but it is unrealistic to suggest that these can be avoided by de-linking.
Instead, other problems would soon apPear. The 1986 amendments to the CMA agreement
provided for the de-linking of the lilangeni should the Swaziland authorities believe this
to be necessary. However, four years later it remains at par, suggesting that the
Swaziland authorities themselves believe this to be the more advisable option.
8.5.2 The Advantages of Remaining within the CMA
There are a number of advantages to continued participation in the CMA by
Swaziland116 ; the most important ones will be briefly discussed.
Firstly, membership of the CMA permits Swaziland free access to the South African
capital markets, an advantage which seems to far outweigh the limited autonomy over
interest rates that it entails. It was shown above that Botswana had failed to benefit from
this 'advantage'; freedom to choose an optimal local interest rate had led to harmful
negative real interest rates being adopted, and the lack of preparedness of the monetary
system for the assumed degree of autonomy was shown up in a shortage of long term
finance. There is increasing consensus in the literature as to the harmful effects of
financial repression and the necessity of maintaining 'market' rates of interest.
Secondly, membership of the CMA, through its constraining effect on monetary expansion
in Swaziland, has placed limits on Swaziland spending and inflation, thereby promoting
macroeconomic stability. This specific result is confirmea and supported by Oliver (1991,
pp.11-12), who suggests that those who see the CMA as an obstacle to Swazi monetary'
policy may in fact desire the removal of an obstacle to 'undue monetary expansion' (p.l1).
Killick (1991) has shown just how much of a misnomer 'monetary autonomy' is in a
116. For the remainder of this chapter read 'Lesotho and Swaziland' for 'Swaziland'.
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developing country due to the lack of sophistication of instruments and institutions and the
instability and unpredictability of the money demand functions. Thus, by linking to an
external, more sophisticated monetary systeln, a developing country loses the freedom of
'retarded' monetary policy and gains spending discipline and macroeconomic stability.
Thirdly, and surprisingly, the CMA has promoted exchange rate stability for Swaziland
and Lesotho. This is the finding of a PTA technical study group which concluded:
" ... the analysis indicates that only two Member States have managed to
escape from the costs of protracted overvaluation. These are Lesotho and
Swaziland, whose continued membership of the CMA appears not to have
permitted those macroeconomic policies that induce exchange rate instability"
(pTA, 1990, p.3).
The critics of Swaziland's membership of the CMA bemoaned the supposed ill effects of
the rand's depreciation on that country, but in fact it appears as if overvaluation would
have been the alternative. This problem does seem to be almost endemic among
developing countries, and various authors feel that nominal depreciation plus appropriate
macroeconomic policy remedies is the best solution (Edwards, 1989). Pfefferman (1985,
p.1?) suggests that a common starting point of an overvalued currency is domestic
monetary expansion, inflation and a lack of willingness to let the nominal rate depreciate.
This is less likely to happen to individual countries in a larger monetary union, with or
without a union central bank.
8.6 CONCLUSION
Thus there appear to be significant benefits to continued participation in the CMA by the
Two, and the fact of Botswana's non-participation does not seem to affect this conclusion.
Botswana withdrew from the RMA more for political than economic reasons and was able
to sustain certain aspects of its monetary autonomy through its unique massive external
financial surplus. The single benefit of its flexible exchange rate was the freedom to run
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a moderately lower inflation rate than SA, and it showed a preference for a relatively
stable real exchange rate with the rand. On the other hand, its nascent financial system
was unable to meet the demands placed on it by the monetary authorities, and it was also
unprepared for expansionary monetary policy. Thus monetary autonomy did not
necessarily entail monetary policy effectiveness. Finally, lack of access to a larger more
sophisticated financial market meant a shortage of long term finance, since the financial
intermediaries in Botswana were unable to fill the gap left by the South African securities
and money markets. Thus the Botswana case does not provide a demonstration effect to
the Two for withdrawal from the CMA, and it must be concluded that they have more to




9.1 SUMMARY OF THE STUDY
To summarise, Chapter 2 established that the theory of monetary integration is concerned
with generating a set of principles against which a monetary integration arrangement can
be judged. The two most important principles that can be drawn from this body of
knowledge is that, firstly, the desirability of monetary integration depends on the degree
of economic 'closeness' that exists between countries and secondly, the desirability of
monetary integration depends further on the costs and benefits that can be expected from
the arrangement, and their relative weighting. For developing countries, the hierarchy of
goals of monetary integration (and sensitivity to costs) is altered, not the goals themselves.
Further considerations pertain to the degree of monetary integration entailed. A number
of authorities show, for a variety of reasons, that a full monetary union will always be
preferable to less intense forms of monetary integration, and Allen and Kenen, whose
model is used extensively in this thesis, are among them.
In Chapter 3, the Allen-Kenen model served as a useful theoretical tool for analysing the
workings of various degrees of monetary integration under different market conditions.
After analysing in detail the effects of monetary and fiscal policy and internal and external
disturbances it was concluded that the degree of asset and goods market integration extant
between countries has a profound effect on their ability to conduct independent economic
policy and to enjoy insulation from outside shocks. Beyond a certain level, independent
policy becomes impractical and some form of monetary unification - involving at least
policy co-ordination - is seen to be necessary. This includes fiscal policy, since integration
of goods markets, though often not as intense as asset market integration, can lead to high
costs of offsetting policy.
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It was pointed out in Chapter 4 that the CMA was never a result of a conscious decision
for or against monetary unification, instead it evolved fronl a de facto arrangement which
existed as the natural result of the close origins of its members. The de facto union was
formalised, though, in order to provide for more equitable treatment of its smaller
members. With the development and sophistication of the smaller members' economies,
however, came the desire for more control over national policy and central banks were
established. This led in turn to a further revision of the agreement, and one which
provided Swaziland with greater autonomy and the choice to de-link its currency from the
rand. The issue at stake seems to be the lack of control of the Two over their economies,
but the solution is not necessarily the attempted sundering of links, for that path is shown,
in later chapters to be difficult and ill-advised.
It was shown in Chapter 2 that the OCA approach suffered from various problems, among
them its qualitative nature and vagueness. Chapter 5 provided a review and critique of an
application of OCA theory to the CMA and concluded that more must be done to usefully
address empirically the issue of the optimality of the CMA. However, doubt was also
expressed about the usefulness of this approach per se.
After analysing the regional roles of SACU and SADCC, it was determined that the degree
of economic co-operation between South Africa and the Two improves the case, if
anything, for continued monetary co-operation. It was shown in Chapter 6 that SADCC,
despite apparently presenting a threat to links between South Africa and the Two, is unable
to carry through its rhetoric of reduced dependence and thus is of minor importance to the
CMA. The monetary agreement is facilitative to goods market integration and thus
supports the SACU, which, it was shown, has benefitted the two far more than it has
compromised them. The apparent exception to this - the case of Botswana - was analysed
in a later chapter.
By applying the 'integration functions' of the Allen-Kenen model to the CMA it was
possible to assess the degree and implications of goods and asset market integration for its
members. The results of this endeavour, undertaken in Chapter 7, show that high levels
of asset and goods market integration do exist· and that this has the effect of reducing
significantly the policy autonomy of the smaller countries. The use of Swaziland in the
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study - which is less highly integrated with South Africa than Lesotho - adds credibility
to these results.
Finally, Chapter 8 addressed the question of Botswana's non-participation in the CMA,
specifically the nature and implications of its monetary autonomy from South Africa. It
was argued here that the Botswana case is not a sufficient reason to motivate for the
withdrawal by the Two from the CMA because this 'autonomy' is neither of major degree
nor has it permitted Botswana to follow a significantly different path of financial
development to that of the Two (or to that it might have followed had it remained in the
CMA). What has permitted Botswana some degree of greater autonomy (and insulation
from South African based disturbances) has been its unique, massive external financial
surplus. On the other hand, there have been disadvantages to Botswana of not participating
in the CMA and there are important advantages to Swaziland (and Lesotho) of staying in.
The findings of Chapter 8 do thus not affect the credibility of the recommendations of
Chapter 7.
9.2 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The title of this thesis suggests that the question of the viability of the CMA is central to
the study, if 'viability' is understood to imply a preferable solution to attempted monetary
independence. Thus it is that the final conclusion must address this question primarily.
What has been determined with satisfactory accuracy is that the CMA appears still to be
a viable arrangement - provided some flexibility concerning joint decision-making is
incorporated into it. This must be such as to permit the smaller members more say in
policy decisions taken at the union level, thus the Reserve Bank must come to resemble
more closely the Union Central Bank analysed by Allen and Kenen. In addition, the
currency of the union must approach a true common currency if the monetary union is to
be made properly functional. Any other less intense form of integration will be sub-
optimal, except if it is merely part of the transition to full monetary union. Transition is
important - even the European Monetary Union is being reached by stages.
Namibia, which was excluded from the study because for most of the duration it was not
an independent country, has now joined the CMA but its future within it is uncertain as
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it has indicated that it intends to float its own currency and establish its own central bank
by 1992. Should it remain, however, the case for a revision of the agreement to increase
joint decision-making would be strengthened.
The CMA must thus change to become more like a true co-operative monetary union, with
the needs of the Two taken into account at union central bank level. South Africa itself
can not be expected to initiate these changes, however, and it is up to the smaller members
to push for them (just as is the case with SACU). Nevertheless, South Africa has a duty
to pay attention to the grievances of the smaller countries, and to deal with them as best
possible. If this is not the case, then the spirit of the preamble to the CMA agreement is
meaningless.
9.3 THE FUTURE
On November 24th and 25th, 1990, the ninth summit of the PTA signified its intention to
become a common market by the end of the decade, and to proceed with monetary
harmonisation with a view to eventually establishing a monetary union between it members
(Daily Dispatch, 1990, p.2). The member states expressed their willingness that South
Africa be included in these arrangements, provided it was a changed South Africa. That
South Africa is changing is now clear, however, whether even a changed South Africa will
find a permanent home in a large African common market is less clear. This thesis has
shown that part of the reason that monetary unions stay together is because they have to -
they are highly integrated and thus cannot, without great cost, go it alone. If a common
market and monetary union of the scale of the present PTA comes about it will be a shaky
arrangement because the countries are not highly integrated and will have to proceed with
deliberate policies to make them more so. This will involve loss of national policy
autonomy which was seen to be the most important cost of monetary integration.
The members of the CMA, however, have little to lose from furthering their links with
each other. With South African internal political turbulence and all its negative side
effects hopefully soon over, the smaller members of the CMA can look forward to close
development alongside the economic giant of Africa; they will have to learn, however, to
use this relationship more to their advantage in future.
APPENDIX
Table A.1 Goods Market Data for the Regression Sample (Original)
obs SWGDPR SAGDP1 SAGDP2 SWGOVR SWBOTR
81.2 98.4000 61925.06 103.2084 16.52500 -30.262
81.3 98.4000 61764.65 102.9411 16.52500 -23.241
81.4 98.4000 61330.59 102.2177 16.52500 -47.971
82.1 101.0250 59148.68 98.5811 17.87500 -55.201
82.2 101.0250 59194.79 98.6579 17.87500 -31.545
82.3 101.0250 61480.27 102.4671 17.87500 -35.671
82.4 101.0250 61373.92 102.2899 17.87500 -59.221
83.1 100.7250 59007.00 98.3450 17.45000 -67.577
83.2 100.7250 60279.97 100.4666 17.45000 -86.009
83.3 100.7250 60448.00 100.7467 17.45000 -6.354
83.4 100.7250 60610.28 101.0171 17.45000 -41.971
84.1 103.9750 63349.20 105.5820 18.95000 -62.307
84.2 103.9750 63001.22 105.0020 18.95000 -31.293
84.3 103.9750 62963.16 104.9386 18.95000 -27.293
84.4 103.9750 63579.16 105.9653 18.95000 -46.395
85.1 106.4250 62716.89 104.5282 19.72500 -60.892
85.2 106.4250 61264.77 102.1079 19.72500 -5.104
85.3 106.4250 61584.57 102.6410 19.72500 -31.504
85.4 106.4250 62609.81 104.3497 19.72500 -70.305
86.1 115.8250 60251.39 100.4190 19.95000 -69.651
86.2 115.8250 60354.84 100.5914 19.95000 -33.727
86.3 115.8250 61355.98 102.2600 19.95000 0.747
86.4 115.8250 62432.29 104.0538 19.95000 -9.830
87.1 115.5750 62747.51 104.5792 18.52500 -53.315
87.2 115.5750 62993.10 104.9885 18.52500 4.600
87.3 115.5750 64965.02 108.2750 18.52500 6.558
87.4 115.5750 64682.88 107.8048 18.52500 -39.677
88.1 124.9500 64161.67 106.9361 19.97500 -27.860
88.2 124.9500 65681.16 109.4686 19.97500 -30.091
88.3 124.9500 68274.56 113.7909 19.97500 -12.491
88.4 124.9500 67525.50 112.5425 19.97500 NA
89.1 130.0750 66248.53 110.4142 20.82500 NA
89.2 130.0750 66907.25 111.5121 20.82500 NA
SOURCES: South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin, Various issues 1982-90
Central Bank of Swaziland Quarterly Review, Various issues 1983-1990
Central Bank of Swaziland Annual Report, Various issues 1988-1990




Goods Market Data for the Regression Sample (Transformed)
obs XSWGDP XSWGOV XSAINT XSAGDP XRER XSWBOT
80.1 .NA .NA .NA .NA .NA .NA
80.2 .NA .NA .NA .NA 0.283593 19.04160
80.3 .NA .NA .NA 57.13217 0.315825 -8.708614
80.4 .NA .NA -4.016856 55.52542 0.329508 -46.79503
81.1 .NA .NA -1.931650 53.84410 0.320078 -44.90341
81.2 54.80880 9.204425 0.852295 59.51108 0.329177 0.462756
81.3 54.80880 9.204425 0.751383 57.21978 0.345194 -9.834520
81.4 54.80880 9.204425 2.595810 56.61479 0.305889 -37.67618
82.1 57.43380 10.55443 4.446570 53.29869 0.310323 -33.95015
82.2 56.27093 9.956375 1.172782 54_98654 0.288469 -7.090999
82.3 56.27093 9.956375 4.268187 58.76162 0.322998 -21.69701
82.4 56.27093 9.956375 1.243181 56.89698 0.398528 -43.41868
83.1 55.97092 9.531376 -2.016430 53.03058 0.425927 -41.34282
83.2 56.10383 9.719650 3.559998 56.89977 0.378112 -56.07286
83.3 56.10383 9.719650 4.793234 56.23999 0.402157 31.74785
83.4 56.10383 9.719650 6.469906 56.38631 0.354448 -39.15599
84.1 59.35383 11.21965 6.755687 60.83143 0.381075 -43.71452
84.2 57.91407 10.55515 4.949178 58.22918 0.369304 -3.691104
84.3 57.91407 10.55515 8.476223 58.42271 0.305398 -13.43073
84.4 57.91407 10.55515 6.317240 59.47751 0.290359 -34.30485
85.1 60.36408 11.33015 4.641856 57.58557 0.309439 -40.33890
85.2 59.27873 10.98683 1.485767 55.80191 0.276235 21.87082
85.3 59.27873 10.98683 0.108210 57.40720 0.150727 -29.24288
85.4 59.27873 10.98683 -2.148631 58.87974 0.215733 -56.34957
86.1 68.67872 11.21183 -3.287164 54.19208 0.307455 -38.50619
86.2 64.51453 11.11215 -1.580063 56.10579 0.191494 -2.871378
86.3 64.51453 11.11215 -3.428271 57.69801 0.313881 15.68888
86.4 64.51453 11.11215 -3.074549 58.75263 0.288756 -10.16169
87.1 64.26453 9.687149 -1 .620288 . 58.48337 0.291838 -48.96061
87.2 64.37528 10.31843 -2.647395 58.65992 0.290969 28.21944
87.3 64.37528 10.31843 -1.609180 61. 76510 0.291624 4.520219
87.4 64.37528 10.31843 -1.118737 59.83898 0.268803 -42.58263
88.1 73.75028 11.76843 1.424849 59.17857 0.239588 -10.28369
88.2 69.59715 11.12608 1.978593 62.09591 0.260838 -17.74969
88.3 69.59715 11.12608 2.729686 65.29631 0.240719 0.838951
88.4 69.59715 11.12608 4.020436 62.13314 0.244801 .NA
89.1 74.72215 11.97608 2.966969 60.55787 0.252594 .NA
89.2 72.45178 11.59953 2.732846 62.59861 0.258034 .NA
89.3 72.45178 11.59953 2.405596 .NA 0.258842 .NA
89.4 72.45178 11.59953 4.355975 .NA 0.285648 .NA
90.1 .NA .NA 4.275525 .NA 0.264930 .NA
SOURCES: South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin, Various issues 1982-90
Central Bank of Swaziland Quarterly Review, Various issues 1983-1990
Central Bank of Swaziland Annual Report, Various issues 1988-1990
International Financial Statistics (Monthly), Various issues 1983-1989
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Table A.3 Asset Market Data for the Regression Sample
obs SWINTR SAINTR WINTR SWBNDR SWSAVR RER
80.1 .NA .NA -3.037619 .NA 77.78982 0.569270
80.2 .NA .NA -5.483000 .NA 75.12846 0.535779
80.3 -1. 743250 -3.458430 -1.794910 11.68513 82.60447 0.553175
80.4 -10.63423 -5.548940 -1.489229 11.19553 76.25698 0.574565
81.1 -12.57692 -4.389830 -0.326780 10.58451 62.32395 0.574611
81.2 -12.21325 -1.092400 0.064930 10.07035 67.50419 0.583730
81.3 -7.839161 0.267450 2.537320 9.791531 64.33225 0.603786
81.4 0.743950 2.714290 3.137020 9.928985 72.41949 0.573366
82.1 0.911970 5.649000 2.175270 9.401094 64.03440 0.564324
82.2 5.201001 3.675289 3.242644 9.171624 72.46377 0.538465
82.3 6.436490 5.896340 2.585310 8.776643 71.89781 0.561538
82.4 5.613540 3.855260 3.133782 8.834680 73.18148 0.647290
83.1 -1.559030 -0.308550 5.673060 8.135318 64.27605 0.712676
83.2 6.609459 3.423310 5.866417 8.461647 69.88036 0.693828
83.3 8.875913 6.309760 4.636941 8.377257 86.62207 0.709522
83.4 1.321091 9.265130 3.825686 7.886650 84.06801 0.668766
84.1 7.174560 10.86014 3.558715 7.645910 77.96092 0.677338
84.2 2.477131 9.760220 3.472604 7.391617 84.55090 0.669365
84.3 9.080260 12.80000 5.719812 7.122908 95.55684 0.601927
84.4 6.360210 11.98764 4.528898 6.552017 85.50956 0.557013
85.1 5.952379 9.952380 6.538518 6.330256 77.07693 0.556196
85.2 4.640720 5.894671 5.007906 6.141294 83.43283 0.522629
85.3 1.227350 2.719549 4.806171 7.762861 94.21852 0.382252
85.4 4.208060 -0.943870 5.581236 7.456000 78.49412 0.385071
86.1 3.902570 -3.705299 6.655470 7.261229 78.27681 0.478041
86.2 5.295022 -3.221510 6.859037 7.231401 86.49018 0.403266
86.3 2.269970 -4.855400 6.887150 9.223009 97.43362 0.492527
86.4 1.488240 -5.225491 7.153249 8.835947 85.84146 0.506945
87.1 1.901283 -3.935181 6.105365 8.692280 86.90611 0.516414
87.2 -1.592150 -4.390680 4.596061 8.389879 96.76295 0.519741
87.3 -0.264729 -3.554251 5.007144 11.02200 90.69505 0.521869
87.4 -2.207930 -2.693270 4.615265 10.37946 89.38641 0.499991
88.1 -2.249820 0.231731 5.191267 10.18908 92.74741 0.461084
88.2 -0.006789 2.081250 3.648920 9.933987 104.4821 0.465099
88.3 0.780950 3.651680 5.379652 10.18981 111.4905 0.446758
88.4 7.750369 5.638130 5.543879 10.07620 110.6634 0.442715
89.1 3.708449 5.464660 4.664511 9.584638 131.1471 0.448717
89.2 4.085700 5.153690 4.677613 9.326994 142.1660 0.456816
89.3 2.994920 4.688680 4.717119 9.090568 135.9770 0.461212
89.4 0.214270 6.433060 6.718066 8.746899 .NA 0.489965
90.1 2.282220 7.125370 6.680016 8.488115 .NA 0.481984
SOURCES: South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin, Various issues 1982-90
Central Bank of Swaziland Quarterly Review, Various issues 1983-1990
Central Bank of Swaziland Annual Report, Various issues 1988-1990
International Financial Statistics (Monthly), Various issues 1983-1989
Table A.4 Miscellaneous Data: Price Indices and Inflation Rates
obs SAINF SWINF SAPRIC SWPRIC UKPRIC
80.1 13.67178 .NA 94.40000 92.30000 94.50000
80.2 14.05099 .NA 97.40000 97.30000 99.97752
80.3 12.95843 11.24325 101.7000 102.9000 102.1505
80.4 15.04894 20.13423 106.4000 107.4000 104.0445
81.1 15.88983 23.07692 109.4000 113.6000 106.3000
81.2 15.09240 22.71325 112.1000 119.4000 111.5000
81.3 15.73255 19.33916 117.7000 122.8000 113.4000
81.4 14.28571 12.75605 121.6000 121.1000 116.2000
82.1 14.35100 12.58803 125.1000 127.9000 118.2000
82.2 16.32471 9.798999 130.4000 131.1000 121.9000
82.3 14.10366 11.56351 134.3000 137.0000 122.5000
82.4 14.14474 12.38646 138.8000 136.1000 123.4000
83.1 14.30855 15.55903 143.0000 147.8000 124.0000
83.2 12.57669 8.390541 146.8000 142.1000 126.5000
83.3 11.69024 9.124087 150.0000 149.5000 128.2000
83.4 10.73487 16.67891 153.7000 158.8000 129.6000
84.1 10.13986 10.82544 157.5000 163.8000 130.4000
84.2 11.23978 17.52287 163.3000 167.0000 133.1000
84.3 12.20000 15.91974 168.3000 173.3000 134.2000
84.4 13.01236 18.63979 173.7000 188.4000 135.9000
85.1 15.04762 19.04762 181.2000 195.0000 137.6000
85.2 16.10533 20.35928 189.6000 201.0000 142.3000
85.3 16.28045 17.77265 195.7000 204.1000 142.7000
85.4 17.44387 12.79194 204.0000 212.5000 143.4000
86.1 19.20530 11.89743 216.0000 218.2000 144.5000
86.2 17.72151 9.004978 223.2000 219.1000 146.3000
86.3 18.85540 10.73003 232.6000 226.0000 146.4000
86.4 18.72549 11.01176 242.2000 235.9000 148.4000
87.1 16.43518 9.898717 251.5000 239.7990 150.2000
87.2 16.89068 13.39215 260.9000 248.4422 152.4650
87.3 16.05425 12.06473 269.9422 253.2663 152.8897
87.4 15.19327 14.00793 278.9981 268.9447 154.4469
88.1 13.76827 14.24982 286.1272 273.9699 155.1547
88.2 12.91875 13.10679 294.6050 281.0050 158.9769
88.3 12.34832 12.61905 303.2755 285.2261 161.1004
88.4 12.36187 7.249631 313.4875 288.4422 164.3564
89.1 13.53534 10.49155 324.8555 302.7136 167.1877
89.2 14.84631 10.01430 338.3430 309.1457 172.0009
89.3 15.31132 11.20508 349.7110 317.1859 173.5581
89.4 14.56694 14.28573 359.1530 329.6483 177.0972
90.1 13.87463 12.21778 369.9280 339.6985 180.2116
SOURCES: South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin, Various issues 1982-90
Central Bank of Swaziland Quarterly Review, Various issues 1983-1990
Central Bank of Swaziland Annual Report, Various issues 1988-1990
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